Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Consequence Management Operations

U.S. Marine Corps

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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FORWARD

1. PURPOSE. Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-33B, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Consequence Management Operations is a "work in progress". It is designed specifically to get useful reference information into the hands of the operating forces as specific doctrine continues to develop. It provides guidance concerning the MOOTW missions of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and consequence management (CM) for commanders and staff planners. This publication should be used in exercises and operations, its content assessed, criticized, and recommendations made for its eventual improvement and inclusion as formal doctrine in this area is developed.

1. SCOPE. MCRP 3-33B provides guidance to Marine forces, which deploy assessment, planning and mitigation capabilities to a regional CINC, whose mission is to respond to foreign humanitarian assistance and consequence management operations. It defines Marine operating force response to FHA/CM operations, provides reference to existing policy, addresses organizational and interagency coordination, as well as provides planning considerations, and organizational options for execution. This manual also includes reference material and case studies for consideration and should be read by all commanders and staff planners with the potential to support FHA/CM operations.

3. SUPERCESSION. None.

4. CERTIFICATION. Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1000. Purpose. This handbook provides guidance to Marine forces, which deploy assessment, planning and mitigation capabilities in response to the MOOTW missions of foreign humanitarian assistance and consequence management operations (FHA/CM).

1001. Background. The commonality of these MOOTW missions lends them to articulation in one publication. Each has potential to deal with the effects of disaster, each requires rapid assessment to shape a force with diverse capabilities, each requires the military force to potentially deal with a multitude of agencies, contractors, governmental and non-governmental organizations common to complex contingencies.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) is not a new mission. It is defined in Joint Doctrine (JP 3-07.6/JP 3.0) as: Operations conducted to relieve or reduce the results of disaster brought on by either natural (flood, drought, fire, hurricane) or manmade (civil violence, nuclear, biological or chemical accident) causes, or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. It is generally limited in scope and duration: it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies with primary responsibility for providing assistance.

Consequence Management (CM) is a new mission. It is the response to (1) deliberate or inadvertent release of CBRN contaminants or (2) the viable threat of release of CBRN contaminants. The mission evolved from Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39 and 62 which directed the development of effective capabilities for managing the consequence of terrorist use of NBC material. It involves planning actions and preparations to identify, organize, equip, and train emergency response forces and to develop and execute plans implemented in response to radiological accidents or accidents/incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (accidents included per JP3.0; intentional employment (incidents) included as per CJSCI 3214.01): and the actions following such an accident to mitigate and recover from the effects of the accident. CM may be planned and executed for locations ***at home and abroad*** within US owned territory and in foreign countries as directed by the NCA (JP 3-0). CJSCI 3214.01, on Foreign Consequence Management tasks Geographic CINCS to develop plans for CM, recognizes the functional similarity of CM with humanitarian assistance missions, and recommends Geographic CINCS use existing Humanitarian Assistance plans and response force structure as the basis for planning.

Domestic Support Operations* As per JP 3.0, Domestic Support Operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, and normally are taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of civil authorities. DSO can be as diverse as temporary augmentation of essential services during labor strikes, restoration of law and order in the aftermath of a natural disaster, or providing relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

*(**NOTE:** *While CM in the context of CONUS based situations would not necessarily involve Marine Operating Forces, the potential for involvement in Domestic Support Operations exists. The emphasis of this publication is on foreign operations which most likely would involve Marine Operating Forces. For additional guidance regarding DSO operations, refer to FM 100-19/FM-FM 7-10)*

1002. Threat. MCDP 1, *Warfighting* underscores the importance of pitting strength against weakness. Our potential enemies are becoming less traditional, and will employ asymmetrical means to create conditions favorable to achieving their goals. This results not in attacks against well trained conventional forces, but attacks against vulnerable infrastructure, communications capability, and even innocent civilian populace to further their objectives. Increased access to technology, the potential to construct, or even purchase outright, weapons of mass destruction, is frustrating efforts to limit proliferation. There is an increasing potential for terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction by non-state terrorist organizations, as evidenced by the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. Potential remains for future commercial industrial accidents or sabotage as occurred with the release of methyl-isocyanate in Bhophal, India resulting in significant loss of life. The continued threat of these intentional and inadvertent man-made disasters, combined with the normal frequency of natural disasters which occur throughout the globe, underscore the need for Marine forces to be sensitive to the potential for involvement in Incident Response in the future.

The immediate effects of such a crisis can result in thousands of deaths, tens of thousands of causalities and hundreds of thousands of refugees. The initial response requirement to this type of crisis overwhelms most local and state governments anywhere in the world and national governments in all but a select few countries. Initial responders are normally local police and fire departments supported by civilian volunteers, local military, civil defense and emergency medical personnel. The workload rapidly outpaces the capability of initial responders. Local hospitals become inundated with sick, injured and dying patients and, if strict decontamination procedures are not followed, these facilities fall victim to contamination themselves. Personnel in contaminated zones require immediate evacuation to clean areas once their shelter, food sources, water or sanitation facilities become contaminated.

The JTF tasked with a responding to such an incident must be an organization with diverse capabilities. It must deal with a multitude of U.S. Agencies, civilian contractors, international governmental organizations (IGO), private voluntary organizations (PVO), Non-governmental humanitarian organizations (NGO), Other Governmental organizations (OGO) Coalition or Allied Military units, Host nation organizations and potentially those commercial/industrial organizations involved in the event of a commercial/industrial disaster. Maximum participation of the agencies will be required to ensure understanding of requirements and capabilities available.

1003. Policy and Key References. Policy references addressing FHA and CM are provided below. As these functions relate to DSO, relevant references are provided in appendix H.

a. DOD directive 5100.46 Foreign Disaster Relief, had long established policy guidance for Foreign Humanitarian assistance operations. It describes FHA as prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims and includes humanitarian services and transportation, to include provision of food, clothing, beds and bedding, temporary shelter and housing, medical material and medical and technical services and essential services restoration. Foreign disasters may result from acts of nature or acts of man. DOD policy permits military components to participate in FHA operations in response to these disasters only at the direction of the President, upon request from the Department of State and in emergency situations in order to save lives. Sections 402, 2547 and 2551 of title 10, USC, and the Annual DOD Appropriation Act extend DOD authority and funding to donate and transport humanitarian relief supplies worldwide.

b. Policy addressing the need to for CM capability originated with Presidential/National Security Council Decision Directive (PDD/NSC) 39:*"The United States shall give the highest priority to developing capabilities to….manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical materials or weapons use by terrorists."* PDD/NSC 39 tasked the DOS as the lead agent for OCONUS CM operations and tasked DOD to develop plans to assist in this effort.

c. PDD/NSC 56 further addressed the interagency process for dealing with Complex Contingency Operations. CJCS Instruction 3214.01 defined foreign CM as the USG's interagency assistance to mitigate damage resulting from the employment of a WMD. Geographic CINC's have now expanded this definition to include natural or accidental occurrences that cause the release of a nuclear, chemical or biological agent that would cause similar effects. Emerging joint doctrine, Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Operations in NBC Environments, (Draft) also indicates the Joint Force Commander must plan for in-theater NBC Consequence management.

1004. Types of Missions. The type of missions to which Marine Forces will respond would include, but are not limited to the following:

Relief missions – designed to deliver or facilitate the prompt delivery of aid to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims.

Dislocated civilian missions - which might include organizing camps, provision of care, and placement or relocation to other more permanent camps, locations or countries (Note: this mission can rapidly increase in scope/duration)

Security missions - which establish and maintain conditions under which humanitarian assistance can be provided.

Technical assistance and support functions - which provide restoration of infrastructure or communications, provide humanitarian de-mining, provide emergency medical care, manage relief resupply, or high priority relief delivery until normal delivery means can be established or re-established.

CM missions: Efforts to mitigate effects of WMD/manage effects of CBRN material contamination.

Combination of any of the above.

1005. Response. Any USG response to FHA/CM will be interagency in nature, with the DOS assuming lead agency position OCONUS (FEMA/FBI in CONUS) and DOD in a supporting role. The forward deployed posture of operating forces, coupled with ability to rapidly deploy forces from CONUS into theater, make military forces the response of choice for OCONUS FHA/CM operations. Marine Corps response to FHA/CM missions will normally comprise an expeditionary force task organized for initial response and mitigation – which will eventually turn over to a more robust capability should the mission requirement exceed the capability in terms of size, scope or duration. Marine operating forces response to these scenarios would be scaleable in nature, from providing a narrowly focused technical presence to participating in full-blown JTF organized along functional lines with or without heavy contractor augmentation. It may require the organization of a coalition with a number of allied nations, or merely providing augmentation to a pre-existing allied headquarters (e.g.: NATO).

(1) **Immediate Response**: Immediate response is any form of immediate action taken by a DOD component or military commander under the authority of DODD 3025.1 and any supplemental guidance prescribed by the head of a department of defense component, to assist civil authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions occurring where there has not been any declaration of catastrophic or major disaster or emergency by the president or attack. A military commander at the scene of a foreign humanitarian disaster may undertake prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. The commander should report at once the action taken and request guidance. Reimbursement of funds expended under these circumstances is not assured. Responding elements must track costs incurred by maintaining detailed records of expenditures, and provide detailed billing information to support their reimbursement for supplies an/or services provided in support of foreign disaster relief.

(2) **Response**: Activities to address the immediate and short-term effects of an emergency or disaster. Response includes immediate action to save lives, protect property, and meet basic needs. Marine operating forces respond to FHA/CM in five phases:

- Initial Assessment.

Formation and deployment of an assessment team will normally characterize the first participation by Marine Operating forces, unless the scenario occurs in close proximity to forward deployed forces capable of providing immediate response. A team may be deployed to support CINC assessment in anticipation of pending disaster, or to advise the CINC in the instance of a developing situation where a request for assistance from the host nation has not yet been made, but is anticipated.

If Marine Forces are subsequently tasked to provide a response force in support of an emerging disaster (FHA and/or CM), the early stages of that response would be in the form of an assessment team. The assessment team frames the

requirement/identifies required capabilities, as well as identifies to the executive agent in theater those tasks which may exceed the capability of the responding force, thus requiring major contract support.

- **Immediate Assistance** would be carried out by the response force to assist the host nation in reducing/mitigating the initial effects of the disaster (FHA and/or CM).

- **Extended Operations** continue efforts to assist the host nation, accept follow-on forces designated to augment/expand the effort, and begin transition efforts.

- **Disengagment/Handover** occur once the responding force has met its stated measures of effectiveness, achieved its endstate, or a follow-on force, agency, or contractor capable of assuming the response force role has been established in theater.

- **Redeployment** will occur once transition has been completed to include the identification of remain behind forces, if any.

1006. Implications of Domestic Support Operations: By definition, FHA operations are limited to those which occur outside the continental United States, its possessions and territories**,** however, ***potential exists for CM operations to occur domestically.*** Domestic support operations are essentially the responsibility of U.S. Joint Forces Command and normally would emphasize Army and National Guard forces. However, such domestic incidents might involve CONUS based Marine Corps installations, or facilities in proximity to Marine Corp forces which could require an initial response before formal assignment of the mission can be made through the appropriate chain. While agency coordination for domestic support operations is different from those occurring OCONUS, the specific functions, the necessity for coordination and the actions taken to mitigate domestic incidents are as applicable domestically as they would be OCONUS. Hence, the commander should be aware of the potential to conduct CM operations in CONUS, as well as in a foreign country

1007. Principles of MOOTW Operations. There are six principles of MOOTW that apply to FHA/CM missions. Careful consideration of these principles can help ensure success and minimize losses. These principles are as follows:

- Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable **objective**.

- Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose.

- Security is always important and depends on never permitting hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.

- MOOTW may require **restraint** in order to apply appropriate military capabilities prudently.

- Perseverance allows for measured protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

- Committed forces must sustain the **legitimacy** of the operation and the host government, where applicable.

1008. Considerations For Conduct Of Humanitarian Action In Armed Conflict. Joint Pub 3-07 also cites eight considerations for conduct of humanitarian assistance developed by The Humanitarianism and War Project of the Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University.

A. Relieving Life-Threatening Suffering: Humanitarian action should be directed toward the relief of immediate, life-threatening suffering.

B. Proportionality to Need: Humanitarian action should correspond to the degree of suffering, wherever it occurs. It should affirm the view that life is as precious in one part of the globe as another.

C. Nonpartisanship: Humanitarian action responds to human suffering because people are in need, not to advance political, sectarian, or other agendas. It should not take sides in conflicts.

D. Independence: In order to fulfill their mission, humanitarian organizations should be free of interference from home or host political authorities. Humanitarian space is essential for effective action.

E. Accountability: Humanitarian organizations should report fully on their activities to sponsors and beneficiaries. Humanitarianism should be transparent.

F. Appropriateness: Humanitarian action should be tailored to local circumstances and aim to enhance, not supplant locally available resources.

G. Contextualization: Effective humanitarian action should encompass a comprehensive view of overall needs and of the impact of interventions. Encouraging respect for human rights and addressing the underlying causes of conflicts are essential elements.

H. Subsidiary of Sovereignty: Where humanitarianism and sovereignty clash, sovereignty should defer to the relief of life-threatening suffering.

CHAPTER 2

ORGANIZATIONS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR FHA/CM OPERATIONS

2000. GENERAL. In FHA/CM operations, the role of the host nation (HN) and of the Ambassador cannot be overemphasized. FHA/CM operations commence only after the HN makes a request for USG assistance. The Ambassador is responsible for all USG activities within the HN and interprets US policy and strategy relative to the HN. A MAGTF may very likely participate as a Service component of the JTF.

2001. FHA/CM TWO-FOLD FOCUS

A. In a traditional FHA operation, the Ambassador initiates the USG response with a "Disaster Declaration" and a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is dispatched from USAID. In a CM scenario the initial USG response is to send a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) from the DOS. The FEST (or DART) is an interagency group whose mission is to assess the scope of the disaster and the resultant needs and to recommend follow-up USG action (see OFDA Field Operating Guide (FOG)). The FEST or DART will already be in the HN when the first elements of a JTF arrives.



B. The Ambassador is the President's direct representative to the HN. DOS, (not DOD), will be the Lead Agency in FHA/CM. The JTF chain of command flows from the NCA via the CINC to the JTF. As the name implies the response will be Joint and draw on military, civilian and contractor assets of all the Services and agencies. Any JTF mission is likely to emphasize medical and other logistic shortfalls. The DOD JTF is especially valued for its C2 and logistics capabilities.

C. Defining the endstate is critical to transition and handover. To be successful, the JTF should fade out of the picture almost unnoticed as the HN's normal coping mechanism and infrastructure kicks in, or a combination of traditional relief agencies and/or contract efforts replace the military presence. JTF is not intended

to permanently replace the HN's normal infrastructure. The return to pre-incident normality is ultimately the HN's responsibility.

D. The JTF commander may operate with non-standard organizational relationships and accomplish non-standard tasks. In order to avoid getting bogged down, tactical decisions should be made with an eye to restore the HN's normal infrastructure. Although the JTF is in country to provide relief and not to provide long term remediation or development, a key underlying principal of "first do no harm" applies.

2002. Participants In Foreign Humanitarian Assistance or Consequence Management. As FHA/CM operations are complex, participating USMC units may come in contact with a number of individuals and organizations. The following are some of the key players.

A. **The Ambassador.** The Ambassador is responsible for all USG activities within the HN and interprets US policy and strategy relative to the HN. The Ambassador (Chief of Mission) is the direct representative of the President of the US. With the communications difficulties that occur during a disaster, the Ambassador is the individual who normally receives the request for assistance from the HN. The Ambassador can issue a Declaration of Disaster and can disburse up to $25,000 cash for immediate assistance. While the geographic combatant commander and JTF do not fall under the Ambassador's broad statutory authority, understanding and incorporating the Ambassador's political role is critical to the success of a JTF.

B. The Country Team. The country team is composed of the senior member of each department or agency of the USG that is represented in the HN. The Ambassador as Chief of the US diplomatic mission heads the country team. The country team concept encourages USG agencies to coordinate their efforts. The senior member of each agency on the country team has direct communication with and line of authority from the parent organization. A member may receive home agency instructions that conflict with the consensus of the country team. Important issue conflicts are resolved internally at the U.S. national level.

C. DART. Upon receipt of a Declaration of Disaster, (accidental or natural incident) USAID deploys a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to assist the Ambassador. The DART assesses the scope of the disaster's damage and assesses the initial needs of victims. The DART reports to the Ambassador (chief of mission) and to its parent agency (the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within USAID). OFDA provides its DART members with a Field Operations Guide (FOG) that is available on the inter-net. The FOG is a compact tool with very useful reference information to include a standard format for assessment reporting.

D. FEST. In CM scenarios involving intentional/malevolent use of WMD or CBRN material contamination, DOS deploys a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST). The FEST is an interagency team , which possesses CM peculiar capabilities. The

FEST reports to Ambassador once deployed to the Host Nation. The FEST once deployed, gives the Ambassador a C2 structure to deal with the crisis at hand.

E. THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOC). Prior to arrival of the advanced elements of a JTF, the country team will have been augmented by in-theatre SOC assets. This augmentation will normally supplement the Ambassador's communication capabilities and provide military Civil Affairs specialists to help with assessments.

F. National Command Authority (NCA)

When NCA decides to respond to an FHA/CM incident, a series of actions are put in motion. If the NCA chooses to employ military forces, CJCS alerts the AOR CINC of a potential FHA/CM mission. The AOR CINC alerts the relevant forces of a potential FHA/CM mission. Marine forces may be called upon to respond and/or provide the JTF command element. An example of the event sequence can be seen in Operation SEA ANGEL. Operation SEA ANGEL was triggered by Typhoon Marian which battered Bangladesh on 29-30 April 1991.

- 10 May, the NCA decided to deploy military forces.

- 11 May 1991, CINCPAC activated a JTF; the President announced that a JTF would be sent to Bangladesh.

- 12 May 1991, the CG of III MEF arrived in Bangladesh and established a JTF headquarters.

-15 May 5th MEB arrived off Bangladesh and commenced operations.

– 29 May 5th MEB accomplished emergency relief mission and departed.

-13 June the last JTF personnel departed on 13 June 1991.

A close reading of the SEA ANGEL case study (Appendix A), reveals that on 6 May 1991, the American Ambassador pre-staffed the issue of military support for the relief effort by official inquiry to CINC PACOM. This pre-staffing is not surprising. When a significant FHA/CM becomes widely visible, parallel pre-planning becomes prudent. However, no significant action occurs until directed by the NCA.

G. US Government Organizations

(1) National Security Council (NSC) advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy – domestic, foreign, military, and intelligence.

(2) Interagency Working Group (IWG) Develop policy as issues work their way to the President and, after the President's decision, ensure proper implementation.

(3) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the relief portion of USAID. USAID has both relief and development functions. OFDA is chartered to provide only relief efforts and is excluded by law from long term development effort. OFDA views the military as a "contractor" during FHA operations.

(4) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is provided by USAID. The DART assists the Ambassador in assessing the need for and extent of relief. The DART will be in place prior to the arrival of Marine Operating Forces.

(5) Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) comes from the DOS Office of Counter Tterrorism rather than USAID. The FEST is deployed for CM (CBRN release or viable threat). It provides the Ambassador with robust communication and other capabilities and allows the Ambassador to operate a 24 hour Command Center. It is made up of FBI, DOD, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), DOE, DOJ, DOS and scientific assets that help differentiate CM from similar man-made disasters and helps preserve evidence.

(6) DOD. The Military Attaché is part of the country team. The attaché can help military leaders with key cultural and political insights from a military view.

(a) SOC assets may arrive as part of an assessment and communications team or as part of a JSOTF prior to USMC advance elements of a JTF tasked with a FHA or CM mission.

(b) Tech Escort Units from the U S Army Soldiers Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) are units that have special skills in safely transporting a recovered WMD.

(c) Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) a USMC unit whose primary focus is to turn contaminated casualties into decontaminated patients. (For specific capabilities refer to Appendix I, CBIRF Organization, Capabilities, Employment, Deployment)

(d) A variety of technical experts with relevant specialties may come from CONUS after being provided by JFCOM. These experts may be attached individually or in units to USMC or other elements of the JTF.

(7) Department of Energy (DOE)

(a) The Nevada Test Site (NTS) operates the Federal Radiological Monitoring & Assessment Center (FRMAC) that deploys teams to identify the nature and extent of a radiological release. FRMAC provides dose assessment, aerial mapping of contamination, and contamination control recommendations.

(b) Oakridge National Laboratory (ORNL) operates a Hazardous Waste Remedial Action Program (HAZWRAP) which identify the nature and extent of industrial and/or radiological contamination. A USMC unit may work with HAZWRAP in order to remove a chemical or radiological obstacle impeding the FHA or CM mission.

(c) Other DOE facilities. The DOE has several other national laboratories as well as a variety contractors who might be made available for an appropriate task.

(8) Department of Justice (DOJ)

(a) Forensic scientist may help differentiate an incident from an accident

(b) FBI to recognize & preserve evidence in an incident

(9) Center for Disease Control (CDC)

(a) Identify, analyze, and confirm exotic biological contaminates

(b) Help contain traditional or exotic epidemics

(c) Use statistical means to quantify when morbidity and mortality return to normal ranges.

(10) Other Government Agencies. The USMC unit may find itself coordinating with a variety of USG agencies. Key elements from the lead agency for any of the 12 essential functions of the US Federal Response Plan could be assigned to the JTF or more likely to the embassy to support the FHA/CM mission (for more detail on the Federal Response Plan see Appendix F) .

D. **NonGovernment Organizations.** (NGOs)/Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO)'s. There a wide variety of NGO/PVOs and many will already be in country before the FHA/CM mission begins. Their interest is long term because they will remain after the FHA/CM mission ends. During the FHA/CM mission, the military and the NGO/PVO short-term objectives can be very similar. Within the local NGO/PVO community, the military commander may find either redundant resources or resources that offset shortfalls. The commander may also find that the local NGO/PVOs may not be true to the parent organizations avowed mission.

E. Contractors

Generally the commander will encounter three groups of contractors in an FHA/CM operations. The first is the provider of incidental local logistic support (ice, bottled water, porta-johns, cell phones, etc). The second is the forgotten contract who comes as technical support to military equipment or units. The third is the existing large contingency contract that may be in the AOR as a logistic or construction force or as a contamination clean up force. The third type contractor will be controlled by others but the USMC commander may need to draw support from or coordinate with contingency contractors. Due to the specialized fiefdoms within very large organizations, the DOD (or other USG agency) representative may not know about the existence of or the method for accessing existing large contractors within his/her own agency.

2003. ROLE OF CINC. The CINC establishes a JTF for specific missions. The CINC provides to and/or requests forces for the JTF appropriate to the mission.

A. JFC – refers to the Joint Force Commander who commands forces from more than one military department.

B. USJFCOM – US Joint Forces Command (formerly USACOM) is a force provider for DSO HA/CM operations. USJFCOM assigns appropriate forces to the CINC with OCONUS AORs. USJFCOM is responsible for developing and training appropriate CM forces.

C. Component Commanders with the CINC (MARFOR / NAVFOR / ARFOR/ AFFOR / *SOC*). The Service component commanders fund and administer forces sourced from of their own service that are assigned to the JTF. SOC component command may have a JSOTF on site to help the Ambassador with communications and assessment and to provide the JTF ADVON with RSO&I.

D. MARINE CORPS ROLE/CONTRIBUTIONS/ASSETS

(1) MEF – The MEF may be called upon to provide the JTF command element as well as a component forces.

(2) MEB - A MEB may be called upon to be the nucleus of small JTF for FHA/CM. It also may be called upon to lead a contractor heavy JTF for FHA/CM where host nation sensibilities severely limit the number of US military personnel who can be in country.

(3) MEU – A MEU can provide immediate assistance when a FHA/CM mission arises. The MEU can provide security, transportation, logistic support and can act as a JTF enabler. The MEU also possesses organic enhanced NBC capabilities, including force protection, limited detection, protective equipment and decontamination capabilities.

(4) CBIRF – CBIRF detects, identifies, and samples CBR-N hazards in order to safely extract victims from contaminated areas. Victims are

processed through ambulatory or non-ambulatory patient decontamination sites. CBIRF also possesses organic force protection and equipment decontamination capability, but does not conduct detailed equipment decontamination (DED) or area decontamination operations. If other decontamination assets are available, CBIRF will focus on detection, identification, and sampling as well as search and extraction operations, and medical triage.

(5) Civil Affairs - Civil affairs operations involve civil affairs specialists, US military and nonmilitary elements, host nation elements, and international agencies. MAGTF civil affairs assets are organized and trained in two Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs), located in the Reserves. They provide functional assistance to the MAGTF G-3/S-3.

(6) MARFORRES –MARFORRES has a full range of combat, combat support and combat service support units that could provide support but funding may be required.

E. EXECUTIVE AGENT.

An Executive Agent (typically delegated by either DOD or Service secretary) would have authority to support, coordinate common functions, direct, and control specified resources for a specific purpose (see JP1-02).

The executive agent funds the FHA/CM operation, typically subject to reimbursement. FHA/CM operations, whether dependent solely on military forces or involving extensive use of contractors, can quickly consume resources greater than the military commander's operating budget. Mission disruption is most likely, when a large portion of the FHA/CM work is performed by contractors and when effective monitoring coordination is not achieved. When the FHA/CM response places heavy reliance on contractors, the commander must first coordinate up the chain of command to assure adequate fund flow from the executive agent, and then stay apprised of the funding status of critical contracts.

2004. USG DOMESTIC TRADITION

The United States has a long tradition of local government control. Systems of mutual support for emergency services are well established at the local level. As mutual support resources are exhausted, higher echelons of government lend assistance to the affected locality. As State resources are exhausted and a disaster has been formally declared, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would respond to requests for federal assistance.. When needed, FEMA requests assistance from Director of Military Support (DOMS), for which the Army is executive agent.

For CM, the tradition is altered only slightly. Under Presidential Decision Document 39 (PDD 39), the FBI has the lead during Crisis Response and FEMA retains the lead for Consequence Management. There

is a Federal Response Plan (FRP) that assigns a primary USG agency for each of 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESF's). DoD is the primary for "Public Works & Engineering". (For discussion of federal response to DSO and a delineation of the emergency support functions, refer to Appendix H, Domestic Emergency Support Functions).

2005. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

A. The Ambassador coordinates with the Host Nation, reports to the President and controls the Country Team, the DART, and the FEST.

B. The JFC reports to the CINC and has operational control of assigned military forces, including military contractors, coordinates closely with the ambassador and US agencies; and coordinates with Host Nation, NGOs, PVOs, IGOs, and OGOs

C. Marine Forces component commander reports to the JFC. He coordinates his logistics requirements through theater level logistics agencies for Common User support, and COMMARFOR for support requirements beyond theater capability. His efforts in theater are closely coordinated with other JFC Service components, contractors, Host Nation representatives and the various agencies and organizations within his assigned area of operations.

D. NGO/PVO – Already in country

NGO/PVOs do not operate within the either the military or civilian governmental hierarchy. Their relationship with the USG is neither supported nor supporting. They are independent partners or associates with emphasis on the independent. They are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They are frequently on the scene before US forces arrive and will most likely remain long after military forces have departed.

On scene NGO/PVO often exercise an extraordinary degree of autonomy from their parent organization. They are diverse, flexible, and independent. In addition to the relief mission, they clearly may be influenced by long standing local NGO/PVO competition or by HN political concerns. The country team can help place NGO/PVO in context.

E. CMOC – A Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) or a Humanitarian Assistance Center (HAC) is a critical link in coordination with NGO/PVOs. A HAC or CMOC is an ad hoc organization established to coordinate the activities of USG organizations, PVO/NGO, and relevant HN agencies. If the organization of the USG response is primarily military, the ad hoc center is usually called a CMOC. If the USG relief response is predominantly civilian in character, it will probably be dubbed the HAC or HAOC.

The CMOC often serves as a clearing house for taskings. One NGO/PVO may bring a task "for the military" and find that another NGO/PVO has a resource available that can handle the task. The CMOC also translate the civilian request from a NGO/PVO into terms that more precisely match military terminology and thus the CMOC helps avoid unnecessary confusion.

The CMOC does not control the NGO/PVO with whom it works. The CMOC is a facilitation tool. A military briefing is given theater style with only those with information to pass speaking. NGO/PVO representatives are most comfortable in a circle where everyone gets to participate. Recognizing the comfort level needs of the NGO/PVO representatives is quickest way to get on with the mission of identifying and acting upon the common short-term objectives that have brought the military and NGO/PVO to the scene.

F. Contractors. Contractors are "controlled" by the administrative contracting officer, who will be guided in his/her duties by policies generated by the Joint Force contracting center. Joint publications also describe a Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) and a Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC). This function focuses on keeping the military contracting officers from bidding against each other and on the allocation of shortages. In FHA/CM scenarios this board would also be sensitive to excessive dislocations that might be caused by the presence of the military relief force.

CM is somewhat unique. CM contracting may heavily utilize several large pre-existing contracts. The Army and Air Force have large logistic contracts. The DOE and Army have large environmental clean up contracts and the Army and Navy have large construction contracts. The use of multiple major contracts often requires a "program management office" that manages schedule and the assignment of large tasks to the most appropriate contract vehicle. This program management function may be described in a CONPLAN as a "Joint Contract Control Cell" or a "Joint Program Control Cell".

PVO/NGO are also potential "contractors" although there may not be an exchange of funds.

G. Domestic Support Operations (DSO). DSO is addressed extensively in other references. The basic rule of thumb is that (1) FEMA is in charge anywhere that *posse comitatus* applies and (2) FEMA is not allowed to go to the CINCs AOR.

Installations traditionally have mutual support agreements with the local government. Fire Departments and HAZMAT teams are classic examples. When requested the by the locals the Fire Department assists the community or vice versa. These situations are usually governed by prior formal agreements. Irrespective of agreements, a commander can render immediate emergency aid at his/her own command's expense.

Normal civilian disaster recovery operations draw on local civilian resources (including civilian to civilian mutual aid) until they are exhausted. As the local resources are exhausted, State resources are called into play. If the disaster overwhelms its resources, the State requests Federal assistance that is coordinated by the federal lead agency, FEMA. When FEMA determines there is a mission needing DOD assets, it coordinates through the DOD Office of Domestic Support Operations. The ODSO tasks the appropriate military agency.

Domestic Consequence Management operation relationships were adjusted slightly by PDD 39. FEMA remains the lead agency for picking up the pieces after the release of a WMD, "Consequence Management" while the FBI is the lead agency for "Crisis Response". The FBI focuses on preventing the release and/or gather evidence. The

domestic focus of DoD's CM effort is USJFCOM's Joint Task Force –Civil Support (JTF-CS) in Norfolk, VA.

CHAPTER 3

PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

3000. Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)– Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning* provides guidance for preparing for and entering into a joint operation with a FHA/CM Mission. MCWP 5-1 provides a framework to think, reason, and organize thought, that can be used to plan operations at all levels across the spectrum of conflict, and is compatible with joint processes. Key to our requirements here, the process is useful in providing a framework for planning all operations and in preparing Marine Forces to participate in Joint Operations.

3001. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS. Marine Corps forces are not specifically designed for humanitarian relief missions. However, the unique ability of the Marine Corps to task-organize to perform humanitarian assistance and consequence management missions is recognized by combatant commanders. Employing Marine Corps capabilities may not be the most efficient or cost-effective means of response, but in some situations the Marine Corps will be the only organization with the assets capable of rapid response. To assist in planning the military response, a generic list of information requirements may be prepared in advance and modified as the situation warrants (refer to Appendix D for lists of questions). Primary among them would be: (1) specific assistance requested by the HN; and (2) HN limitations on US military footprint. When tasked to perform the missions referenced in this manual, the prime planning guidelines for employment of military support are:

- Only do those things that other agencies cannot and will not do.
- Determine early in planning and assessment:
    - How long tasks must be done
    - Who will replace you
    - What your political and military objectives are
    - Whether adequate resources will be available
    - What your endstate will be

3002. CM Considerations. Indications and Warnings (I&W), such as earthquakes, floods and famines often precede Foreign Humanitarian Assistance missions. In contrast, CM events may occur with little or no notice and require immediate response. If a CM event results from the intentional release of a WMD or CBR-N material, there is a requirement to counter the threat. Counter-terrorist (CT) forces will be assigned to deal with the threat. CM forces will focus on the CM mission and coordinate their actions with CT forces. Although many of the same tasks must be performed during a CM mission as in a Humanitarian Assistance mission, the added dimension of a contaminated environment significantly increases the difficulty of planning and executing a CM mission.

The CM mission involves mitigation of conditions that result in loss of life and significant property damage. It is not the intention of the USG to conduct long-term remediation as part of a CM mission.

The unique requirements of CM planning and execution result from its CBR-N nature. Examples include pre-deployment medical base-lining of JTF members, plume modeling of

CBR-N contaminated areas, exclusion of personnel from the Hot Zone and personnel decontamination. Reachback to tactical scientists provides the JTF with the expertise it needs to deal with CBR-N agents outside the scope of military expertise. Additionally, the JTF must coordinate execution of a CM mission with the U.S. ambassador/chief of mission to the affected country and numerous USG organizations and agencies involved in a U.S. response to a CM event.

The six step Joint Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process offers a framework for a rapid DOD response to a CM event. Marine forces assigned to conduct a CM mission as a Joint Task Force (JTF) will conduct CAP Phase III, including mission analysis and Course of Action (COA) development/comparison/ decision. The JTF will submit a Commander's Estimate to the regional CINC that includes the JTF commander's recommended COA. Ultimately, NCA will select/approve the COA for the mission.

During initial planning, it is critical for the JTF to determine its end-state and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). Once in-theater, it is critical for the JTF to regularly communicate this end-state to all parties involved in the response, especially the Host Nation. MOEs provide measures of mission success or failure and provide indications that it is time to shift to the next phase of the CM operation. MOEs are critical to defining end-state and facilitating transition of functions to the Host Nation or other responsible agency. Rapid accomplishment of the CM mission allows the JTF to re-deploy as soon as possible in order to be ready for further tasking.

3003. FHA Considerations – A detailed model for planning MOOTW missions has been provided as Appendix D).

A. Foreign Political Operating Environment. It is important to remember that, in situations where we are supporting a friendly foreign government, we do not want to be seen as pushing that governmental entity aside. The lawful government must be viewed as the responsible authority — and our military forces are viewed strictly in a supporting role.

B. Assessment Methodology. Assessments in humanitarian emergencies are an important way to improve relief efforts. The purpose of an assessment is to:

- review the relief situation or disaster's effects
- identify the victims' needs
- recommend appropriate actions to meet these needs

C. Situation and Needs Assessment. In order to understand what must be done and what is expected of responding Marine Forces a complete understanding of the situation must be obtained. Obtaining permission to send an assessment team is an essential first step. The team follows a four-step process**:** (1) data collection, (2) problem analysis, (3) reporting and (4) follow-up activities to smooth the arrival of Marine forces into the area. A general assessment checklist is provided in Appendix D.

3004. Assessment and Liaison. Assessments assist in designing the right task organization for an incident response. In the event of an incident, an assessment or liaison team is requested by a regional CINC and then sent to the incident area in

order to evaluate how Marine capabilities can be integrated with the needs and with other Forces as designated by the CINC. See Appendix C.

A. Right Aid. The assessment team will typically identify what aid is needed to save lives and preserve property. It is important to note that not all relief aid is useful. Unneeded aid (such as blankets in warm weather), unusable aid (such as expired medication or with labels in another language) and less important items (such as clothing) that are shipped to an incident area can have a negative impact on the relief effort. Unnecessary items are a burden to the logistics system and can divert attention and effort from the most urgent needs. For example, an unneeded shipment of relief supplies can result in misuse of scarce transportation assets, disrupt the incident area's local economy, and cause congestion at ports, airfields, roads and disaster sites. Furthermore, relief aid that is not delivered in a timely manner or which is halted prematurely can have a devastating effect on the morale of the people the Force was sent to support. This can greatly complicate the mission, turn the local populace against the military, and/or threaten the ultimate success of the mission.

B. Responsibility for Providing Aid. Although nonmilitary agencies have primary responsibility for providing aid in humanitarian emergencies, the military must be viewed within its proper context. Military support can provide a number of unique capabilities to support the effort during humanitarian emergencies.

- If the incident is in a foreign country, the host nation has responsibility for taking actions towards recovery. Host nation efforts are often augmented by UN agencies, NGOs and PVOs.

- In the U.S., the responsibility belongs to state governments and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

- In a humanitarian emergency, other agencies will be conducting assessments of the complete effects of the situation and the entire spectrum of relief needs. This highlights the fact that the military will normally only be involved when the urgency of need requires or when the specific need cannot or will not be performed by another agency, whether host nation or private. The military assessment should primarily be focused on identifying relief needs not being met by other agencies.

3005. Objective of Military Assessments. The objective of assessments is to identify potential roles for the military in relief operations (options). This may include collecting sufficient information for military commanders (often at higher headquarters) and civilian leaders to make informed decisions on which roles to undertake. Understand that the desires of the HN may limit the scope of support operations, or conversely exceed the scope of what would reasonably be considered mitigation, regardless of the assessed need. Accordingly, military assessments should answer these five key questions.

1. What are the relief needs of the population that other agencies do not have the capability to meet?

a. This is important within the framework of the military's role as providing *only* that support that other agencies cannot.

b. In some instances, other agencies may not be responding to needs, but are in the process of setting up assistance programs, in which case military assistance of the same kind might be unnecessary (or only required for a very short period).

2. Are potential roles for meeting the needs within the capabilities of the military?

    a. The US military is able to deploy and support large numbers of forces because it has many resources and capabilities.

    b. To determine whether or not the right capabilities exist, the information in assessments on potential roles must be specific (e.g., types of medical aid required).

3. What will be the effect of not providing such assistance?

    a. Will the complete relief effort fail, resulting in widespread suffering?

    b. This is important for considering the costs of not responding.

4. What are the options for the military to meet the needs or facilitate others to do so?

    a. For example, when faced with a shortage of food in an area, a military unit could provide MREs, transport relief agency provisions, or repair roads to the area.

5. How long will military assistance be required?

    a. To help a commander decide on options, an assessment should include an estimate of how long the military roles will be required and what the desired end-state will be.

    b. In most cases, either the roles will diminish (e.g., search and rescue becomes less important 72 hours after an earthquake), tasks are completed (e.g., a bridge is built), or someone else takes over responsibility (e.g., transporting supplies).

3006. Assessing the Situation. Understanding the scale and nature of the emergency is critical. A number of assessments will be conducted by various agencies. The assessment the CINC conducts may refer to these (note: while other assessments may exist – they should only augment – never supplant the need for the CINC/JTF/MAGTF commander to conduct their own assessments). Understanding is important so specific unmet needs can

be viewed in context. Information may be available from other assessments completed by other USG agencies prior to military force arrival.

• For foreign emergencies, the *U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)* sends out *Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs)* to coordinate the U.S. government's response.

- If a disaster is of sufficient magnitude to require military support, OFDA will usually be present (In a CBR-N emergencies, FEST would be present in lieu of a DART).

- It may also be useful to talk to officials from the American Embassy, host nation ministries, disaster coordination centers, United Nations agencies, and NGOs.

- FEMA has the lead role in mitigation of domestic emergencies.. It establishes a *Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)* to help coordinate USG relief efforts for disasters. When there is military involvement, the FCO coordinates with military units through a *Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)*. If officials from those agencies cannot provide the information, they will usually be able to provide points of contact of those who can (The FBI is lead agency prior to the need for mitigation in CBR-N operations).

3007. Identifying Potential Military Roles. In addition to specific guidance provided by the CINC, valuable information on potential military roles in the relief effort may be offered by USG agencies operating in theater to CINC/JTF/MAGTF LNOs. There are two complementary ways to approach this information.
Approach One:

- First identify unmet relief needs (e.g., food or water). Ask those knowledgeable about the situation (e.g., OFDA, NGO, etc.) to identify unmet needs. In many cases, they may have participated in coordination meetings in which relief needs were identified and no one was able to meet them. Examine needs in each major category (e.g., food, water) to determine whether mutually agreed upon and specified standards of aid are being met.

- After identifying unmet needs, determine *why* those needs are not being met. If, for example, a distant town was struck by a typhoon, an initial assessment may indicate that the residents lack food. Assessing "why" may show that the villagers cannot buy food because a bridge on the only road leading to the area has been destroyed. The government can neither move heavy equipment into the area to repair the bridge, nor transport food from government stocks or other markets because they lack helicopters capable of doing so. The "why" information helps identify options for potential roles —transport food with helicopters, make temporary bridge repairs, and/or transport contractors to the area to rebuild the bridge.

Approach two:

- This approach involves determining potential problems in the relief efforts most familiar to the U.S. military. In many cases, the most important, military-unique contribution may be interim infrastructure and essential services restoration—ports, airfields, roads, bridges, and utilities—that comprise and support the relief distribution system.

- The military can facilitate provision of relief by other agencies. (e.g. making vital, minor, temporary repairs that allow others to provide relief, or provide temporary transport, especially heavy rotary wing lift).

3008. Collecting Information. Assessments should rapidly identify the most urgent military tasks first. This requires prioritizing assessment efforts. The best way to prioritize effort is to interview personnel with the best overall view of: 1) the effects of the disaster; and, 2) problems with the ongoing relief effort. OFDA (or FEMA for DSO) should be able to give a preliminary idea of potential military roles. Next, these complementary sources of information can be pursued:

• Interviews with other government officials or relief agencies.
• Aerial reconnaissance of roads, facilities, and distant areas.
• Site visits to confirm that certain military tasks will be required.

A. Analyzing Information. *The most important aspect of analyzing assessment information is to carefully distinguish between chronic and disaster-related needs.* In most instances, military support is focused on providing aid in response to the latter. Making this distinction requires the assistance of people familiar with the region in order to establish:

• Baseline data, – e.g., current versus the pre-disaster level of malnutrition.
• Standards, – e.g., potable water available per person versus what is considered the minimum acceptable.

Comparing the situation to baselines or standards provides insight to the extent of the relief requirement.

B. On-Scene Information Resources. On Scene sources can help describe what conditions were normal before the disaster. Some of the best resources for information are:

- US embassy officials.
• HN local
• OFDA officials.
• Non Governmental Organizations (NGO).
• Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO) – or other volunteer disaster relief officials.
• Media.
• Law enforcement.
• Local military, Reserves and National Guard.
• Local medical officials.
• Victims themselves.

C. Assessment Focus. Assessment focus will be mission driven. The nature of the disaster and the most compelling need will drive which functional areas are

emphasized and establish the priority of work. The assessments conducted by initial responders and agencies already on site will be important input for the JTF assessment team. While such assessment may accurately describe the situation, any analysis as to cause or perceived needs should not necessarily be taken at face value until SME's with appropriate technical expertise have been able to confirm the information. Usually the assessment will include the following functional areas:

(1) CBR-N Hazards. With regard to CBR-N hazards in CM operations, the assessment will need to quantify the nature and extent of the hazard at the site. The assessment team will need to know what other agencies, if any, are available that possess personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as detection/ID and monitoring/sampling equipment. The team will assess the needs and capabilities for decontamination equipment both organic to the JTF and other supporting agencies. Organic JTF capabilities may include CBIRF or a MEU with enhanced CBR-N capability. The supporting MAGTF's capabilities for casualty search/extraction and medical assistance will be estimated against the need.

(2) General Situation. With regard to the FHA portions of a FHA/CM scenario, the assessment team will focus on the nature of the disaster, its causes and impact (both short and long term). In an ongoing disaster, the impact over time (e.g. growing refugee population) must be considered. The impact will be assessed against the ability of the JTF to mitigate effects/restore pre-disaster conditions, the ability of relief agencies to conduct relief operations, and the overall capability to alleviate the immediate suffering of the population. Other considerations include:

(a) Water . Examine the availability, population requirement, source, location, contamination level, contamination source, and the means available to purify, store and transport water.

(b) Sanitation: Consider what sanitation needs exist and determine those that can only be met by the military. Determine the local means for disposing excreta and assess its impact on contamination of food and water sources. Examine the adequacy of sanitation facilities, quantity, location, cleanliness, convenience, and consider any cultural mores which may preclude the population from using them.

(c) Food: Assess those nutrition needs of the population that can only be met by the military. Is the issue the non-availability of food, or limited access to available sources due to degraded, damaged infrastructure? The total population requirement, signs of malnutrition, the total delivery capability versus the need in calories per day, the most vulnerable segments of the population, cultural mores, availability of utensils, and cooking fuels should be considered.

(d) Shelter: With regard to shelter, what is the total requirement? Will it increase or decrease over time? Is the need for long- or short-term shelter? What is the urgency? Will the requirement be met by providing temporary

encampments, supplies to assist in restoration, relocation to an alternate location or a combination of any or all of the above?

(e) Health: Determine what health needs of the population can only be met by the military. The JTF effort should be focused on augmenting and not supplanting the predisaster level of HN health care. It will assess the pre-disaster morbidity/mortality rates and compare them against those since the disaster has occurred. It will determine the current health care risks, the potential for them to increase should the current need not be met. It will look at mitigating the causative factors impacting the health of the population. It will identify existing organizations with appropriate health care capability, and identify how the military can assist them in meeting the need. It will examine exacerbating factors of infrastructure, transportation, water and food access, availability, contamination, etc, that affect the overall health of the population and identify how those factors might be resolved.

(f) Facilities and Infrastructure: Focus on infrastructure/facility damage that most affects the JTF's ability to conduct its mission. Consider the damage that impacts other organization's ability to conduct relief efforts, and what limited restoration actions are necessary to reduce the general suffering of the populace. Assessments will identify potential bottlenecks in the relief network that prevent or impede the flow of relief supplies, and the cause of insufficient throughput at ports, airfields, and supporting road networks.

(g) Coordination: Identify early on, the agencies and organizations with whom the assessment team coordinates, is supported by, and supports. Determine Liaison officer requirements essential to maintain coordination with these agencies. Identify key coordination issues that cannot be addressed due to lack of subject matter expertise or personnel and recommend actions to resolve them.

D. Additional considerations

- Identify long-term clean up requirements in order to coordinate transition
- Establish the priority of decontamination specific to :
  --Force protection
  --Ambulatory and non-ambulatory Casualties

  --Mission essential equipment/facilities
  --Targeted HN infrastructure to enable mission (beyond CBIRF/MAGTFcapability –external support req'd)

E. Reporting. Clear, accurate assessment reports are a vital aspect of FHA/CM operations. Ensure reporting provides a common picture to the unit as well as higher headquarters. (See Tab 4, Appendix D)

F. Coordination Mechanisms. Create coordination mechanisms at key levels of HN leadership (this may include the full range of national/state level to the local level). These mechanisms are vehicles for both coordination and information sharing. In some operations, the military creates a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). Be aware that the term CMOC may be offensive in nations where the

civilian government is wary of suggesting that they have surrendered control to a foreign military. In order to be effective, this coordinating mechanism should:

- Include the key players who will require military help to accomplish their mission.
- Serve as a clearinghouse for information on the disaster.
- Ensure a shared view among governmental, non-governmental, and military agencies on the desired end-state for the operational area.
- Be able to resolve priority conflicts among agencies.
- Understand and be receptive to negotiated relationships among players.

G. Staff Augmentation. Public Affairs personnel, operational lawyers, and contracting personnel are critical to the success of an FHA/CM assessment effort and the ongoing relief operation. They should be present at the JTF and MARFOR or Marine Air Ground Task Force (/MAGTF) levels, but may need to be pushed if these organizations are operating remote from their higher headquarters.

H. Assessment Pitfalls.

- Be aware of previously negotiated agreements.
- Understand the limits of your authority to negotiate interim agreements.
- Attempt to deliver some relief, even during the early stages of assessment.
- Promote the perception that U.S. forces are acting in support of the HN government.
- Don't sign up to any long term or binding missions before the assessment has been approved by higher headquarters.
- Learn the pre-disaster norms in the area being assessed.
- Try to quickly plug into existing host area relief mechanisms.
- Be sensitive to HN sovereignty and cultural norms.

Assessment Questions for JTF, MARFOR or MAGTF Level.

- What was the crude mortality rate before the disaster; – what is it now?
- What is the situation in terms of: Water, Food, Shelter, Medical Support, Power, and Lines of communication?
- What are the conditions of various ports and airfields?
- What relief is being conducted; who is conducting it?
- What elements can only the U.S. military supply? How long? Who will replace us and when?
- What desired endstate will be used to define the success or failure of the mission?

Focused Assessment - Assessment Questions to Ask at Small Unit Level.

- What is the security situation; – is anyone threatening you?
- How many people died per day before the disaster; – how many per day are dying now?
- What is your source of water; – has it been polluted by the disaster?
- How many people are without food?
- How many families are without shelter?
- What relief agencies are in place, – who are they, – how can we contact them?
- Who is in charge of local relief efforts?

• Have any unusual diseases been noted; – particularly among children?
• How many health care professionals do you have? – Are they adequate?
• What is our normal source of power; – has it been disrupted?

I. "Mission Creep". When in the midst of suffering and destruction, it may be difficult to guard against the unintentional expansion of MAGTF activities— or "mission creep". It is vitally important to keep the parameters of the mission confined to *only* those things that are absolutely required to reduce mortality and alleviate suffering. Because the military only fill gaps in the relief effort, the military assessment should be primarily focused on identifying those relief needs not being met by other agencies.

3009. CONTRACTING

A. NORMAL CONTRACT SERVICES REQUIREMENTS

(1) Idenfity the need for a contracting officer or government credit card holder.
(2) Identify what services are required (cell phones, fuel, waste disposal, porta-johns, bottled water, meals)
(3) Identify the impact on the local economy (duration of requirements)

B. CONTINGENCY CONTRACT CAPABILITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS

(1) Potential force for relieving military units that can build and/or operate a full range of logistic support.
(2) Ability to quickly bring to bear third country assets from within theater through existing contracts.
(3) Clean up contracts can be invaluable in removing/containing contaminated obstacles thus speeding the JTF with its relief mission.
(4) The major contingency contracts are designed to err on the side of "too much/too soon" and avoid "too little/too late", thus the clearer the task, the more cost-effective contractor performance.
(5) Contingency contractors consume money much faster than ordinary contractors and very much faster than military units, therefore the comptroller expertise in monitoring fund flow is critical. The comptroller will be pressing the Executive Agent to send appropriate funds/supplemental funds. If the contractor runs out of money, work stops abruptly. The Commander should require the comptroller to establish a monitoring system that clearly depicts the "red/yellow/green" status of contractor funding.

	AFCAP	CONCAP	LOGCAP	Rapid Response
Type Contract	Cost +	Cost +	Fixed & Cost +	Cost plus
Capacity	$450MM	$250MM	$105MM (per event)	
Duration	5 year	5 year	5 year	

Awarded	1997	1996	1997*	Orig 1989
Limitations	Full CS/CSS less Mortuary	Planning, Eng. Construction	Full CS/CSS	Assess/ Remove CBR-N Contamin
Contracting Organization	AFCESA	NAVFAC (LANTDIV)	AMC (CECOM)	*COE (Omaha Dist)

- *Army Corps of Engineers (COE) (Omaha District) Provides World Wide Rapid Response Toxic Clean-Up
  - 240**+** Response Actions since 1989
  - Used by FEMA & by US EPA
  - Sustained Response to Chem/Bio/Rad Event
  - 2 day US or 14 day OCONUS Mobilization

3010. PA CONSIDERATIONS

Public Affairs (PA) can contribute significantly to mission accomplishment of Marine forces conducting FHA/CM operations. PA personnel should be involved in all phases of planning a CM operation and should be represented in the JTF ADVON. The news media can shape public perception of mission success or failure, so it is imperative for PA to clearly communicate JTF mission, end-state and accomplishments to local, U.S. and international audiences. This will help counter any misinformation reported by the news media, allay unreasonable fears of deploying service members and their families and clarify the U.S. military role in support of the U.S. DOS and HN government. PA efforts to highlight mission successes and progress toward JTF endstate can help facilitate transition of essential functions to the HN or other responsible agencies, and timely redeployment of the JTF.

PA tasks include developing Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG), establishing a Joint Information Bureau, holding daily press conferences, accrediting and escorting media personnel and completing the PA annex to the operations order. Subject Matter Experts (SME) should be assigned to assist the JIB in responding to press inquiries of a technical and scientific nature.

Unity of effort among all USG organizations involved in a foreign CM event is essential for achieving mission success in the shortest time possible. In regard to PA, all USG organizations should "speak with one voice." JTF PA activities must be coordinated with the Regional CINC, the American Embassy, the United States Information Service, and other elements of the JTF, including the Information Operations cell. Host Nation and coalition partner sensitivities should be considered.

The standard DOD policy of maximum disclosure with minimum delay applies in a CM event. Information may be withheld during CM operations only for reasons of OPSEC, safety or to protect personal privacy.

3011. Endstate and Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) help gauge progress toward endstate .

A. Crafting MOE. MOE provide an underlying basis for quantifying progress. It can be used as an interagency tool to achieve common understanding. It provides a common language for resource allocation and phase transition. MOE can be used for public affairs benefit and provides a means to measure level of success or failure. Examples of MOE include morbidity/mortality rate reduction and tons of relief supplies delivered.

MOEs should be based on task-related, measurable criteria. Although it is possible for some measurable criteria to be subjective—normally based on expert judgement of an assessor—most MOE should be objective. While it must be recognized that the success of the mission cannot be measured by numbers and percentages alone, quantitative MOE are one of the indicators of an operation's progress. MOE are also a means of determining information requirements; (i.e., information required to articulate the MOE, should be collected)

B. MOE Criteria. Selection of MOE is situation dependent, however, many are common to FHA/CM operations. For example:

- Magnitude of military effort. The number of convoys escorted, gallons of water pumped, numbers of tents erected, etc.
  - These are useful to track progress, convey information to higher headquarters and impart a positive image to the general public..
- Sufficiency of military tasks.
  - The percentage of water supplied to a refugee camp (versus the total requirement; or the number of tents erected (verses people without shelter) are good indicators of the sufficiency of military support toward the overall relief objectives. Such indicators are a more sophisticated approach to assessing whether the military is meeting the needs of the victims.
- Progress toward attaining humanitarian objectives.
  - Changes in morbidity/mortality rates, if available, are good indicators of progress in relieving human suffering. Such indicators can help put the disaster in perspective by comparing pre-disaster and post-disaster rates. These can also alert the JTF to emerging problems.
- Status of the transition. The degree of task completion can illustrate when to transition from one phase of the operation to another, or from one agency to another. Examples include:
    - Reduction in size of exclusion zone (CBR-N)

- Percentage of CBR-N patients decontaminated
- Construction effort completed
- Facilities turned over to HN or appropriate agency

C. Prioritization and Allocation. MOE can help the commander decide when and where to shift effort or assets; whether more (or fewer) forces are required, and where efforts are in relation to the end of the operation (endstate).

D. Avoid Averaging MOE. Progress toward meeting endstate may vary from region to region or locality to locality. Averaging MOE can overlook or marginalize the status of a few inaccessable areas or areas that have unmet needs. This can lead to faulty decision making and potentially result in a re-emergence of the problem.

E. Integrated Assessment. Once data relative to MOE is collected and used to analyze the efforts of each reporting unit, the commander can begin the integrated assessment process. The following example matrix identifies requirement categories, status, progress toward endstate and transition to appropriate agency or HN.

Status *	Category	Endstate Goal	Progress	Plan to Replace US Military	Notes	Agency
Green	Food	300 tons/ day to airport	On track	N/A	N/A	CARE
Amber	Food Delivery	300 tons/ day	Slightly Behind (Wx)	No one, Est .30 Days	Fcst for good Wx tomorrow	USMC helo
Green	Measles Vaccine	10,000 doses	On track	N/A	N/A	CARE
Amber	Vaccine Transport	10,000 doses	Behind: bad Wx	No one, Est 10 Days	Fcst for good Wx tomorrow	USMC helo
Red	Medical	2,000 bed hospital	En route	Doctors Without Borders: 20 days	N/A	USAF
Green	USMC Engineers	75 tube wells dug	Ahead of Schedule: 75% complete	10 days	N/A	USMC

E. Exit Criteria. MOE can assist in establishing exit criteria. The following questions are linked to essential tasks that help identify exit criteria:

• Who will take over the function; how long will it take to do so?

• How will transfer of responsibility/authority occur?
• How will process ensure there is always someone in charge throughout the transfer?
• How and when will shut down of temporary functions be determined?
• What are the agreed upon MOE that indicate endstate is achieved?
• What are the activities that should not be conducted by U.S. forces?

CHAPTER 4

EXECUTION

4000. **General** -. FHA/CM operations are normally conducted in five phases. Within each of the phases, the following tasks and functions may occur:

4**001. Phase I Initial Assessment**

A. An incident occurs which requires the formation of a JTF that include Marine Forces. Preparations are conducted to launch a task organized assessment team to coordinate with and advise the regional CINC, HN, Country Team, Allied and Coalition assets and conduct initial assessment of the situation. Concurrently, the theater SOC forward and Fleet Anti-terrorist Support Team (FAST) may deploy.

B. The designated Marine Component Commander and his staff will conduct mission analysis based upon the Warning Order and incident type. In an FHA/CM incident, a team of SMEs may deploy to conduct initial liaison and assessment. If the incident has a CBR-N aspect, a CBIRF (or equivalent) assessment team may be included. Personnel deploying must possess personal protective equipment, medical screening and immunizations, and all personnel will receive approved country clearance via DOS as required. Additional guidance or clarification and DIRLAUTH with cognizant external agencies will be requested from higher headquarters as required.

C. The Marine Component Command and Control (C2) structure will be activated in order to support the FHA/CM mission.

D. A detailed assessment of the FHA/CM problem is conducted.

E. Determine the availability of forces and assets already in-theater and those CONUS-based assets which may be made available to the supported CINC.

F. The Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) for the FHA/CM mission is constructed based on timelines and operational/support requirements. (see figures 4-1, and 4-2 for examples of timelines.)

G. Determine the adequacy of HN plans, and the status of HN, Allied, International, PVO and NGO assets capable of responding to the FHA/CM incident.

H. Identify and task organize the required personnel and equipment to support the specified and implied tasks contained in the Warning Order for the subject FHA/CM mission.

I. Determine the status and availability of required movement assets and the HN transportation infrastructure.

J. Determine Force Protection requirements, including CM needs for Personal Protective Equipment (Field Protective Mask, Mission Oriented Protective Posture ensembles, and canister filters, as well as conducting medical screening and administering any required immunizations for all personnel.)

K. Request Rules of Engagement (ROE) guidance or clarification as required.

L. Prepare the initial Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) guidance and plans.

M. Ensure Status of Forces (SOFA) issues and/or deficiencies are identified and de-conflicted with the HN as required. Be sure to address contractors who may be part of the JTF.

.

N. Issue Warning Orders.

O. Complete the Commander's Estimate.

P. Establish command relationships with the DOS, HN, NGO, Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs), higher headquarters, the CINC, and the Commander, Marine Forces.

Q. Identify any fiscal shortfalls, restraints, constraints.

R. Determine the endstate for the subject FHA/CM mission.



4002. Phase II Immediate Assistance

A. The initial military responders deploy. A JTF ADVON coordinates initial real estate

requirements (e.g., access to ports/airfields/MSRs, etc.), initial contract efforts, and provides input to published EEIs. Communications and liaison are established with DOS/HN/IGO/NGO/PVO. The Marine Forces component to the JTF has been organized.

B. The JTF Forward arrives and assumes the FHA/CM mission. It establishes a CMOC, JIB and joint contracting center. The bulk of the JTF deploys. The JSOTF functions transition to the arriving JTF. MARFOR FWD as part of the JTF FWD …

- Conducts initial FHA/CM operations.
- Assists the HN in isolating incident area(s), as required.
- Provides security for relief personnel.
- Coordinates with, and assists local medical authorities as required.
- Employs the CBIRF reconnaissance team in order to determine the extent of the CBR-N hazard, and to establish hot, warm, and cold zones within the incident site (CM).
- Determines and establishes appropriate PPE levels for relief personnel conducting operations in the incident site (CM).
- Evacuates any ambulatory contaminated casualties from the incident site(CM).
- Employs a CBIRF reconnaissance team to detect, identify, sample, and monitor for CBR-N hazards in the incident site (CM).
- Conducts non-ambulatory casualty search and extraction operations.
- Employs EOD team as required to identify, render safe, and conduct mitigation of secondary devices (CM).
- Provides emergency medical treatment.
- Conducts decontamination triage as required (CM).
- Conducts detailed personnel decontamination for ambulatory/non-ambulatory casualties (CM).
- Conducts force protection decontamination (CM).
- Conducts force protection extraction as required (CM).

C. Provide force medical care as required.

D. Conduct initial epidemiological investigations.

E. Assist in fire-fighting operations.

F. Initiate PA campaign.

G. Expand and formalize LNO efforts.

H. Establish full C4I connectivity.

I. Conduct detailed assessment of HA/CM situation.

J. Request additional force capabilities as required.

K. Determine/establish contracting requirements.

L. Identify mortuary support requirements.



4003. Phase III Extended FHA/CM Operations

A. Continue service support efforts, sustainment operations and relief efforts as required.

B. Continue assisting HN in isolating the incident area.

C. Prepare the reception plan for additional/follow-on forces, capabilities and assets, as required.

D. Assist the HN in establishing refugee camps.

E. Continue to assist the HN with casualty recovery.

F. Assist the HN with mortuary affairs.

G. Assist the HN with infrastructure repair to facilitate FHA/CM operations.

H. Continue to assist the HN with personnel and casualty decontamination and limited decontamination of mission essential equipment and facilities.

I. Conduct Information Operations in support of the FHA/CM effort..

J. Establish transition criteria and begin preparations for the transition effort.

K. Track progress toward attainment of Measures of Effectiveness.

FHA Timeline: Operation Sea Angel



4**004. Phase IV Disengagement/Handover of HA/CM Efforts**

A. Attainment of End State criteria/MOE in sight
-transition criteria established
-transition forces arrives or transitional agency identified

B. Prepare to conduct hand-off operations to HN designated IGO, NGO, PVO, or civilian contractor.

C.. Develop the redeployment TPFDD.

D. -JTF contracting effort winds down as transitional contracting effort is established
.

E. Conduct disengagement/hand-over to HN designated representatives.

F. Transition criteria is met and completed.

4005. Phase V Redeployment

A. Conduct redeployment as directed.

B. Identify remain behind forces.

C. Marine Corps forces redeploy.

D. Endstate attained.

APPENDIX A

CASE STUDIES OF FHA/CM OPERATIONS

The following case studies provide historical examples of FHA/CM Incidents:

TAB 1: Operation SEA ANGEL

TAB 2: Union Carbide-Bhopal Disaster

TAB 3: Sarin Gas Attack – Tokyo

Each case study discusses how the situation developed and was subsequently addressed. While not all case studies represented involve a military response, there are obvious parallels for the application of military force and the potential exists for future employment of military capability in similar circumstances.

Tab 1 to Appendix A

Natural Disaster Incident: Operation SEA ANGEL

INTRODUCTION

Background. Typhoon Marian battered the coast of Bangladesh from Chittagong to Cox's Bazar. For eight hours during the night and morning of 29 and 30 April 1991, 140 mph winds created and drove a twenty-foot tidal surge into a coast that is barely above sea level. In a country possessing 2000 people per square mile, with thousands living on *chars* (literally sandbanks that are at sea level during high tide), the devastation was immediate and overwhelming.

The final death toll was somewhere between 139,000 and 152,000 people. In the face of this catastrophic loss -- to include infrastructure, particularly communications and washed out roads -- the newly elected Bangladeshi government and its military struggled to meet the needs of its people. Equally affected were the national and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), primarily based in the capital of Dhaka, who could not get their supplies and foodstuffs to the coast, the outer shore islands, and the hundreds of *char*s.

On 6 May, American Ambassador to Bangladesh, William B. Milam, officially inquired of Pacific Command in Hawaii about the possibility of military support for the relief effort. On May 11th, President Bush announced that a Joint Task Force (JTF) would be sent to Bangladesh to aid in the relief effort. On 12 May, Major General Henry Stackpole, Commander, III MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa, Japan), landed with an advance party in Dhaka, where they established a JTF headquarters. Already en route back from the Gulf War, the 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) arrived off the coast of Chittagong on 15 May. The force, ultimately under the guidance of Ambassador Milam and the Bangladeshi government, but directed by General Stackpole, quickly conducted liaison with the coordination center in Chittagong established by the JTF forward command element. This center became the focal point for the relief effort. By 29 May, 5th MEB had sailed for home. On 7 June, the JTF forward element shut down operations in Chittagong. On 13 June, with the emergency over, and the Bangladeshi government fully enabled to address the remaining problems, the last American JTF personnel redeployed.

Key Results, Consequences, and Insights. The NGO/military relationship would prove pivotal in this humanitarian relief effort. Despite little or no knowledge of each other prior to their mutual effort, this relationship resulted in newfound respect. The NGOs proved to be highly efficient organizations, adept at identifying needs and procuring needed supplies. Indeed, one of the greatest lessons to come out of SEA ANGEL was the efficacy of the NGOs. Overall, according to one senior NGO representative, the coordination between the two communities was "very successful."

DISCUSSION

Key Points of Cultural Intelligence. Gen Stackpole communicated clear, simple, and repeated intent for the JTF, which was understood by his own men, and further

communicated to the Bangladeshi government and the NGOs. Gen Stackpole's diplomatic methods, primarily his consistent effort to subordinate himself to the American Ambassador and to Prime Minister Zia, were integral to isolating the relief effort in Chittagong from political considerations. Moreover, the overwhelming logistical leverage that the Americans brought to the emergency further reduced any political complexities to inconsequence. Relatively isolated from these underlying tensions, the coordination effort witnessed the convergence of the two civil affairs "tracks",

Track 1: the traditional civil-military relations with the established government; and
Track 2: the non-traditional civil-military relations with the NGOs.

Both tracks took place simultaneously in the same room every morning in both Dhaka and Chittagong. Under the lead of the Bangladeshi government, as manifested in government or military officials, both the NGOs and the American military worked together to address the problem.

Chris Seiple pointed out the reports, by *The Boston Globe* and other sources, which noted the initial miniscule efforts by the US and other major world powers to meet the Bangladeshi humanitarian requirements. The NGO relief effort had been in progress two weeks before the US JTF arrived to render assistance. During the two-week span, as well as other times, there were numerous and varied misperceptions brewing among the Bangladeshi governmental and NGO personnel concerning the lack of action or promise for support. In addition, other events had transpired and were ongoing which planted the seeds of discontent and mistrust towards the US and Bangladeshi governments. The following summarizes some of those events that fed the underlying tensions – a situation, if not handled smartly, had the potential to be counterproductive to the JTF humanitarian mission, a major setback for the US's prestige, and a destabilizing factor for the new Bangladeshi government.

1. There were NGO concerns that the military would come in with a "take charge" attitude while not being sensitive to the hard work already in progres**s.**

2. During the early-May time period, there were concerns in Bangladesh that the US would not send substantial help because the US did not have confidence in the new government.

3. The NGOs as well as all governmental agencies were "struggling" to meet the needs for relief efforts. The conditions were made worse by tensions in the Bangladeshi government that pre-dated the arrival of the storm.

4. The public was not fully discerning in criticizing the current new government's response to this major storm while comparing the former government's response to less severe storms.

5. No Bangladeshi official had been given authority to coordinate and command relief efforts.

6. During the Gulf War period, there had been an anti-American protest by a mob near the American embassy in Bangladesh.

7. Once the American forces arrived, certain political parties raised the issue, on the parliamentary floor, of American forces trying to establish a permanent base in Bangladesh.

8. There were misconceptions and mistrust relative to the motives and capabilities of the NGOs harbored by the Bangladeshi as well as between the respective members of the NGOs toward each other.

9. Despite the past disasters, there was no comprehensive plan for responding to such an emergency. The Association for Developmental Agencies of Bangladesh (ADAB), an umbrella NGO for national and international NGOs, had tried to formulate a plan, but with little result. Although great efforts to improve the disaster response had been made since a 1970 cyclone (in which an estimated 500,000 people died), and despite early warning issued by the government as to the severity of the storm, the Bangladeshi government was simply overwhelmed. Even if a comprehensive plan had existed, it would have been near impossible to implement.

10. Inevitably, there was some consternation among the Bangladeshi people with its government. Mohammed Yunus -- known world-wide for his bank program to empower entrepreneurs of the poorest background -- demanded that the government take control: "To those who say NGOs are the only way out, I say this is opting out, the government is supposed to do all these things. If the government cannot serve the people -- if we say let's forget about the government and call the NGOs and let them do this -- then why do we have to have a government?"

Assessment. In assessing the scope and scale of the situation, General Stackpole noted that essentially he was given one command: help them. "My orders were clear. I was to report to the US Ambassador and provide humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh, period. Nobody told me how to do it; no one gave any additional instructions. As a matter of fact, the lack of real-time intelligence was such that we really didn't know what we were standing into." General Stackpole's plan began to emerge according to the simple humanitarian intent he had been given. The advance party soon began to establish liaison with the Bangladeshi government, the American embassy team, and the NGOs. After his initial survey of the disaster area, General Stackpole decided upon a three-step plan, centered on the logistics of distribution, phased over a period of 30 days, i.e.,

Step 1: Take immediate efforts to stabilize life-threatening situation (about one week),

Step 2: Make limited efforts to restore infrastructure in manner that allowed for the Bangladeshi government to take full control of effort (about two weeks), and

Step 3: Prepare for US withdrawal and actual assumption of responsibility by Bangladeshi government (about one week).

The political perceptions and underlying tensions aside, the magnitude of the disaster remained. It was a very difficult environment in which to have basic human dignity. By the time General Stackpole arrived on 12 May, the conditions were almost overwhelming. As the JTF Marines were getting on the ground in Bangladesh, they immediately had to make changes to plans on the scene as intelligence came from the NGO / relief agency personnel as well as by direct observations. The NGOs were seasoned and professional.

The sources most dependable and trustworthy were the well-established NGOs that had been in place for several years. The following provides an assessment summary.

1. The infrastructure was not there;
   - The government had lost eight ships and 60% of its helicopters,
   - Roads had been completely washed out,
   - Chittagong's port was clogged with sunken vessels,
   - The city's airport was initially under six feet of water,
   - The power supply system was inoperable,
   - Perhaps most important, communications were down,
   - There was no way to assess the damage as there was no way to get there, and
   - There was no way to hear about it.

2. International communications were wiped out as well.

3. Approximately 139,000 people were dead.

4. A critical necessity existed to clear the corpses and carcasses from the land and sea.

5. There was a population of ten million affected by a flood zone spread over the four coastal districts of Bhola, Noakhali, Chittagong, and Cox's Bazar.

6. The survivors were coping with numerous problems; the most important of which was the water supply. Most local wells and water sources had been contaminated by the saline surge that had only stopped after moving three miles inland. Included in the tidal surge was the oil from a tanker that had sunk in the storm.

7. A cholera epidemic was feared as scattered reports of cholera were being received.

8. With little to no food, the stranded people became increasingly more susceptible to disease.

9. If everything they owned had not been swept away by the tidal surge, many – quite literally, had their clothes blown off their bodies.

10. The tidal surge had an enormous impact on the crops as well, damaging 3.5 million acres.

11. If the road and ferry infrastructure had not been destroyed, CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere) and the Red Crescent would have been largely capable of handling relief efforts with organic and contract assets as they had built up adequate supplies of emergency food and relief supplies for just such an eventuality. The Red Crescent Society is a quasi-government organization, enjoying a status analogous to American Red Cross's relationship with the American government and military.

Command and Control. Command and control overall was successfully done. Communications assets were a critical element required for coordinating the management and logistics efforts as well as reestablishing the infrastructure. SEA ANGEL was the first operational employment of the Pacific Command’s Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC).

Coalition Management. In operational management, “command and control” from the perspective of the role played by the JTF was instead analogous to “coordination and control.” The arrival of the military, with its organized presence and communications capability, provided the infrastructure which two weeks after the storm still did not exist. In cases of fast breaking natural disasters, many nations tend to respond with assistance teams. Historically, most teams will accept management conditions set by the host nation / senior authority. Some country teams will not accept joining others, as was the case during SEA ANGEL. The Chinese and Indian teams did not become part of the Combined JTF, but they did agree to cover areas that the Combined JTF could not. Flexibility was critical to success. The Americans -- under the guidance of the ambassador and joint task force commander – quite consciously made every effort to empower Bangladeshi leadership. By insisting on deference to the Bangladeshi government at every level, the American forces presented the official position that it was just a tool of a Bangladeshi comprehensive effort. What would result was an American advisory role to the Bangladeshi leadership in Dhaka as the joint task force implemented Dhaka's guidance through its forward command element in Chittagong. (Although the JTF forward was also subordinated to a Bangladeshi official).

The Bangladeshi response effort was coordinated at two levels in Dhaka. At the highest level, there was the National Coordination Committee (NCC). This committee met at the cabinet level and included such ministries as Health and Family Welfare, Food, Agriculture, and Women Affairs. An American equivalent to this committee might be a National Security Council, of sorts, dedicated solely to relief efforts - a FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) with greater clout due to the frequency of disasters in a much smaller country.

Directly beneath the National Coordination Committee was a standing cell known as the Relief Activities Coordination and Monitoring Cell (RACMC). This cell centrally headquarters all activities with all ministries, services headquarters and all other civil agencies. Essentially, in the American analogy, it was a standing interagency subcommittee to the NSC. General Shaffat headed the RACMC and was the liaison back to the NCC. The RACMC was located in the Presidential Secretariat at Zia International Airport. This cell implemented its decisions through the various organizations represented at the council. Besides the national ministries and other governmental organizations represented in Dhaka and Chittagong, two other key players were represented.

The first participant, was the NGO community. Although any NGO was welcomed, the NGO participants, largely due to size, numbered only three. ADAB, a nominal representative of the NGO community was there, as well as the Red Crescent Society. The third NGO represented was CARE. CARE, with its $40 million dollar budget and 1400 employees, was sure to be an integral part of any relief effort. Finally, The US Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.) had a liaison desk officer present at the meetings. It was according to this coordination structure that the Bangladeshi government, largely without a plan and certainly without an infrastructure, struggled to meet the overwhelming need of "Marian's" aftermath.

Logistics. The JTF brought to the scene some major elements needed to connect the pieces required to alleviate a crippled humanitarian relief operation. The primary items were transportation (helicopters) and communications assets. The ATF’s organic medical

personnel provided medical assistance. Initially, water was the most critical requirement, the ATF had numerous Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs) to employ, however, on the advice of CARE, concerned about a dependency link being established, only a limited number were put into use. CARE also advised the JTF not to get involved in the burial of the dead Bangladeshi. While the number of bodies was a health issue, it was first and foremost a cultural one the Bangladeshi people had to solve for themselves. Also, the JTF provided enabling management support to facilitate tying the transportation and communication capabilities to the Bangladeshi and NGO's management structure.

One other operational point needs mentioning. There never were more than 500 American personnel ashore overnight, and for the most part the ships remained over the horizon. The helicopters and LCACs (Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned) would come ashore each morning, and return to the ships each evening. The ability to daily install an infrastructure and then to remove it as to reduce its impact on the very fragile local infrastructure is a unique ability of the Navy-Marine Corps team. This "sea-based" notion of support, furthermore, did not exacerbate any of the existing political tensions ashore. Thus, the physical capacity to do so, plus the political utility of such a methodology, ensured that neither the local infrastructure or fragile democracy was burdened by the "overwhelming force" of the United States military. There is no doubt that this concept will be used again in support of a humanitarian operation.

End State and Disengagement. In many ways, SEA ANGEL was a classic civil-military operation in which the American military supported a sovereign state pursuant to its humanitarian needs. As a result, there was an established national structure with clear command and control relationships to support the relief process. Additionally, there was an American embassy that provided guidance to the Joint Task Force commander. The US military was not in charge. It supported and enabled the effort. It never assumed, nor wanted, leadership. Moreover, it only did reconstruction of infrastructure in support of its limited mission. There was never had any intent to restore the infrastructure; that is not a task for the military. It is something for the international community to do. General Stackpole kept his force focused, always supporting, but never crossing the line into long-term infrastructure projects. His means of achieving this conceptual end-state was rather basic: he repeated it again and again and again. They didn't create false expectations, as happens all too often in operations of this nature. The JTF clearly stated what it intended to do and kept stating it over and over again. Therefore, the Bangladeshi and NGOs were prepared, as much as possible, to take over upon the JTF's departure.

LESSONS LEARNED

In OOTW, a proper assessment up front will save a tremendous amount of trouble in the long run. Getting it right early is critical because it is hard to recover if you find yourself trying to solve the wrong problem and working with the wrong people to do it. Assessments and plans made with limited intelligence input before arriving on the scene may be very costly and a hindrance to the effort if not planned to allow flexibility as the situation unfolds. Assessment is an ongoing process until mission completion. The following highlights the lessons learned.

Assessment of the Situation.

1. Having the right team with you when you do an assessment is key. Make sure you have proper public affairs, legal, and contracting support to the assessment team. All will be needed.

2. An interagency non-governmental mechanism may already exist. If it does, plug into it. If it does not, help create one. Beware of insisting on the kind of rigid doctrinal Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) concept that is becoming the norm in Joint and Army doctrinal publications. These may not be appropriate when a host nation or friendly US governmental organization is in charge.

3. Link up quickly with the lead US government agency (the embassy on overseas disaster and FEMA in domestic situations). Remember that that FEMA will be in support of a State or local agency. Even if you have better capabilities, do not overshadow the local authorities.

4. Ascertain which teams will join the Combined JTF. If joining the Combined JTF is not possible for any team(s), determine what cooperating and coordination agreements and procedures can be established. Determine the OOTW teams' language and telecommunication capabilities.

5. It is most important for the management personnel at all echelons be aware of each teams capabilities, or lack thereof.

6. Listening skills are critical in assessments. Link up as quickly as possible with anyone who knows anything. However, bring judgement and caution to bear – your expectations and willing acceptance of local government and NGO persons' advice and consent based on your adaptation to the US culture may cause trouble. You may be dealing with "a wolf in sheep's clothing" and being led to facilitate "putting the fox in to protect the chickens." Likewise, use caution - the cultural-diversity factor works both ways. Don't cause the NGOs to enter into an ill-advised agreement which may not be to their, or the mission's best interest because the cultural differences contributed to miss communications or poor understanding.

7. Do not succumb to culture shock. The culture of the relief community is different from the military culture. In these operations, you are all on the same team. Remain flexible. Concentrate on what is really wrong. You need to realize that in some places the day-to-day standard of living would be unacceptable in the US. You need to find out what the norm was before the disaster. Your objective in relief work is to get them back on the road to their norm, not yours.

8. Reducing the mortality rate is generally a good indicator of humanitarian Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) success. Remember - you cannot get to zero, work toward the norm mortality rate. However, realize there are two causes of death in a disaster. The first is the immediate effects, usually caused by trauma or drowning. This will go down as a disaster very quickly. The second classification of mortality will be diseases caused by polluted water, dehydration from lack of water, starvation, and exposure to extreme temperatures. The effects of the second classification of conditions will begin to manifest in several days or weeks after the initial disaster event. The results of your efforts to rectify / circumvent the litany of items in the second classification, as compared to the established MOE, will be your grade and one of the signals for your go/no-go trip home.

Planning and Execution

1. In the beginning, plan the ending. In the initial stages of determining the mission, begin to develop proposed MOE criteria immediately. The MOEs are the road map for your ticket home. The sum of the MOE is the mission's End State. The MOEs must be agreed upon by the key players to meet their expectation(s). The MOEs then should be prudently "packaged" to be easily comprehended by all, especially the media, so as to produce the "best foot forward" results. It will not be good for you to declare victory if "others" do not agree the End State has been met.

2. Cultural intelligence is critical. It is important that you do not inadvertently insult or anger the people you are trying to help. Some good sources are:

- US Embassy personnel
- NGOs / PVOs (Private Volunteer Organizations) working in the region
- Local government relief organizations
- Reporters can be a valuable source of information.

3. Contrary to prevailing opinion, the primary need from the US Military is usually transportation instead of engineering and medical assistance.

4. When clean water is needed, ROWPUs may not always be the best solution. Tube wells or chlorine treatment may be better long-term solutions. You will want ROWPUs in your pack up. With the state of the Bangladesh wells following the tidal surge, pumps were the preferred items to facilitate pumping and purging wells of the salt water and muck.

5. Be very wary of getting involved with disposal of human or animal remains, you may be getting into a culture-related situation. CARE and other agencies had funds to contract with local citizens to perform the task.

6. Distribution of relief supplies is best handled by local authorities or relief agencies. They have experience with the locals, and can better monitor the activity.

7. If US medical assistance is needed, it is better to keep it simple so on departure; the locals will not feel abandoned.

8. Engineering projects should be short term and contribute directly to saving lives and alleviating suffering. Infrastructure improvements, as opposed to emergency repair, is an invitation to "Mission Creep."

10. Psychological operations can be important, but remember that the ambassador must approve all PSYOPS in friendly countries.

11. Put in for blanket permission to fly non-DoD civilians in military aircraft as soon as you are assigned the mission. This is not easy to obtain, and it is not a "fast-track" procedure.

12. If your tactical units are employing commercial-off-the-shelf radios, obtain frequency clearance from the host nation as soon as possible.

13. If there is not a SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) type agreement with the host nation, make getting one a priority one for the staff lawyer.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To view *Operation SEA ANGEL* as just a logistics operation is misleading. Indeed, the great success of this operation has, perhaps, nullified its own study, reducing it to just a "simple" logistics operation. While definitely not a complex humanitarian emergency, the subtle complexities of this humanitarian intervention should not be ignored, particularly in discussing the NGO/military relationship.

1 The following landmark documents were used as source material for the extracts, quotes, and paraphrased elements used in the development of this paper:
a. The U. S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, by Chris Seiple, ed., Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, Carlisle Barracks, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/org/pki/referenc/frame.htm>.
b. Staff paper, “Sea Angel Lessons Learned,” undated, by Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC, Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.

Tab 2 to Appendix A

Man Made, Inadvertent Incident: The Bhopal Disaster

BACKGROUND. In the early hours of Monday, Dec. 3, 1984, a toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas enveloped the hundreds of shanties and huts surrounding a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India. Later, as the deadly cloud slowly drifted in the cool night air through streets in surrounding sections, sleeping residents awoke, coughing, choking, and rubbing painfully stinging eyes. By the time the gas cleared at dawn, many were dead or injured. Four months after the tragedy, the Indian government reported to its Parliament that 1,430 people had died. In 1991 the official Indian government panel charged with tabulating deaths and injuries updated the count to more than 3,800 dead and approximately 11,000 with disabilities. Of the 800,000 people living in Bhopal at the time, 300,000 were injured and as many as 8,000 have died since.

Although it was not known at the time, the gas was formed when a disgruntled plant employee, apparently bent on spoiling a batch of methyl isocyanate, added water to a storage tank. The water caused a reaction that built up heat and pressure in the tank, quickly transforming the chemical compound into a lethal gas that escaped into the cool night air.

The plant was operated by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), just over 50 percent of which was owned by Union Carbide Corporation. The first report of the disaster reached Union Carbide executives in the United States more than 12 hours after the incident. By 6:00 a.m. in the U.S., executives were gathering with technical, legal, and communications staff at the company's Danbury, Connecticut headquarters. Information was sparse but, as casualty estimates quickly climbed, the matter was soon recognized as a massive industrial disaster.

The first press inquiry came at 4:30 a.m. in the U.S., marking the beginning of a deluge that, at its peak, reached 500 calls a day for several weeks. The scope of the Bhopal tragedy made it "page one" material in the weeks and months that followed. And, as its legal, political, technological and -- above all -- human aspects were explored; it became a persistent headline into the 1990s.

The leak was caused by a series of mechanical and human errors. A portion of the safety equipment at the plant had been nonoperational for four months and the rest failed. When the plant finally sounded an alarm--an hour after the toxic cloud had escaped--much of the harm had already been done. The city health officials had not been informed of the toxicity of the chemicals used at the Union Carbide factory. There were no emergency plans or procedures in place and no knowledge of how to deal with the poisonous cloud. A series of studies made five years later showed that many of the survivors were still suffering from one or several of the following ailments: partial or complete blindness, gastrointestinal disorders, impaired immune systems, post traumatic stress disorders, and menstrual problems in women. A rise in spontaneous abortions, stillbirths, and offspring with genetic defects was also noted. Although Union Carbide denied liability, in 1989 the Indian Supreme Court agreed to a settlement payment of $470 million by Union Carbide to the survivors of the disaster. One of the world's worst industrial accidents, the Bhopal tragedy clearly demonstrates the inequalities between human rights and safety in developed and

underdeveloped countries. In response to that, the Chemical Manufacturing Association has created the Responsible Care Program that is now being implemented worldwide. The Program's aim is to improve community awareness, emergency response and employee health and safety.

Perhaps because of the enormity of the event, many people, even those only peripherally involved, tended to remember in detail and with great clarity the sequence of events of that night. Nevertheless, people experienced the event in different ways, thus yielding, for example, varying estimates of the duration of the actual release.

The tendency of plant workers to omit facts or distort evidence was also clearly evident after the Bhopal incident, making the collection of evidence a time-consuming process. In investigating any incident in which facts seem to have been omitted or distorted, it is necessary to examine the motives of those involved. The story that had been initially told by the workers was a preferable one from their perspective, because it exonerated everyone, except perhaps the supervisor. According to this version, the reaction happened instantaneously; there was no time to take preventive or remedial measures, and there was no known cause. Without a cause, no blame could be established.

Because critical facts were being deliberately omitted and distorted, the investigation team had to continually review and reanalyze each new piece of evidence and to assess its consistency and veracity with hard evidence and known facts. Ultimately, several firm pieces of evidence came to light -- evidence that simply did not fit the story told initially by the workers, and that eventually led to the conclusion that a direct water connection had been found by the workers, but had been covered up.

DISASTER CHRONOLGY

The results of this investigation show, with virtual certainty, that the Bhopal incident was caused by the entry of water to the tank through a hose that had been connected directly to the tank. It is equally clear that those most directly involved attempted to obfuscate these events. Nevertheless, the pieces of the puzzle are now firmly in place, and based upon technical and objective evidence, the following sequence of events occurred. At 10:20 p.m. on the night of the incident, the pressure in Tank 610 was at 2 psig. This is significant because no water could have entered prior to that point; otherwise a reaction would have begun, and the resulting pressure rise would have been noticed. At 10:45 p.m., the shift change occurred. The unit was shut down and it takes at least a half-hour for the shift change to be accomplished. During this period, on a cold winter night, the MIC storage area would be completely deserted.

It is believed that it was at this point -- during the shift change -- that a disgruntled operator entered the storage area and hooked up one of the readily available rubber water hoses to Tank 610, with the intention of contaminating and spoiling the tank's contents. It was well known among the plant's operators that water and MIC should not be mixed. He unscrewed the local pressure indicator, which can be easily accomplished by hand, and connected the hose to the tank. The entire operation could be completed within five minutes. Minor incidents of process sabotage by employees had occurred previously at the Bhopal plant, and, indeed, occur from time to time in industrial plants all over the world.

The water and MIC reaction initiated the formation of carbon dioxide which, together with MIC vapors, was carried through the header system and out of the stack of the vent gas

scrubber by about 11:30 to 11:45 p.m. Because the "common valve" was in a closed position before the incident and the tank held a strong vacuum when it cooled down after the incident, it is clear that the valve was temporarily opened to permit the entry of water. This also permitted the vapors initially generated to flow (via the PVH) out through the RVVH. It was these vapors that were sensed by workers in the area downwind as the earlier minor MIC leaks. The leak was also sensed by several MIC operators who were sitting downwind of the leak at the time. They reported the leak to the MIC supervisor and began to search for it in the MIC structure. At about midnight, they found what they believed to be the source, viz., a section of open piping located on the second level of the structure near the vent gas scrubber. They fixed a fire hose so that it would spray in that direction and returned to the MIC control room believing that they had successfully contained the MIC leak. Meanwhile, the supervisors went to the plant's main canteen on break.

Shortly after midnight, several MIC operators saw the pressure rise on the gauges in the control room and realized that there was a problem with Tank 610. They ran to the tank and discovered the water hose connection to the tank. They discussed the alternatives and called the supervisors back from the canteen. They decided upon transferring about one ton of the tank's contents to the SEVIN unit as the best method of getting the water out. The major release then occurred. The MIC supervisor called the MIC production manager at home within fifteen minutes of the major release and told him that water had gotten into an MIC tank. (It later took UCC's and GOI's investigating teams, working separately, months to determine scientifically that water entry had been responsible.)

Not knowing if the attempted transfer had exacerbated the incident, or whether they could have otherwise prevented it, or whether they would be blamed for not having notified plant management earlier, those involved decided upon a cover-up. They altered logs that morning and thereafter to disguise their involvement. As is not uncommon in many such incidents, the reflexive tendency to cover up simply took over.

When the news reached Union Carbide in the United States, it was already afternoon in India, 10 and a half hours ahead of the company's Connecticut headquarters on standard time. Information direct from Bhopal was slow in arriving and fragmentary at best because the disaster had quickly overwhelmed the capacity of two telephone trunk lines serving the central Indian city of 750,000. In those early hours, company executives in Connecticut relied on telephone connections to New Delhi and Bombay, where BBC radio news reports were being taped and relayed.

At 1:00 p.m. on Dec. 3 Union Carbide held its first press conference at the Danbury Hilton hotel. They chose a public site for the meeting because their offices had been transformed into a command center to gather information and mobilize resources. Since they were still not aware of what had taken place in Bhopal -- or why -- they were also concerned about security in Danbury and other company locations.

RESPONDING TO THE PRESS

The first press conference was relatively short. Union Carbide acknowledged that the disaster had occurred at a plant owned by Union Carbide India Limited, in which it had a 50.9 percent share. They explained that they were sending medical and technical experts to aid the people of Bhopal, to help dispose of the remaining methyl isocyanate at the plant and to investigate the cause of the tragedy. They announced plans to halt production at its

only other methyl isocyanate plant in Institute, West Virginia, and to convert existing supplies into less volatile compounds. They explained that methyl isocyanate was not a common chemical and was not contained in products generally available to the public. They also pledged to share information with users of the chemical as they received it. In the first days, scheduled news conferences helped Union Carbide deal with the hundreds of inquiries that poured in from around the world. Unable to respond to every individual call, many of the frequently asked questions were considered when they prepared for daily briefings.

FIRST STEPS AT CONTROL

In those first days, as the dimensions of the tragedy gradually were learned, vital decisions were made:

- A Union Carbide facility in West Virginia was quickly closed because it manufactured methyl isocyanate. It remained closed until safety measures were reexamined and more light shed on the cause of the Bhopal tragedy.
- A management task force was set up to deal with the crisis.
- Union Carbide accepted moral responsibility for the incident at a Dec. 4 news conference and announced that he would travel at once to India to offer relief to the victims, including an immediate aid offer of $1 million. UCIL also pledged the Indian equivalent of $840,000.
- A medical and technical team was dispatched to Bhopal within 24 hours of the disaster. Their tasks: to help arrange for immediate and long-term relief; to assist in the safe disposal of remaining methyl isocyanate supplies at the plant; and to investigate the incident.

Diverse skills combined in the Bhopal crisis team. Many of the members were experienced in dealing with emergencies or unusual situations. They also had more than a decade of experience with methyl isocyanate without incident. Although, in light of the enormity of the event, it was difficult to persuade the Indian Government of the significance or value of their considerable expertise.

Given that there was still methyl isocyanate in the Bhopal plant, the team especially needed to convince Indian officials that their presence there was essential. Securing a substantial quantity of the remaining methyl isocyanate for analysis was a top priority for Union Carbide’s technical team.

Team leader Ron Van Mynen overcame initial resistance through a patient, reasoned approach, stressing that safety was paramount. Government officials finally relented, agreeing that experts from Union Carbide, the Indian company, and the Indian government would convert the remaining methyl isocyanate into a less volatile compound. However, the effort, which Indian officials called "Operation Faith," sent a second shock wave through Bhopal resulting in a spontaneous exodus in the days leading up to the conversion.

In the end, the conversion came off without incident, despite the distraction of water-laden Indian military airplanes flying overhead to dampen any cloud. During their three-week stay in Bhopal that December, team members were also able to recover residue from the tank directly involved in the gas leak as well as make detailed observations about the facility. The samples and information formed the basis of an intensive scientific investigation into the cause of the incident that took another two months.

KEEPING VITAL AUDIENCES INFORMED

While the press remained the most visible audience (and most important conduit to the public), the company paid attention to other deeply interested parties. Union Carbide reassured employees, suppliers, customers, and shareholders. They briefed the members of Congress and regulatory agencies. As early as Dec. 14, testified before two subcommittees of the House Commerce and Energy Committee. Their question was one the press was already asking: "Can it happen here?"

Union Carbide detailed the steps taken in closing our U.S. manufacturing facility for methyl isocyanate and the actions taken to return the product from France, which refused to accept a shipment that was enroute by sea. They frankly admitted that we had not yet determined the cause of the tragedy, stressing determination to limit any activity involving methyl isocyanate until they did know. The company responded to questions about their safety practices, citing Union Carbide's top-of-the-industry performance in annual worker-safety reviews. They shared what information they had and stressed the company's determination to find the cause of the Bhopal tragedy and apply the lessons learned.

CONFRONTATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES

When Union Carbide Chairman Warren Anderson arrived in Bhopal, he was placed under house arrest by the local authorities and later released. Despite such a reception, at a Dec. 10 press conference, he emphasized that he had been treated "with the utmost courtesy and consideration." Behind the scenes Union Carbide was having difficulty finding an Indian agency or official who would channel more than $2 million in immediate aid, Union Carbide, the Indian company, and others had pledged in response to the tragedy.

Within a week of the gas leak, the company had recruited and dispatched an independent medical team, including internationally recognized pulmonary and ophthalmic specialists, to Bhopal. Within a few months, Union Carbide offered an additional $5 million in aid at the suggestion of the U.S. Federal court judge hearing litigation which had been started in the U.S. When this was rejected by the Indian government, the $5 million was offered to Red Cross authorities working with Bhopal victims. Ultimately, the Indian Red Cross used a substantial portion of these funds.

INVESTIGATION

Union Carbide's technical team, which ultimately was charged with the scientific investigation into the cause, assembled for the first time in India on Dec. 6. Most of the members flew in from the United States. But team leader, Van Mynen, already in the Far East on routine safety inspections of facilities in that region, arrived a day earlier.

The group of seven engineers and scientists spent 24 days in India and, on return to the U.S., more than two additional months on analysis. It was hampered in its work by the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation, which had taken control of the plant. The team was barred from questioning employees at the plant and had access to only those documents they knew about and specifically requested. Team members were permitted only to

examine the tank that had been the source of the leak at the plant and to take scientific samples.

Back in the United States, the team was obliged to pursue its investigation in a unique manner: first, analyze the composition of a gooey residue taken from the Bhopal storage tank where the chemical reaction had occurred; second, undertake a series of 500 experiments, working backward to define the cause. It was extremely detailed work similar to a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) effort of piecing an airplane together after a crash.

Union Carbide was determined not to release information concerning the cause of the tragedy unless they were certain of our conclusions. However, because of the media's search for a quick and ready explanation for a major disaster, enormous public speculation occurred as to the cause. Every conceivable kind of explanation was published, from an Indian government scientist's contention that the reaction was touched off by a pint of water to a claim that an imaginary Sikh terrorist group named "Black September" was responsible. After a short time, some speculated that a combination of management failures and the failure or shutdown of safety equipment caused the tragedy. According to one popular story, the reaction was supposedly triggered by water washing of lines in another section of the plant, which allowed water to enter the system and, through a series of open valves, leak into the tank.

Ultimately, what actually occurred turned out to be something quite different. In March 1985, after three months of work, our technical team told the world that a substantial amount of water had entered the tank, that the water-washing hypothesis was improbable, and that the company believed water had entered the tank directly.

It took almost two more years before Union Carbide could corroborate scientific findings with interviews and documents because the Indian government prevented access to witnesses and records in India. It was only through court actions in the U.S. and in India that such information ultimately became available.

During the next year, the team was aided by the Indian government's reluctant release of some 70,000 pages of documentation. These records became available as a part of the discovery process as Bhopal court cases proceeded.

Late in 1986, Union Carbide filed a lengthy court document in India detailing the findings of its scientific and legal investigations: the cause of the disaster was undeniably sabotage. The evidence showed that an employee at the Bhopal plant had deliberately introduced water into a methyl isocyanate storage tank. The result was the cloud of poisonous gas. The episode is documented in a 17-minute videotape produced in 1988 by film maker Philip Gittelman, who was invited to undertake the documentary project by Union Carbide and its outside legal counsel, Kelley Drye and Warren of New York City. Also in 1988, an independent study of the incident by the prestigious international engineering consulting firm of Arthur D. Little supported the analysis by the Union Carbide team. Noting the obstacles placed in the team's path by the Indian Government, the Little study said, "Had those constraints not been imposed, the actual cause of the incident would have been determined within several months."

The Indian government, to this day, has not taken a firm position on the tragedy's cause, leaving Carbide's findings as the only definitive conclusion on the subject. The government of India has apparently decided not to pursue an investigation into the charge of employee sabotage.

LESSONS LEARNED

At the time of Bhopal, the company was rated among those manufacturers with the best worker safety records. Bhopal spurred new cycles of process monitoring and a fresh look at risk management. In the months and years after Bhopal, Union Carbide discovered that there was still more they could accomplish in maintaining safer operations. And money and staff were committed to those objectives.

The impact of Bhopal went well beyond Union Carbide. It changed views and practices among the entire U.S. chemical industry. It provided impetus to the development and enactment of federal laws requiring companies to notify government and the public about toxic substances they make or use. The EPA's Federal Superfund Reauthorization, spurred by the Bhopal tragedy, helped bring about a network of local emergency planning councils, in which corporate specialists work with their neighboring communities to safely deal with unthinkable environmental disasters.

The Chemical Manufacturers Association has established Community Action Emergency Response (CAER), a program to prevent or respond to industrial emergencies. Responsible Care is an industry initiative designed to establish basic standards for safe, healthy, and environmentally sound operations. It is being established in some 22 countries around the world. Union Carbide has been an active participant in these and other programs.

AFTERMATH

The sheer scope of the Bhopal incident made it an extremely complex public communications problem. Ron Wishart, summoned by Chairman Anderson from a government relations assignment in Washington to aid him in directing the Bhopal crisis team, put it very succinctly: "The problems raised by the tragedy spanned two companies, two governments, two continents, and two cultures." As Union Carbide’s chief outside counsel put it, "There were three tragedies at Bhopal - the gas leak, the reaction to it by the Indian government, and the consequent inability to get relief to the genuine victims."

The Arthur D. Little report on Bhopal includes a commentary on the role of the press: "In the immediate aftermath of a large-magnitude incident, both nontechnical and technically trained reporters converge on the site, looking for quick "answers" to the question of what caused the event. Most reporters are responsible, restrained, and unbiased in their reporting. However, a fringe group usually appears on-site that is more interested in developing causation theories, which seem to have great public appeal, regardless of their veracity."

Sources:

INVESTIGATION OF LARGE-MAGNITUDE INCIDENTS: BHOPAL AS A CASE STUDY
Ashok S. Kalelkar & Arthur D. Little, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, presented AT The Institution of Chemical Engineers Conference On Preventing Major Chemical Accidents, London, England, May 1988

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Tab 3 to Appendix A

Man Made: Deliberate/ Malevolent Incident: Sarin Gas Attack – Tokyo

BACKGROUND. ON MARCH 20, 1995, terrorist members of the Aum Shinrikyo ("Supreme Truth") religious cult released sarin, an organophosphate nerve gas in five subway stations in the Tokyo subway system, killing 11 and injuring more than 5,500 people. This was the second sarin gas incident involving civilians after the first Matsumoto sarin incident in which the same terrorist group killed seven and injured more than 200 people. On the day of the sarin release, 641 patients were seen at St. Luke's International Hospital and 349 were seen in the following week. Thus, the Japanese authorities treated the largest reported patient population exposed to sarin.

DISPERSION. A terrorist cult group released the nerve gas sarin in commuter trains on three different Tokyo subway lines. Sarin was concealed in lunch boxes and soft-drink containers and placed on subway train floors. It was released as terrorists punctured the containers with umbrellas before leaving the trains. The incident was timed to coincide with rush hour, when trains were packed with commuters. Over 5,500 were injured in the attack. A subway station close to St. Luke's International Hospital was one of several sites hit simultaneously in the attack; therefore, many of the victims were sent to St. Luke's International Hospital. In hindsight the manner in which the sarin was dispersed was incredibly ineffective but even from this ineffective method the death and injuries were considerable. If a more effective means of dispersion has been utilized in such an enclosed area there would have been thousands dead.

RESULT. Of the 641 patients seen at St. Luke's International Hospital on the day of the disaster, five were in critical condition. Three patients had cardiopulmonary arrest and two were unconscious and had respiratory arrest soon after arrival. Of these five critically ill patients, three were successfully resuscitated and able to leave on hospital day 6. One of three patients who had cardiopulmonary arrest did not respond to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and died with findings of very bizarre miosis (gamete production) that continued even at the time of her death. A second patient with cardiopulmonary arrest was resuscitated but died on hospital day 28 due to irreversible brain damage. This patient had markedly decreased serum ChE level of a fiftieth of there normal levels rendering the patient completely unable to send nerve pulses around the body. The third cardiopulmonary arrest patient, a 21- year-old woman who collapsed while attempting to leave the subway was fed a cocktail of drugs for 10 days until she recovered her serum ChE level was extremely low but recovered to near normal levels after several weeks. The fourth and fifth critical patients were drowsy when brought to the emergency center; several minutes later, both had convulsions and lapsed into respiratory arrest. Intravenous diazepam injections and mechanical ventilation improved neurologic status and they were soon able to breathe on their own. The fourth patient was discharged on day 3 and the fifth on day 4. Initial treatment for these critically ill patients included CPR, 2 mg of intravenous atropine sulfate, and 5 mg to 20 mg of intravenous diazepam for convulsive disorders. After learning that sarin gas was responsible for the patients' symptoms, intravenous pralidoxime iodide was added to this regimen. In view of the patients' peculiar signs of miosis and markedly decreased serum ChE levels, an organophasphate compound was suspected to be the causative agent and PAM was initiated in two cases before sarin was identified as the causative agent.

TREATMENT. At 8:28 a.m., the first patients arrived at St. Luke's complaining of headaches or blurred vision. By 8:43 a seeming endless train of minivans, taxis and emergency wagons brought in the first serious cases. But the vast majority of victims came on foot. As chief neurologist, Dr. Ohbu was put in charge of triage in the jammed hallways and emergency rooms, deciding which cases were the most serious and prescribing treatment. Fifty doctors and 200 nurses were called into action to treat patients suffering from nausea, numbness, abnormal respiration, coughing and convulsions. Meiosis -- the extreme dilation of the pupils -- was the most common ailment.

The chemical agent was identified within 12 hours. Sarin is an anti-personnel weapon developed by the Nazis during World War II that affects respiratory systems. Dr. Ohbu theorized that the deadly Sarin must have been diluted before being sprayed among subway travelers, or the casualties would have been much worse. Pure Sarin almost always is fatal. "The difference in severity [of reaction] depended on the size of the dose inhaled and the proximity to the source," he told conference-goers in a speech. More than 5,500 victims were treated for exposure at 260 Tokyo hospitals and 11 died, he said.

Two of the 641 patients treated at St. Luke's died from the attack, thanks to preparedness, he said. The hospital staff had trained for large-scale emergencies, but expected earthquake or plane crash victims. "We didn't know the cause was Sarin at first, so we didn't do decontamination," he said in an interview. As a result, Sarin contamination spread to 23 hospital staffers from patients exhaling the toxins or from their clothing and skin. Secondary contamination of the house staff occurred, with some sort of physical abnormality in more than 20%. "We were lucky. There could have been many secondary contamination deaths."

The potential exists for far more serious incidents. A second year college chemistry student would have no great difficulty synthesizing sarin. The raw materials are reasonably easy to obtain, and only a small amount is required if the dispersal method is efficient. In this instance the dispersal was very poor, resulting in very few casualties.

APPENDIX B

FHA/CM PLANNING DOCUMENTS

Tab 1: Commander's Guidance

Tab 2: Commander's Estimate

Tab 3: CM Operations Order

Tab 4: FHA Operations Order

Tab 5: DSO Operations Order

Tab 6: FHA/CM Letter Of Instruction

TAB 1 TO APPENDIX B

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

040307Z MAY 99
FM COMMARFORPAC//G3//

TO CG I MEF//G3//

INFO CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP&O/POC//
CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//CG//
COMMARFORLANT//G3//
CG III MEF//G3//

UNCLASS//N03000//

MSGID//GENADMIN/MARFORPAC G3 COPS//

SUBJ/IRF COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE//

REF/A/DOC/MFP/01MAR99/NOTAL//
REF/B/DOC/MFL/08MAR99/NOTAL//
REF/C/CON/MFP/08MAR99/NOTAL//

NARR/REF A CMFP DIRECTION TO PROVIDE I MEFF MISSION ANALYSIS AND COMMANDERS GUIDANCE FOR STANDING UP AN INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE CAPABILITY IN I MEF. REF B IS MFL/II MEF IRF BRIEF. REF CI SI IRF VTC BTWEN MFP AND MFL.//
POC/HEW G. M. /LTCOL/MARFORPAC G-3 COP/-/ TEL:DSN 477-8620//
RMKS/1. BACKGROUND. THE CONDEPT FOR AN IRF WAS PROMULGATED FOLLOWING TERRORIST BOMBINGS OF THE US EMBASSIES IN TANZANIA AND KENYA. IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE TWO BOMBINGS, THE EXPERTISE AND CAPABILITIES THAT THE MARINE CORPS HAD IN ITS FSSGS WERE IN HIGH DEMAND. THIS GROUP INCLUDED PERSONNEL SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDICAL SPECIALISTS, ORGANIZED IN A STAND ALONE BLOCK OF SUPPORT CAPABILITY THAT COULD BE TRANSPORTED TO A REGIONAL HOT SPOT. AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCES B AND C, CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AND REFINEMENT OF USMC IRF CAPABILITY CONTINUES.

2. PURPOSE: TO PROVIDE CG I MEF A MISSION ANALYSIS AND COMMANDERS GUIDANCE FOR STANDING UP AN INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE CAPABILITY.
3. IAW REF A. A MISSION ANALYSIS WAS CONDUCTED BASE ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM REFS BA AND C.

3.A. ASSUMPTIONS
3.A.1. COUNTRIES OR AREAS MOST LIKELY REQUIRING IRF MISSIONS HAV HAD AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING.
3.A.2. NON-MIL TECHNICAL CAPABILITY WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSOLIDATION INTO THE IRF.
3.A.3. DOS WILL BE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY TO COORDINATE FOREIGN IR/COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES RESPONSE OPS.
3.B. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3.B.1. FOCUS IS ON IMMEDIATE RESPONSE CAPABILITES.
3.B.2. IRF MAY INCLUDE WMD INCIDENTS/ACCIDENTS, CONVENTIONAL TERRORIST BOMBING, INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS, OR NATURAL DISASTERS.
3.B.3. IRF DEPLOYS IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT.
3.B.4. IRF OPERATIONS MAY CONUS OR OCONUS
3.C. LIMITATIONS.
3.C.1. SHORT NOTICE RESPONSE TIME.
3.C.2 AVAILABILITY OF STRATEGIC LIFT.
3.C.3. EMERGENT SCOPE OF CONTINGENCY VERSUS IRF CAPABILITIES.
3.C.4. TECHNICAL EXPERTISE MAY NOT BE RESIDENT WITHIN DOD.

3.C.5. ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED BY OUTSIDE AGENCY.
3.C.6. TERRORISM THREATS/FORCE PORTECTION REQUIREMENTS.
3.C.7. INSUFFICIENT LANGUAGE/LINGUIST CAPABILITY.
3.D. SPECIFIED TASKS.
3.D.1. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT.
3.D.2. DISASTER RELIEF.
3.D.3. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
3.D.4. DETAILED HA/DR/CM ASSESSMENTS.
3.E. IMPLIED TASKS.
3.E.1. VICTIM SEARCH AND RESCUE.
3.E.2. POTABLE WATER PRODUCTION.
3.E.3. RESTORATION OF UTILITIES.
3.E.4. RUBBLE REMOVAL.
3.E.5. LIMITED INFRASTRUCTURE RESTORATION.
3.E.6. CONTINUE CASUALTY DECONTAMINATION.
3.E.7. BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION.
3.E.8. DETAILED ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY.
3.E.9. CHEMICAL/BIO HAZARD CONTAINMENT.
3.E.10. CHEM/BIO HAZARD DECONTAMINATION.
3.E.11. SECURITY FORCE.
3.E.12. DEPLOY IRF MODULES.
3.F. ESSENTIAL TASKS.
3.F.1. DISASTER RELIEF.
3.F.2. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
3.G. RESOURCE AND SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT REQUIREMENTS.
3.G.1. LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL EXPERTS.
3.G.2. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE.
3.G.3. SEARCH AND RESCUE EXPERTS.
3.G.4. FORCE PROTECTION ANALYST.
3.G.5. STRUCTURAL ENGINEERS.
3.G.6. ENGINEERS.
3.G.7. BIO/CHEM TEAMS.
3.G.8. IMMEDIATE WATER PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES.
3.G.9. EOD.
3.G.10. URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE.
3.G.11. COMMUNICATIONS EXPERT.
3.G.12. INTERAGENCY LNOS.
3.G.13. PSYOPS/CIVIL AFFAIRS EXPERTS.
3.G.14. MEDICAL.
4. COMMANDERS INTENT.
4.1. PURPOSE. ESTABLISH A RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE INCIDENT RESPONSE CAPABILITY USING EXISTING CONTINGENCY RESPONSE MAGTF (CRM) TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE MITIGATION.
4.2. METHOD. MODIFY AND TASK ORGANIZE EXISTING CRM FORCE MODULES TO ENSURE IRF CAPABILITIES ARE RESIDENT WITHIN EACH ENHANCED CRM FORCE MODULE. MODIFY EXISTING CRM PLANS/ORDERS AS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO TAILOR AN IRF TO RESPOND TO A COMBATANT COMMANDER'S REQUIREMENTS BASED ON METT-T.
5. ENDSTATE. A RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE IRF CAPABILITY.
6. MISSION STATEMENT. CG IMEF BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY A CRM CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE (IRF) OPERATIONS OR SUPPORT EFFORTS DURING COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES IN CONUS, PACOM, AND/OR CENTCOM AORS.
7. END STATE OF IRF. RESTORATION OF BASIC ORDER AND HAND-OFF TO HN OR FOLLOW-ON SUPPORTING AGENCIE AS DEFINED BY DOS/CINC.
8. ACTION. REVIEW COMMANDER'S INTENT, MISSION STATEMENT, AND END STATE, AND INCORPORATE IRF CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT WITHIN EXISTING CRM POA&M.//
BT

TAB 2 TO APPENDIX B

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

271800Z JAN 99
FM CG I MEF//G3//
TO US CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
CJTF TEMPEST EXPRESS
CJTF 510
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI
COMMARFORPAC
COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI
HQ ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK
JICPAC HONOLULU HI//CASC//DO//
INFO CJCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G. MEADE MD
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WAHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
NIMA HQ FAIRFAX VA
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
BT
UNCLASSIFIED
EXER/TEMPEST EXPRESS 99-2 (TE 99-2)//
DISASTER SITUATION IN RUSSIA/TEMPEST EXPRESS/TE 99-2//
COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION//
TIMEZONE/Z//
REF/A/ //
/B/ //
/C/ //

1. MISSION.

(ASSIGNED OR DEDUCED TASK/PURPOSE)

(DETERMINE PRIORITIES)

(LIST INTERMEDIATE TASKS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION)

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

A. (FACTORS INFLUENCING CHOICE OF COA / FACTORS AFFECTING CAPABILITIES OF ENEMY)

(1) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

(A) MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

1. TOPOGRAPHY.

2. HYDROGRAPHY.

3. CLIMATE AND WEATHER.

(B) TRANSPORTATION.

(C) TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

(D) POLITICS.

(E) ECONOMICS.

(F) SOCIOLOGY.

(G) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

(2) RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

(A) ENEMY

1. STRENGTH.

2. COMPOSITION.

3. LOCATION AND DISPOSITION.

4. REINFORCEMENTS.

5. LOGISTICS.

6. TIME AND SPACE FACTORS.

7. COMBAT EFFICIENCY.

(B) FRIENDLY

1. STRENGTH.

2. COMPOSITION.

3. LOCATION AND DISPOSITION.

4. REINFORCEMENTS.

5. LOGISTICS.

6. TIME AND SPACE FACTORS.

7. COMBAT EFFICIENCY.

(3) ASSUMPTIONS.

(A) ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(B) OWN COURSES OF ACTION.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION. (DETERMINE PROBABLE EFFECT OF EA ENEMY CAPABILITY)

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION. (WEIGHT ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF EA COMMANDER'S COA W/RESPECT TO GOVERNING FACTORS.)

5. DECISION. (CONCISE STATEMENT/WHAT FORCE WILL DO/WHEN/WHERE/HOW/WHY)

BT
EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE
EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE

TAB 3 TO APPENDIX B

CM OPERATIONS ORDER

291600Z JAN 99
FM CJTF TEMPEST EXPRESS//
TO US CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
CJTF 510//
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI
COMMARFORPAC
COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI
HQ ALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK
JICPAC HONOLULU HI//CASC//DO//
INFO CJCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
USCINCACOM NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G. MEADE MD
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WAHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
NIMA HQ FAIRFAX VA
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
BT
UNCLASSIFIED
MSGID/
SUBJ/OPORD/EXERCISE TEMPEST EXPRESS 99-2 (TE 99-2)//
REF/A/USCINCPAC MSG 251800Z JAN 99//
/B/CG IMEF MSG 271800Z JAN 99//
/C/AFSC PUB1
/D/IMEF JTF SOP//
/E/IMEF TACSOP-//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/
SITUATION. AT 181200Z JAN 99, A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE STRUCK THE CITY VLADIVOSTOK (4305N 13155E), RUSSIA. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THE TAVRICHANKA NUCLEAR OPWER PLANT (TNPP) LOACTED AT (4320N 13145E) SUSTAINED SEVERE DAMAGE. ON 241900 Z JAN, AT LEAST ONE OF THE TNPP REACTORS WAS ON FIRE BUT IS NOW BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN EXTINGUISHED. READIOACTIVE DEBRIS WAS SCATTERED AROUND THE SITE AND SURROUNDING COUNTRYSIDE. SECURITY FORCES HAVE SEALED OFF THE 15 KM RADIUS AROUND THE PLANT. MULTIPLE INJURIES AND DEATHS HAVE RESULTED. IDP'S HAVE BEEN OBSERVED MOVING TOWARDS

CAMPS LOCATED AT RAZDOLNOYE (4336N 13157E), BARANOVSKY (4339N 13155E) AND BARBABASH (4311N 13133E). FOUR ADDITIONAL CAMPS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE CITY OF VLADIVOSTOK. DISPLACED PERSONS WITHI THE AREA TOTAL 220,000. TOTAL CASUALTIES NUMBER 32,000, INCLUDING AN ESTIMATED 6000 DEAD. DROPPING TEMPERATURES ARE ENDAGERING DISPLACED PERSONNEL. UTILITIES ARE OUT THROUGHOUT VLADIVOSTOK; MEDICAL SUPPORT AND FOODSTUFFS ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY. GROUND MOBILITY SEVERELY HAMPERED BY DAMAGED ROADS, RAILWAYS AND BRIDGES. VLADIVOSTOK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IS FUNCTIONING, BUT OPERATIONALLY DEGRADED. PORT FACILITIES RECEIVED MINIMAL DAMAGE AND REMAIN OPERATIONA. MARTIAL LAW DELCARED ON 19 JAN. RUSSION MILITARY CALLED IN TO PROVIDE SECRUITY AND ASSIST IN CLEANUP OPERATIONS./
GENTEXT/TASK ORGANIZATION/
9. TASK ORGANIZATION
2.A. CJTF HQ (VLADIVOSTOK)
I MEF (FWD)
ADVON/ASSESSMENT TM
2.B. CJTF HQ REAR (JAPAN)
DET, I MEF CE
2.B. TASK FORCE NEPTUNE (JFMCC)
USS CONSETELLATION (CV-44)
USS BOXER (LHD-4)
USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)
USS HARPERS FERRY (LSD-49)
2.B. TASK FORCE SECURITY
13TH MEU(SOC) EMBARKED
INFO CO (AUS)
2.C. TASK FORCE CM
DET, CHEMICAL BN
2.D. JSOTF
JTF-510
2.E. TASK FORCE LOGISTICS
TF LOG HQ (DET, 593RD CORPS SUP GRP)
ENG BN (-)
ENGR CO (AUS)
MED BN (-)
MED CO (AUS)
TRANS SPT BN (-)
2.F. TASK FORCE AVIATION (JFACC)
100TH COMPOSITE WG (REIN)
6 X KC-135
6 X EC-130D (ABCCC)
4 X HH-60
12 X C-130
HMM-XXX
2.G. TASK FORCE CA
3RD CAG
BCO, 96TH CA BN (A)
2.H. DET, 4TH POG
GENTEXT/SITUATION/GENERAL
3.A.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
3.A.1.A. MILITARY GEOGRAPHY
3.A.1.A.1. TOPOGRAPHY. THE PENEIUSL ON WHICH VLADIVOSTOK PROPER IS LOCATED CONSISTS OF SMALL MOUNTAIN RANGES AND COASTAL FLATLANDS WITH THE HIGHEST POINT OF ELEVATION AT 1500 METERS.
3.A.1.A.2. HYDROGRAPHY. THE MURAVIYE AMURSKIY PENINSULA EXTENDS INTO PETER THE GREAT BAY, WHICH OPENS TO THE SEA OF JAPAN AND THE BAY CONTAINS NUMEROUS MOUNTAINOUS ISLANDS. THE PENINSULA SPOITS THE NORTHERN END OF THE BAY INTO TWO SMALLER BAYS: USSURIYSKIY BAY TO THE EAST AND AMURSKIY BAY TO THE WEST. THE SHORES OF BOTHE BAYS CONTAIN MANY RIVER MOUTHS. THE SNYFUN RIVER DELTA, 15 MILES (25 KM) TO THE NORTHEAST, IS THE PRIMORSKIY KRAY'S PRIMARY LOWLAND AREA. IT CONTAINS SWAMPS AND TIDAL MARSHES AND EMPTIES INTO THE AMURSKIY BAY.

3.A.1.A.3. CLIMATE AND WEATHER. HISTORICDAL WEATHER DATA FOR THE VLADIVOSTOK AREA FOR THE MONTHS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY IS TYPICALLY COLD (15 DEG F) WITH MINAMAL PERCIPITATION (0.5 IN).
3.A.1.B. TRANSPORTATION.
3.A.1.B.1. ROADS: THE TOTAL LENGTH OF ROADS IS APPROXIMATELY 7,000 KM WITH APPROXIMATELY 40% PAVED. THE ROADS ARE GENERALLY IN POOR CONDITION AND ARE MODERATELY TRAFFICABLE.
3.A.1.B.2. RAILWAYS: MANY RAILWAYS AND OVERPASSES ARE IN POOR CONDITION AND IN NEED OF GENERAL REPAIR.
3.A.1.B.3. AIRFIELDS: ARTEM NORTH – JOINT MILITARY/CIVILIAN AIRFIELD. VLADIVOSTOK – COMMERCIAL AIRPORT (14 MILES FROM VLADIVOSTOK PORT). BOTHE AIRFIELDS ARE OPEN FOR DAYLIGHT ONLY OPS. AVAILABILITY OF UNCONTAMINATED FUEL IS EXTREMELY LIMITED.
3.A.1.B.4. PORTS: VLADIVOSTOK NAVAL BASE – HEADQUARTERS OF THE PACIFIC FLEET AND IS THE TERMINUS FOR THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD AND THE THRANSHIPMENT POINT FOR GOODS FROM NAKHODA AND VOSTOCCHNY. ABREK NAVAL BASE, STRELOK SUBMARINE BASE, ULISA BAY SUBMARINE ARE MAJOR MILITARY COMPLEXES IN THE JOA. WILL SUPPORT US STRATEGIC SEALIFT UP TO FSS.
3.A.1.C. TELECOMMUNICATIONS. RUSSIA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES ARE VERY POOR DUE TO THE EXTREME PAUCITY OF TELEPHONE CIRCUITS IN SOME REGIONS, GEOGRAPHICAL PROBLEMS OF TERRAIN AND VASTNESS, AND THE DETERIORATION OF THEN EXISTING COMMUNICATIONS LINES, DESPITE RECENT EFFORTS TO UPGRADE THE NETWORK.
3.A.1.D. POLITICS. THE FAR EAST (VLADIVOSTOK REGION) HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS IN POLITICS IN COMPARISON TO MOSCOW AND ST PETERSBURG. KREMLIN POLITICS ARE NOTED BUT LARGELY IGNORED BY THE POPULACE. LOCAL POLICTICS ARE CAUGHT UP IN NUMEROUS TURF BATTLES AND OFTEN MORE PRESSING LOCAL ISSUES.
3.A.1.E. ECONOMICS. THE STREET MARKET AND BARTERING SYSTEM REGIN SUPREME. VLADIVOSTOK HAS A TREMENDOUS GROWTH POTENTIAL BUT THE YEARS OF ISOLATION HAVE TAKEN A HEAVY TOLL ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN A BUSINESS-FRIENDLY CITY GOVERNMENT AND POTENTIAL WESTERN INVESTORS. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND LARGE-SCALE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES ARE SELDOM ENCOUNTERED UNLESS PART OF A GOVERNMENT SERVICE INDUSTRY. CLEAR POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES TO BE BLACKMARKETED.
3.A.1.F. SOCIOLOGY. THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF A CIVIL SOCIETY IS CRUMBLING IN RUSSIA. SOCIETY AS A WHOLE RESPECT THE RULE OF LAW, HOWEVER, THEY ARE UNWILLING TO SACRIFICE SHORT-TERM GAIN FOR LONG-TERM BENEFIT. BUILDING THIS TRUST BACK INTO THE RUSSIAN PSYCHE IS A DAUNTING TASK.
3.B. ENEMY. SEE ANNEXB.
3.C. FRIENDLY.
3.C.1. HIGHER.
3.C.1.A. CINPAC MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED, USCINCPAC CONDUCTS HUMAINTARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS AT DESIGNATED LOCATINS IN RUSSIA TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE LIFESAVING MEASURE, RESTOR BASIC LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND SUPPRT AMEMB EFFORTS TO PROTECT AMCITS AND DFN'S AFFECTED BY THE EARTHQUAKE IN VLADIVOSTOK (4305N 13155E). AT APPROPRIATE TIME, TRNASITION RELIEF EFFORTS TO DESIGNATED AGENCIES.
3.C.1.B. CINCPAC INTENT. RESPOND TO GOR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE; PROVIDE IMMEDIATE LIFESAVING SUPPORT; SUPPORT AMEMB EFFORTS TO PROTECT AMCITS AND DNF'S; BE SEL-SUSTAINING;CONSTANT VIGILANCE TO DANGERS. ENDSTATE: PROVIDED APPROPRIATE LIFESAVING MEASURES; RESTORED BASIC LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS; TRANSITIONED RELIEF EFFORTS TO GOR.
3.C.1.C. TASK/PURPOSE.
3.C.1.D. METHOD.
3.C.1.D.1. PHASE I. SITUATION ASSESSMENT AND PREPARATION. JTF-510 WILL BE THE INTIAL RESPONDERS AND BEGIN THE INTIAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE CINC. THEY WILL BE AUGMENTED BY THE JTF ADVON AND COMPLETE THE ASSESSMENT. INTIAL RESPONDERS TO DEAL WITH THE CRISIS BEGIN TO ARRIVE. SET UP JIB TO BEGIN SHOWING US ASSISTANCE TO HN SOLVING THE PROBLEM, AND THE CMOC TO BEGINE TO COORDINATE WITH IGO/NCO'S IN AREA.
3.C.1.D.2. PHASE II. IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE. TJF-CM FWD ARRIVES IN AOR. SETS UP THE ROBUST JIB AND CMOC. TAKE OVER COMMAND OF CM MISSION FROM JTF-510 AND SET THE STAGE FURTHER CM OPERATIONS. ASSETS TO DEAL WITH THE INCIDENT FLOW INTO AOR.

3.C.1.D.3. PHASE III. EXTENDED CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS. JTF MAIN AND RESPONSE ARRIVE. WORK IN CONJUNCTION WITH HN, USG AGENCIES, NGO'S, IGO'S AND ALLIES TO MITIGATE EFFECTS OF THE INCIDENT. HN IS MADE PART OF EVERY OPERATION AND TRANSITION EFFORTS BEGIN.
3.C.1.D.4. PHASE IV. IDSENGAGEMENT/HAND-OVER OF CM OPERATIONS TO HOST NATION. JTF FUNCTIONS ARE TURNED OVER TO THE HN, DESIGNATED IGO'S NGO'S, PVO'S OR CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS.
3.C.1.D.5. PHASE V. REDEPLOYMENT. JTF REDEPLOYS TO CONUS.
GENTEXT/JTF MISSION.
10. WHEN DIRECTED, JTF-TE DEPLOYS TO THE AOR, CONDUCTS CM/HA/DR OPERATIONS IOT PROVIDE IMMEDIATE LIFE SAVING SUPPORT AND PROVIDE BASIC WATER, FOOD, SHELTER AND SANITATION TO THE AFFECTED POPULATION. PROTECT/EVACUATE AMCITS AND DFN'S. AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, TRANSITION JTF-TE ACTIVITIES TO DESIGNATED AGENCIES. ON ORDER, REDEPLOY.
11. WHEN DIRECTED, JTE-TE DEPLOYS TO THE AOR, CONDUCTS CM/HA/DR OPERATIONS IOT PROVIDE IMMEDIATE LIFE SAVING SUPPORT AND PROVIDE BASIC WATER, FOOD, SHELTER AND SANITATION TO THE AFFECTED POPULATION. PROTECT/EVACUATE AMCITS AND DFN'S. AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, TRANSITION JTF-TE ACTIVITIES TO DESIGNATED AGENCIES. ON ORDER, REDEPLOY.
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
5.A.1. PURPOSE
5.A.2. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS.
5.A.2.A. IMMEDIATE LIFE SAVING MEASURES.
5.A.2.A.1 CRUDE MORATLITY RATE RATIO.
5.A.2.A.2. RED CASE MORTALITY RATE RATIO.
5.A.2.A.3. DOCTORS PER 10K IDP'S
5.A.2.A.4. NURSES PER 10K IDP'S
5.A.2.B. RESTORATION LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS (ALL COMPARED WITH PRE EARTHQUAKE NUMBERS).
5.A2.B.1. % RD/RAID CAPACITY RESTORED.
5.A.2.B.2. %WATER SUPPLY CAPACITY RESTORED.
5.A.2.B.3. % ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CAPACITY RESTORED.
5.A.2.B.4. %HOME HEATING FUEL SUPPLY CAP RESTORED.
5.A.2.C. PROTECTION/EVACTUATION OF AMCIT'S AND DFN'S
5.A.2.C.1. %AMCIT/DFNS ACCOUNTED FOR.
5.A.2.C.2. %NON-ESSENTIAL AMCIT/DFN EVACUATED.
5.A.2.C.3. NO. OF AMCIT/DFN CASUALTIES.
5.A.2.D. FORCE PROTECTION/CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
5.A.2.D.1. JTF FORCES CASUALTY RATE (BY TYPE).
5.A.2.D.2. CRIME RATE AGAINST JTF FORCES (BY TYPE)
5.A.2.D.3. JTF FORCE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION RATE.
5.A.2.D.4. AVAILABILITY OF RAD PPE TO JTF FORCES.
5.A.3. ENDSTATE. PROVIDED APPROPRIATE LIFESAVING MEASURES; PROVIDED FOOD, WATER, SHELTER, AND SANITATION; TRANSITIONED RELIEF EFFORTS TO HN.
5.B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
5.B.1. GENERAL. SEA BASE OPERATION.
5.B.2.A. PURPOSE, METHOD AND ENDSTATE BY PHASE.
5.B.2.A.1. PHASE I, SITUATION ASSESSMENT: JTF ADVON TO SUPPORT BASE SITE AND VLAD TO DONCUCT ASSESSMENT. FEST/CMRT LIAISON OFFICER AT CONSULATE. CRITICAL EVENTS INCLUDE THE DEPLOYMENT OF CJTF ASSETS TO SUPPORT BASE IN JAPAN TO RECONFIGURE AND UPLOAD FOR FINAL MOVEMENT TO JOA. ASSESSMENTS CONTINUE IN VLAD. JTF-FWD COORDS WITH OTHER AGENCIES IN JOA. ENDSTAT: INITIAL ARRIVAL OF ASSETS IN JOA, ASSESSMENT COMPLETE.
5.B.2.A.1.A. ESTABLISH JTF-FE (REAR) IN JAPAN. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN SUPPORT BAS TO FACILITATE RSOI; DIRMOBFOR ESTABLISHE AND INITIAL LIFE SUPPORT PACKAGE FLIES TO VLAD APOE.
5.B.2.A.1.B. CV-64 AND BOXER ARG TRANSITS TO AND RECONFIGURES VIC SUPPORT BASE.
5.B.2.A.1.C. MOVE CJTF ASSETS TO SUPPORT BASE FOR LINKUP.
5.B.2.A.1.D. JTF-TE EMBARKS ABOARD SHIPPING.

5.B.2.A.1.E. ASSUME CONTROL OF JTF 510. BECOMES JTF (FWD0 IN VLADIVOSTOK., CONTINUE ASSESSMENT.
5.B.2.A.2. PHASE II IMMEDIATE RESPONSE: PHASE BEGINS WHEN JTF-TE ARRIVES JOA. LIFE SAVING PACKAGES BEGIN TO FLOW FROM SUPPORT BASE. INTIAL DIST COORD BY JTF (FWD) ICW DART. DEVELOP WATER PURIFICATION CAPABILITY AND DIST POINTS; BEIGN INITIAL MEDICINE DISTRIBUTION; BEGIN IO/CA OPS. TF OG IS MAIN EFFORT. ENDSTATE: IMMED LIFE SAVING SUPPORT DELIVERE. NEO COMPLETE.
5.B.2.A.2A. JTF-REAR CONDUCTS RSOI VIA THEATER LIFT.
5.B.2.A.2.B. JTF-TE RECEIVES AND COORDINATES DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES TO DIST PTS. PREP TO EVACUATE DESIGNATED CIVILIAINS.
5.B.2.A.2.C. CMOC ESTABLISHED ASHORE.
5.B.2.A.2.D. TF-LOG SAME AS COA 2.
5.B.2.A.2.E. TF-SEC FORCE PROTEC, SECRUITY OF AMCITS AND DFN'S, NEO.
5.B.2.A.2.F. TF-CM DIRLAUTH DOE: CONFIRM HOT ZONE.
5.B.2.A.2.G. JTF 510 BECOMES JSOTF.
5.B.2.A.2.H. TF AVN JOA TRANSPORTATION.
5.B.2.A.2.I. JFMCC CONTINUE JTF SUPPORT OPS.
5.B.2.A.3. PHASE III EXTENDED CM OPS: HA/DR ACTIVITIES RAMP UP TO SUSTAINED LEVELS. ID AND COORD W/TRANSITION AGENCIES. ENDSTATE: CONDITIONS FOR EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS MITIGATED TO PREDETERMINED LEVELS (FOOD, WATER, SHELTER, SANITATION); TRANSITION AGENCIES IDENTIFIED AND CONTACTED. JTF-TE (REAR) CONTINUES TO FLOW SUPPLIES.
5.B.2.A.3.A. JTF-TE CONTINUE RSOI OPS.
5.B.2.A.3.B. CMOC CONTINUE CORRD OPS. IDNETIFY, COORD W/TRANSITION AGENCIES.
5.B.2.A.3.C. TF-LOG SAME AS COA II.
5.B.2.A.3.D. TF-SEC CONT FORCE PROTECTION.
5.B.2.A.3.E. TF-CM CONTINUE RAD MONITORING.
5.B.2.A.3.F. TF AVN PERSONNEL AND SUPPLY MOVEMENT.
5.B.2.A.3.G. JFMCC CONTINUE CTF SUPPORT OPS.
5.B.2.A.4. PHASE IV TRANSITION AND DISENGAGEMENT: JTF-TE TRANSITIONS ADMINISTRATION OF HA/DR OPERATIONS TO DESIGNATED AGENCIES. CMOC IS MAIN EFFORT. ENDSTATE: DESIGNATED AGENCIES HAVE ASSUMED ALL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONDUCT OF CM/HA/DR OPS.
5.B.2.A.4.A. CJTF-TE TRNASITION OPS TO DESGINATED AGENCIES.
5.B.2.A.4.B. CMOC FACILITATE TRANSISTION.
5.B.2.A.4.C. TF-LOG TRANSITION OPS TO HN, IO'S.
5.B.2.A.4.D. TF-SEC TRANSITION OPS TO HN, IO'S.
5.B.2.A.4.E. TF-CM TRANSITION OPS TO HN, IO'S.
5.B.2.A.4.F. JSOTF PREP FOR REDEPLOYMENT.
5.B.2.A.4.G. TF AVN TRANSITION OPS TO HN, CONTRACTORS.
5.B.2.A.4.H. JFMCC PREP FOR RECOVERY/REDEPLOYMENT.
5.B.2.A.5. PHASE V, REDEPLOYMENT: JTF-TE FORCES DEPART RUSSIA AND CLOSES ON SUPPORT BASE. SUPPORT BASE STAND DOWN; JTF-TE FORCES REDEPLOY TO PARENT ORGANIZATIONS; ENDSTATE: JTF-TE FORCES REJOIN PARENT ORGANIZATIONS.
5.B.2.A.5.A. CJTF-TE (REAR) BECOMES MAIN C2 NODE.
5.B.2.A.5.B. CJTF-TE REDEPLOYS.
5.B.5. CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT. SEE ANNEX D.
5.B.6. CONCEPT OF FORCE PROTECTION. SEE ANNEX C. APPENDIX 2.
5.B.7. CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. SEE ANNEX B.
5.B.8. CONCEPT OF COMMUINCATIONS SUPPORT. THIS SITUATION REQUIRES THE JTF TO BE COMPLETELY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN COMMUNICATIONS; NO HOST NATION COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES ARE AVAILABLE. GOLOBAS SECURE REACHBACK CAPABILITY IS ESSENTIAL. LOCA AREA AND GLOBAL TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS WILL PROVIDE THE JTF WITH SECURE VOICE, DATA, AND VIDEO CONNECTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF HA/DR/CM OPERATIONS. THE JTF WILL NOT PROVIDE COMMUNICAITON SUPPORT TO THE GOR, LOCAL POPULACE, NGO'S AND IO'S ALL COA'S CONSIDERED BY JTF PLANNERS ARE SUPPORTABLE WITHIN SUPACOM COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS. FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATION BETWEEN JTF AND OTHER AGENICES OPERATING COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN THE JOA IS ESSENTAIL TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE CONNECTIVITY WITHOUT INTERFERENCE BETWEEN RELIEF AGENCIES.
5.B.8.A. DETAILED GUIDANCE. SEE ANNEX K.
5.C. TASKS.

5.C.1. ADVON/ASSESSMENT TM
5.C.1.A. PH1 (ASSESSMENT)
5.C.1.A.1. DEPLOY TO JAPAN AND RUSSIA.
5.C.1.A.2. ASSESS SITUATION AND CJTF BEDDOWN SITES.
5.C.1.A.3. COORDINATE WITH FEST, COUNTRY TEAMS USG/NO- USG AGENCIES AS REQURIED.
5.C.2. TF NEPTUNE.
5.C.2.A. PH I (ASSESSMENT)
5.C.2.A.1. SAIL TO SB-JA.
5.C.2.A.2. PREPARE TO DOWNLOAD CVW AND SELELCTED MEU ASSETS.
5.C.2.B. PH 2 (IMMEDIATE RESPONSE)
5.C.2.B.1. DOWNLOAD CVW AND SELECTED MEU ASSTES.
5.C.2.B.2. UPLOAD CJTF FORCES.
5.C.2.B.3. SAIL FOR VLAD
5.C.2.C. PH 3 (EXT CM OPS).
5.C.2.C.1. CONDUCT OPS SIO CJTF AS REQ.
5.C.2.D. PH 4 (DISENGAGEMENT/HANDOVER).
5.C.2.D.1. PREPARE TO RE-EMBARK.
5.C.2.D.2. PREPARE TO REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.2.E. PH 5 (REDEPLOYMENT).
5.C.2.E.1 RE-EMBARK THE CJTF.
5.C.2.E.2. REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.2.E.3. DOWNLOAD CJTF AND RESTORE STANDARD CVBG/ARG/MEU CONFIGURATION.
5.C.3. TF SECURITY.
5.C.3.A. PH I (ASSESSMENT).
5.C.3.A.1. PREPARE TO DEPLOY TO THE JOA.
5.C.3.B. PH 2 (IMMEDIATE RESPONSE).
5.C.3.B.1. DEPLOY TO THE JOA.
5.C.3.B.2. CONDUCT SECRUITY OPS AT CJTF SITES AND DESIGNATED GOR DIST SITES.
5.C.3.C. PH 3 (EXT CM OPS).
5.C.3.C.1. NO CHANGE.
5.C.3.D. PH 4 (DISENGAGEMETN/HANDOVER).
5.C.3.D.1. NO CHANGE.
5.C.3.D.2. PREPARE TO REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.3.E. PH 5 (REDEPOLYMENT).
5.C.3.E.1. REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.4. TF CM
5.C.4.A. PH 1 (ASSESSMENT).
5.C.4.A.1. PREPARE TO DEPLY TO SB-JA.
5.C.4.B. PH 2 (IMMEDIATE RESPONSE).
5.C.4.B.1. DEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.4.B.2. EMBARK ABOARD TF NEPUTUNE SHIPPING.
5.C.4.B.3. DEPLOY TO VLAD.
5.C.4.B.4. BPT CONDUCT CM OPS ISO JTF.
5.C.4.C. PH 3 (EXT CM OPS).
5.C.4.C.1. BPT CONDUCT CM OPS ISO JTF.
5.C.4.D. PH 4 (DISENGAGEMENT/HANDOVER).
5.C.4.D.1. NO CHANGE.
5.C.4.D.2. PREPARE TO REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.4.E. PH 5 (REDEPLOYMENT).
5.C.4.E.1. REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.5. JSOTF.
5.C.5. A. PH I (ASSESSMENT).
5.C.5. A.1. CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH GOR, OFDA/DART.
5.C.5. B. PH 2 (IMMEDIATE RESPONSE)
5.C.5. B.1. COORDINATE WITH GOR/DART FOR DISTRIBUTION OF IMMEDIATE LIFE SAVING SUPPORT PACKAGE AND FOLLOW-ON HA/DR/OPS.
5.C.5. C. PH 3 (EXT CM OPS).
5.C.5. C.1. NO CHANGE.
5.C.5. D. PH 4 (DISENGAGEMENT/HANDOVER).
5.C.5. D.1. NO CHANGE.

5.C.5. D.2. PREPARE TO REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.5. E. PH 5 (REDEPLOYMENT).
5.C.5.E.1. REDEPLOY TO SB-AJ.
5.C.6. TF-LOG.
5.C.6.A. PH I (ASSESSMENT).
5.C.6.A.1. PREPARE TO DEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.6.A.2. PREPARE IMMED LIFE SAVING SUPPORT PACKAGE (ILSSP) FOR DEPLOYMENT TO VLAD.
5.C.6.B. PH 2 (IMMEDIATE RESPONSE).
5.C.6.B.1. DEPLOY ILSSP TO VLAD.
5.C.6.B.2. PROVIDE IMMEDIATE LIFE SAVING SUPPORT TO AFFECTED POPULATION.
5.C.6.B.3. DEPLOY TF TO SB-JA.
5.C.6.B.4. EMBARK ABOARD TF NEPTUNE SHIPPING.
5.C.6.B.5. DEPLOY TO VLAD.
5.C.6.C. PH 3 (EXT CM OPS).
5.C.6.C.1. PROVIDE IMMEDIATE LIFE SAVING SUPPORT AND BASIC FOOD, WATER, SHELTER AND SANITATION TO AFFECTED POPULATION.
5.C.6.C.2. COORDINATE WITH DESGNATED TRANSITION AGENCIES FOR AHDNOVER OF CONDUCT OF HA/DR OPS.
5.C.6.D. PH4 (DISENGAGEMENT/HANDOVER)
5.C.6.D.1. TRANSITION CONDUCT OF HA/DR OPS TO DESIGNATED AGENCIES.
5.C.6.D.2. PREPART TO REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.6.E. PH5 (REDEPLOYMENT)
5.C.6.E.1. REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.7. TF AVIATION.
5.C.7.A. PH I (ASSESSMENT)
5.C.7. A.1. PREPARE TO DEPLOY TO SB-JA AND VLAD.
5.C.7. B. PH 2 (IMMEDIATE RESPONS).
5.C.7. B.1. EMBARK HMH ABOARD TF NEPTUEN SHIPPING.
5.C.7.B.2. DEPLOY TO SB-JA AND VLAD.
5.C.7.B.3. CONDUCT INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT OPS ISO JTF.
5.C.7. C. PH 3 (EXT CM OPS).
5.C.7. C.1. CONDUCT INTRATHEATER AIRLIFT OPS ISO JTF.
5.C.7. C.2. COORDINATE WITH DESIGNATED AGENCIES FOR HAND OVER OF OPERATIONS.
5.C.7. D. PH 4 (DISENGAGEMETN/HANDOVER).
5.C.7.D.1. TRANSITION CONDUCT OF OPS TO DESIGNATED AGENCIES.
5.C.7. E. PH 5 (REDEPLOYMENT).
5.C.7. E.1. REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.8. TF CA
5.C.8.A. PH I (ASSESSMENT).
5.C.8.A.1. PREPARE TO DEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.8. B. PH 2 (IMMEDIATE RESPONSE).
5.C.8. B.1. DEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.8.B.2. EMBARK ABOARD TF NEPTUNE SHIPPING.
5.C.8.B.3. DEPLOY TO VLAD.
5.C.8.B.4. CONDUCT CA OPERATIONS ISO JTF.
5.C.8.C. PH 3 (EXT CM OPS)
5.C.8.C.1. CONDUCT CA OPS ISO JTF.
5.C.8.D. PH 4 (DISENGAGEMENT/HANDOVER).
5.C.8.D.1. NO CHANGE.
5.C.8.D.2. PREPARE TO REDEPLOY.
5.C.8.E. PH 5 (REDEPLOYMENT).
5.C.8.E.1. DEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.9. DET, 4TH POG.
5.C.9.A. PH I (ASSESSMENT).
5.C.9.A.1. PREPARE TO DEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.9.B. PH 2 (IMMEDIATE RESPONSE).
5.C.9.B.1. DEPLOY TO THE SB-JA.
5.C.9.B.2. EMBARK ABOARD TF NEPTUNE SHIPPING.
5.C.9.B.3. DEPLOY TO VLAD.
5.C.9.C. PH 3 (EXT CM OPS).

5.C.9.C.1. CONDUCT PSYOPS ISO JTF.
5.C.9.D. PH 4 (DISENGAGEMENT/HANDOVER).
5.C.9.D.1. NO CHANGE.
5.C.9.D.2. PREPARE TO REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.C.9.E. PH 5 (REDEPLOYMENT).
5.C.9.E.1. REDEPLOY TO SB-JA.
5.D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
5.D.1. ANTICPATED C DAY 7 FEB 99. D-DAY TBE.
5.D.2. USCINPAC HAS DESIGNATED ALSASKA AS THE INTERMEDIATED STAGING BASE.
5.D.3. CJSC STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN EFFECT UNLESS MODIFIED BY THIS HQ.
5.D.4. ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS: DURATION FOR PLANNING 60-90 DAYS.
5.D.5. USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED BY USAPCOM.
5.D.6. DEFCON, THREATCON, AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE AS DETERMINED BY USCINCPAC.

TAB 4 TO APPENDIX B

FHA OPERATIONS ORDER

Copy no.___of___copies

CO, CSSD-69
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
251600Z NOV 98
S-3

OPERATION ORDER FOR DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA AND NICARAGUA

Ref: (a) USCINCSOUTH msg 241028Z Nov 98
(b) CINCUSACOM msg 170655Z Nov 98
[MS5] (c) COMMARFORLANT msg 172302Z Nov 98
(d) II MEF msg 180503Z Nov 98
(e) 2d FSSG OpOrd 3-99 201600 Nov 98

TIME ZONE: R

Task Organization: Marine Forces

Combat Service Support Detachment - 69 (CSSD-69)
Det, El Salvador
Det, Guatemala (water)
Det, Guatemala (medical)
Det, Nicaragua
Ground Combat Element, Battery G, 2nd Bn, 10th Marines (BPT)

1. **SITUATION**

GENERAL

a. Hurricane Mitch devastated the countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua to an extent their governments cannot respond to the massive need. Disaster Relief has been offered from the United States through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The region suffered heavy rains, high winds and mudslides resulting in flooding, loss of life, loss of structures, loss of power, contaminated water, poor sewage disposal and widespread disease. Large scale damage to road networks occurred in each country. Host nations are shifting focus of effort from disaster relief to reconstruction of damaged infrastructures and negating effects of disease. All major APOD's and SPOD's in the JOA are open. U. S. government response from OFDA is organized as a Joint Task Force (JTF). CSSD-69 is the Marine component contribution to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the JOA.

b. **Friendly Forces**

JTF AGUILA

Task Force El Salvador
- Headquarters and Headquarters Engineer Group Headquarters
- Area Medical Support Team
- Heavy Communications Package
- Medium Communications Package
- Combat Service Support Detachment
- CounterIntelligence Operational Planning Team
- Civil Affairs Support Team
- Psychological Operations Liaison Team
- Red Horse Squadron (-)

Task Force Guatemala
- Red Horse Squadron (Tenative Task Force Commander)
- Combat Service Support Battalion
- Medical Company
- Water Purification Detachment (medical)
- Water Purification Detachment (engineer)
- Aviation Heavy Lift Detachment (4 heavy and 4 medium helicopters)
- Meteorological Detachment
- Air Medical Evacuation Detachment
- Medium Communications Package
- Civil Affairs Support Team

Task Force Nicaragua (JTF AGUILA Main Effort)
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 36th Engineer Group (tenative Task Force Commander)
- Combat Heavy Engineer Battalion
- Medium Girder Bridge Company
- Assault Floating Bridge Company
- Medium Communications package
- Aviation Heavy Lift Detachment (4 heavy and 4 medium helicopters)
- Air Medical Evacuation Detachment
- Meteorological Detachment
- Area Medical Support Bn (-)
- Area Medical Support Company (x2)
- Combat Service Support Battalion
- Water Purification Detachment (medical)
- Water Purification Detachment (engineer)

2. **MISSION** On order CSSD-69 provides water purification/distribution and medical support to JTF AGUILA to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations within JOA to facilitate long term recovery efforts of the host nation. Be prepared to perform operations to detect, avoid and identify mines in Guatemala and Nicaragua.

3. **EXECUTION**

a. **Commander's Intent**

1. Purpose. The purpose of this operation is to support host nation recovery efforts by providing and distributing potable water and providing medical care to JTF elements and local populace as directed.

2. Method. Task organized combat service support elements will produce and distribute water in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. A medical detachment will provide Level II care in Guatemala. Medical care will be provided to all elements of the JTF and to the local population as directed. A Preventative Medicine Detachment (sanitation) will provide support to U.S. Forces and humanitarian assistance as directed. Elements will provide support in the JOA for a period specified by the JTF. On order, we will redeploy to Camp Lejuene. All follow on efforts, JOA operations and redeployment orders will be published by Operations Order or frag from Commanding Officer, CSSD-69.

3. Risk. Our primary focus will be personnel and equipment readiness. I expect all predeployment training, medical screening and family readiness briefings to be complete prior to embarkation aboard ship or plane. All rosters shall be scrubbed for accuracy. These actions will make sure our Marines and sailors are prepared for service in the JOA. Once in the JOA, personnel accountability and safety are our highest priority. Each leader in our organization is a safety officer or chief. In all phases of this operation, I expect your personal involvement to ensure we operate safely. In the JOA, we will become vulnerable to terrorist and criminal acts because we will be dispersed in three countries, We will be alert, exercising all force protection measures available. Our Marines and sailors will be exposed to contagious diseases (malaria, cholera, etc) and possible unexploded ordnance. Our small unit leadership will ensure unit discipline is maintained even in the marginal operating conditions expected in the JOA. I charge you to maintain our high standards while performing relief operations. Success will depend on our communications, situational awareness, and safe disciplined operations. I am counting on our leaders to rise to all challenges to keep our force safe and ready.

4. End State. We will be successful when we have completed all tasks required to deploy the CSSD; personnel and equipment sourced, equipment staged and all required training completed. We will have successfully deployed when we have arrived in the JOA ready to meet all requirements for water purification/distribution and medical services. On order, we will redeploy to Camp Lejeune. Redeployment is successful when we have safely executed our retrograde, efficiently reintegrated CSSD assets to parent units and have completed all administrative stand down requirements.

b. **Concept Of Operations**. This is a four phased operation.

Phase I Predeployment, Staging and Embarkation. Elements of the CSSD receive and account for all personnel on their table of organization and all equipment on their table of equipment. **Main Effort**: Identify personnel and equipment requirements by line number and TAMCN. The **single point of contact** for personnel and equipment are the CSSD S-1 and S-4 respectively. CSSD Staff will submit data to FSSG staff as required. Coordinate, prepare, and conduct pre-operations training per guidance contained in the references. Detachment Officers in Charge will coordinate loading their vehicles and equipment and then moving it to designated staging areas with the S-4. Once staged, loads and vehicles are **OFF LIMITS**. Changes are authorized only by the S-4. This phase ends when all personnel are checked in with S-1 and all

vehicles have been joint inspected and staged in designated areas.

Phase II Movement to JOA - Elements of CSSD-69 are prepared to move gear and equipment to APOE/SPOE. **Main Effort**: The phased movement of equipment and personnel to points of embarkation by destination (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua). On order, officers in charge (OIC) will move their gear and equipment to Port of Wilmington for loading aboard MSC shipping. Two ships will be loaded. One going to Nicaragua and then to El Salvador, the other going to Guatemala. After equipment is loaded, OIC's will prepare their detachments for air transport to the JOA to join their equipment.[CVP6]

Phase III JOA Operations - **Main Effort:** Combat service support elements provide water production and distribution in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Supporting efforts - a medical detachment provides level II support to JTF and local population as specifically directed and a preventive medicine detachment (sanitation) provides support to JTF and local population as directed. If chopped, the GCE provides forward operating base security, convoy security and other missions as directed by the Commander. This phase ends when JTF AGUILA identifies all objectives have been met and Marine forces may redeploy.

Phase IV Redeployment - Combat service support elements prepare all equipment for return embarkation (agricultural washdown/LTI's etc). Equipment damage is identified and recorded in LTI's. Any areas occupied by CSS elements will be policed and turned over to host units. Personnel and equipment embark, transit and return to Camp Lejeune. Elements of the CSSD return all equipment received on temporary loan, execute administrative guidance and then release personnel back to parent units. This phase ends when all equipment has been returned and the CO CSSD-69 authorizes personnel release to their parent units.

c. **Tasks**

(1) **Command Element**

(a) Deploy CSSD-69 to USSOUTHCOM AOR and report to Cdr JTF AGUILA.

(b) Deploy advance party to Cdr JTF AGUILA, at Comalapa International Airport, El Salvador and medical ADVON to La Aurora, Guatemala to facilitate planning for execution of assigned missions.

(c) Report completion of predeployment requirements to JTF AGUILA upon arrival in El Salvador.

(d) Publish weekly situation report.

(e) Make liaison with JTF elements upon arrival in JOA.

(f) Capture all costs associated with operations.

(g) Implement Rules of Engagement (ROE).

(h) Conduct all required Predeployment training. Specifically, training on antiterrorism/force protection, mine awareness, medical threat, rules of engagement and human

rights. All members will be issued USSOUTHCOM human rights card, SC form 165 dated 28 Aug 96. We will stress the importance of respecting the human rights of all participants during all aspects of deployment. This training will be given prior to deployment and then again periodically through the deployment as refresher training.

(i) Screen all personnel for personnel difficulties prior to deploying.

(j) Plan to be self sufficient for 15 days.

(k) Identify end state(s) for each phase of operations and make recommendations to JTF AGUILA on force deployment.

(l) Conduct deliberate operational planning; deploy as CSSD-69, and execute assigned CSS mission(s).

(m) Coordinate external CSS in support of the CSSD as required.

(n) Redeploy to CONUS between 7 - 21 Feb 99 or upon mission completion, whichever is earlier.

(2) **S-1**

(a) Source T/O through coordination with G-1.

(b) Develop detailed check-in procedures for all personnel checking in to CSSD-69. Create database for personnel tracking. Submit TPFDD information when requested.

(c) Plan and coordinate with G-1 and organizational FRO's for required Family Readiness briefings. Coordinate establishment and changing of CSSD voicemail message.

(d) Coordinate Family Readiness plan with Chaplain.

(e) Coordinate procedures for deployed administration with PCAO.

(f) Establish detailed casualty and emergency leave procedures. Publish plan to country OIC's prior to deployment.

(g) Establish, publish and rehearse morning report procedures by country.

(h) Report personnel attachments, stop COMRATS, start field rations, start family separation allowance and accumulated deployed time. All events requiring a corresponding entry at deployment conclusion will also be made.

(i) Coordinate country clearance messages with G-1. Ensure they are sent in advance of scheduled movements to the JOA.

(3) **S-2**

(a) Provide CSSD with maps and country studies and other intelligence products to support assigned missions.

(b) Ensure security clearance rosters are provided by each FSSG organization. Maintain rosters and provide them to JTF as required.

(c) Make liaison with JTF S-2 to ensure access to intelligence products once in JOA.

(4) **S-3**

(a) Execute Commander's priorities of work.

(b) Coordinate with S-4 all deployment activities.

(c) Plan support of JTF main and supporting efforts.

(d) Begin record of daily milestones and chronology for use in situation reporting and command chronology.

(e) Coordinate aviation support to the CSSD. Obtain supported unit requirements through direct liaison with element OIC's.

(f) Coordinate deactivation with higher headquarters.

(g) Coordinate with staff sections and OIC's preparation of Commander's post deployment briefing to Commanding General, 2d FSSG no later than 10 days after operation completion.

(5) **S-4**

(a) Create and maintain equipment data list (EDL) from authorized table of equipment. Submit information for TPFDD validation and predeployment report as required.

(b) Coordinate all embarkation and deployment requirements.

(c) Maintain copies of SL-3 inventories and JLTI's.

(d) Consolidate table of equipment with CMR/equipment custody receipt (ECR) cards from each organization providing equipment to CSSD-69.

(e) Establish equipment readiness tracking procedures in JOA.

(f) Coordinate and requisition all classes of supply to support CSSD.

(g) Plan for messing requirements and publish feeding plan.

(h) Coordinate contracting and small purchase support. Refer to fiscal letter of instruction from FSSG comptroller and ensure compliance with instructions provided. All costs associated with deployment will be captured and reported to comptroller.

(i) Establish weapons security and ammunition storage procedures.

(j) After deployment, turnover all supply related correspondance to AC/S, G-4.

(6) **S-6**

(a) Publish communications plan. Ensure element OIC's understand redundant methods of communication and establish backup communications plan.

(b) Develop and provide sources for international voice and data connectivity between elements of CSSD-69 and between CSSD-69 and Camp Lejeune.

(c) Coordinate and provide ITE for all CSSD-69 elements.

(7) **Headquarters Commandant**

(a) Establish workspace, billeting and security plan for CSSD Headquarters after arrival in JOA.

(b) Coordinate command element support requirements with S-4, Security Officer and JTF representatives.

(8) **Chaplain**

(a) Publish Religious ministries plan.

(b) You are assigned as CSSD-69 Family Readiness Officer.

(c) Coordinate Family Readiness Plan with S-1.

(9) **Security Detachment Commander**

(a) Provide force protection for detachments deployed to remote sites.

(b) Prepare for Commander, force protection letter of instruction.

(c) Assist S-3 in all operational planning. Specifically focus planning efforts on elements of JOA circulation control, area security, port operations and law and order within guidelines established by JTF AGUILA.

(10) **OIC, El Salvador**

(a) Deploy two water purification detachments with capability to provide water purification, storage and distribution not to exceed 10k gal per day, per site.

(b) On order, move personnel and equipment to SPOE and APOE for transit to JOA. All personnel will arrive JOA at Comalapa, El Salvador. Equipment will arrive JOA at port of Acajutla, El Salvador.

(c) Establish water purification and distribution sites vic San Miguel and Usulutan.

(d) Coordinate logistics support for water sites through CSSD S-3 and S-4.

(11) **OIC Guatemala**

(a) Deploy three water purification detachments with capability to provide water purification, storage and distribution not to exceed 10k gal per day, per site.

(b) On order, move personnel and equipment to SPOE and APOE for transit to JOA. All personnel will arrive JOA at La Aurora, Guatemala. Equipment will arrive JOA at port of Santo Tomas de Castilla, Guatemala.

(c) Establish water purification and distribution sites vic Coban, Zacapa and Escuinta.

(12) **OIC, Medical Det Guatemala**

(a) Deploy medical detachment to provide level I-II care for force protection to include primary care, light resuscitative surgical care, pharmacy, X-ray, laboratory services (with malaria diagnostics) and 15-20 bed holding capability.

(b) Coordinate logistics support with Red Horse Squadron and OIC, Guatemala. Fuel, water, shower/heads, security and class XIII will be provided.

(c) On order, move personnel and equipment to SPOE and APOE for transit to JOA. All personnel will arrive JOA at La Aurora, Guatemala. Equipment will arrive JOA at port of Santo Tomas de Castilla, Guatemala.

(d) Deploy Preventive Medicine Detachment (Sanitation) to La Aurora to support JTF and host nation as directed.

(e) Deploy medical ADVON EAD/LAD 8-10 Dec. Anticipate Main body movement to JOA 11-16 Dec.

(f) Be prepared to perform medical outreach missions to deliver limited and specified care to local population in Guatemala.

(13) **OIC Nicaragua**

(a) Deploy six water purification detachments with capbaility to provide water purification, storage and distribution not to exceed 10k gal per day, per site.

(b) On order, move personnel and equipment to SPOE and APOE for transit to JOA. All personnel will arrive JOA at Augusto Caesar Sandino, Nicaragua. Equipment will arrive JOA at port of Puerto Corinto, Nicaragua.

(c) Establish six water purification and distribution sites vic Wiwili, Esteli, San Jose de Bocay, (confirmed), Chinandega, Corinto Port, Leon, Quilali, and Tipitapa (sites will change.)

(14) **Ground Combat Element (BPT)**

(a) Conduct deliberate operational planning; be prepared to deploy as the GCE, and execute assigned GCE mission.

(b) Coordinate external GCE requirements with CSSD-69

(c) Be prepared to provide ground combat element support to the SPMAGTF (PR) throughout duration of the operation. Obtain supported unit requirements through direct liaison with CSSD-69.

(d) On order, move personnel and equipment to SPOE and APOE for transit to JOA. All personnel will arrive JOA at Comalapa, El Salvador. Equipment will arrive JOA at port of Acajutla, El Salvador.

d. **Coordinating Instructions**

(1) We will deploy in a self sustaining posture for 15 days. JOA logistics support will be established to provide follow-on sustainment.

(2) Each OIC will arrange for collection and maintenance of medical and dental records for their personnel.

(3) Predeployment checklists and personnel screening. SRB/OQR audits, Wills/Powers of Attorney, medical/dental screening, personnel and gear inspection will be accomplished by each element of the CSSD prior to embarkation.

(4) Elements will deploy with maintenance capability and classes of supply required for mission accomplishment.

(5) Embarkation timelines, staging times/locations and transportation will be published in a frag order.

(6) Family services. Each element of the CSSD will provide points of contact and liaison as part of predeployment preparation information to family members of deploying Marines. Human Resource Services available through the unit and Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejuene. CSSD-69 point of contact at Camp Lejuene, NC will be Major Vohr, Commanding Officer (Acting), 8th Motor Transport Battalion, or Lt Simpson, Adjutant, 8th Motor Transport Battalion (DSN 751-5805, COMM 910-451-5703).

4. **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

a. **Administration**

(1) All personnel will be attached to CSSD-69 TAD in excess.

(2) The CO, CSSD-69 retains sole NJP authority during the deployment.

(3) Personnel will report with T/O weapon and individual equipment per reference (d).

(4) Individual equipment (782 gear) will be provided by parent organizations.

(5) All technicians and mechanics will report with tool boxes.

(6) All personnel will have an EAS not earlier than 22 May 99.

(7) Service Record Books/Officer Qualifications Records (SRB/OQRs) will be audited and corrected by the parent organization with all appropriate entries made prior to detachment. Record books of FSSG Marines will be maintained during the deployment by the deployed administration section of PC&AO.

b. **Logistics**

(1) The senior member of each battalion attachment to CSSD-69 will be appointed

Responsible Officer (RO) for equipment and will report to the CO, CSSD-69 with assigned equipment.

(2) All equipment assigned to CSSD-69 will have appropriate SLs, TMs and record jackets provided by the owning unit and will be SL-3 complete.

(3) Equipment Custody Records (ECR's) will be maintained by the RO of each organization.

(4) All elements will deploy with an organizational maintenance capability.

(5) All pertinent supply usage data will be consolidated at the conclusion of the deployment and delivered to CSSD-69, S-4 for fiscal accountability.

(6) T/O weapons will be transferred to CO, CSSD-69 by letter of transmittal.

5. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL**

a. CSSD-69 will report OPCON to Cdr, JTF AGUILA through USCINCSOCOM and COMMARFORSOCOM upon arrival in JOA.

b. The Plain Language Address (PLAD) is CSSD SIX NINE.

c. Commander, JTF AGUILA is COL (prom) V. Packett, U.S. Army.

d. Commanding Officer, CSSD-69 is LtCol J. R. Daley.

J. R. DALEY
Commanding

Enclosures:
(1) Gear List

APPENDIX C

LIAISON OFFICERS' CHECKLIST

C1. Unity of effort is facilitated through the use of liaison officers (LNOs). LNOs are used to centralize direction and staff cognizance over planning, coordination, and operations with external agencies or forces. Commanders establish LNOs as the focal point for communication with external agencies. LNOs normally report to the operations officer. LNOs may be able to resolve interagency problems by establishing communications to facilitate control for participating forces and agencies. LNOs should have sufficient rank and authority appropriate to their level of liaison and be identified early in the planning process. LNO teams should be staffed with sufficient personnel to conduct 24-hour operations. Senior LNOs should travel with commanders while LNO team activities are maintained. Language qualifications and knowledge of the doctrine, capabilities, procedures, and culture of their organizations are extremely important for LNOs. CA or special operations forces (SOF) teams may be available to serve as LNOs. The use of contracted interpreters to augment LNO teams may be another option, although in some cases their loyalties may affect their reliability.

C.2 This checklist describes general responsibilities of Marine Corps liaison officers (LNOs) before, during, and after a tour of duty with a JTF. It also applies to MAGTF liaison personnel between adjacent units, supporting or assigned forces and CJTF, and CJTF and higher command. This checklist is extracted from Joint Pub 5-00.2; therefore, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs may not be familiar with these standard procedures. If the LNO is attached to an NGO, PVO or IO, they must ensure a complete understanding of their mission and what they will do to assist the organization to which attached.

Liaison officers are a critical part of the planning process. Expert in the capabilities of their parent command, they effectively guide the staff to which assigned in the effective utilization of Marine Corps capabilities. The responsibilities discussed below provide guidance for LNOs in the performance of their duties.

LNO RESPONSIBILITIES BEFORE DEPARTURE

Before departure for the gaining headquarters, a LNO will:

- Be thoroughly briefed on the current situation of his unit's personnel and equipment readiness, commander's intent, including details of the concept of operations, unit locations, and factors such as logistics considerations (particularly real estate requirements for billeting and equipment storage.
- Obtain a copy of parent unit command brief for presentation when checking in to assigned unit.
- Obtain specific information and/or liaison requirements from each staff section. Gain a complete understanding of expectations for feeding information back to the parent unit.
- Clearly understand his mission and responsibilities.
- Ensure that arrangements for communication and transportation meet mission requirements. Primary and secondary means of communication from the liaison area to the parent unit must be planned in advance.
- Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances. (Passport, area clearance).

- If conducting liaison with a coalition unit, check language and interpreter requirements.
- Become familiar with the potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, and operational procedures of his unit and the organization to which they are being attached.
- Be familiar with MAGTF equipment (operating characteristics, capabilities, and consumption data) and as much as possible, those of the unit to which he is being sent.

RESPONSIBILITIES ON ARRIVAL

On arrival at the headquarters to which sent, the LNO should--

- Report to the supported commander or section representative (J3 or chief of staff), state his mission and present orders or credentials (if in writing), offer assistance, and be prepared to brief on his unit's situation on present command brief.
- Visit each staff section, provide information as required, and obtain all information required to be transmitted to his unit. Be prepared to brief them on MAGTF capabilities and gather questions they may have for you to relay back to parent unit.
- Establish communication with his unit and exchange updated information as required.

RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE TOUR

During the liaison tour, the LNO should--

- Establish routine for daily situation reports to the parent command.
- Keep informed of the situation of his own unit and make that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which he is sent.
- Obtain information about how the higher commander or organization intends to employ MAGTF capabilities. Specifically required are mission and commander’s intent, concept of operations and end states.
- Accomplish the mission without interfering with the operations of the headquarters to which sent.
- Report promptly to his own headquarters if he is unable to accomplish the liaison mission or meet expectations in a timely manner.
- Report to his parent command on those matters within the scope of the LNO mission.
- As permitted by official order, inform the visited unit commander of the contents of reports dispatched to the LNO's parent headquarters.
- Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or commander about significant problems being experienced by the LNO's parent unit that could affect operations of other commands and vice versa and LNO suggestions to enhance the effective employment for maximizing the effectiveness of the LNO's parent command.
- Ensure that the LNO's location at the headquarters is known at all times, for example, inform the tactical operations center (TOC) duty officer of daily activities.
- Advise his parent unit, if possible, of departure from the liaison location. For example: missions to assess possible tasks to the JTF or parent unit
- Attend CJTF's daily situation update briefing and other meetings as required.
- Keep an appropriate record of his actions and reports.

- Report to the visited unit commander prior to departing at the completion of his mission.

RESPONSIBILITIES UPON RETURN

Upon return to his own headquarters, the LNO should--

- Brief the commander or section representative on all pertinent information received during the his visit, for example, detailed information concerning the mission of the higher headquarters, unit locations, future locations, and commander's intent.
- Transmit promptly any request of the visited commander.
- Transmit mission requirements and requests for information from the visited headquarters.
- Transmit information required by higher headquarters in each staff area of responsibility.
- Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison requirements.

LNO GUIDELINES

To be more effective and LNO should:

- Get a notebook computer. Ensure it has a LAN card, modem and Microsoft Office 97. Know how to use it. The computer is the primary method for getting your information to those who need to know. Load print drivers for all HP Laser Printers before going. It will save you the trouble of hunting down the drivers when you get there.
- Deploy with a cell phone capable of working in the incident location or liaison site.
- Deploy with a digital camera. Sitreps with digital photos tell your story with much greater impact.
- Get gouge and information books on USMC capabilities to share with the organization you are attached to. Be ready to tell the MAGTF story.

APPENDIX D

ASSESSMENT

The following Tabs comprise a combination of questions, considerations and a model for MOOTW analysis developed at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and a format for reporting assessment. These are provided as a basis upon which to formulate an assessment and are included for informational purposes. Tab 5 provides a format for reporting assessment. While its use is not mandated, it provides a format compatible with that found in the OFDA Disaster Assesment Handbook, a common source used by a number of relief organizations and agencies.

The FHA/CM environment presents unique challenges to the military planner. The analytical categories of METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time) may not neatly mesh with the intricacies and complexity of most FHA/CM Operations. In-depth knowledge of a nation's or region's history, politics, culture, and society, in addition to its military capabilities, is key to understanding how to plan and conduct effective military operations in support of U.S. national policy.

The MOOTW model provides a framework for the planner to analyze all types of MOOTW situations and has application to FHA/CM opertaions. The Model assumes a national level analysis of the situation has been done and a decision has been made or is anticipated to seriously consider employment of the military instrument of power. The military planner must have an appreciation of the pertinent U.S. national interests. *The format should be taken as a guide, not a checklist.* Irrelevant portions should be deleted. The planner may also choose to add critical information and deductions not specifically called for by the Model.

Tab 1: MOOTW Analysis Model

Tab 2: Additional Assessment Planning Considerations

Tab 3: Common Military Assistance Planning Considerations

Tab 4: Assessment Reporting

TAB 1 TO APPENDIX D

MOOTW ANALYSIS MODEL

EXAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR ANALYTICAL AND DEDUCTIVE PROCESS

This provides examples of the types of questions a planner/analyst should consider when conducting an analysis of MOOTW. The stated questions are only examples and should be used as suggestions of "how to think" not "what to think."

CATEGORY	SAMPLE QUESTIONS
I. NATIONAL PROBLEM.	
a. Statement of the National Problem.	What guidance has been given by higher HQ or the NCA? If specific guidance is not available, what does the military planner perceive as the national problem?
b. Relevant National Interests.	Which U.S. national interests are involved in the situation? How significant is the involvement? Are any national interests in conflict?
II. STATED OR PERCEIVED MILITARY MISSION.	What is expected of the military instrument of national power? What conditions can the military instrument of power produce that will support the achievement of National Security Objectives.
III. NATURE OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT.	
a. Geography.	What is the general nature of the geography of the potential area of operations? What is the geostrategic significance of the nation? Does geography have a significant impact on the nature of the area of operations (natural obstacles/natural routes)? Will geography have an impact on the possible use of U.S. military forces and their sustainment?
b. Climate.	What is the general nature of the climate? Does it have any unique features? Has climate had a significant influence on the country or region of concern? Will climate have an impact on U.S. military operations (transport, air ops, artillery, troop health)?
c. Access from USA and U.S. bases.	How far is the AO from the USA and key base facilities? What physical features will have an impact on rail, sea, road, and air transport?
DEDUCTIONS:	How can the impact of significant aspects of the geography be summarized? What general types of U.S. military forces are capable of operating effectively in this physical environment? How can U.S. military forces be sustained in this environment? What tasks will have to be done to meet the challenges of the physical environment....what resources will they require?
IV. NATURE OF SOCIETY.	
a. Population/Demographics.	What is the population density, distribution, and racial/ethnic composition?
b. History.	How did the society develop to its present state? Is there a history of internal and external conflict? Historical relations with USA? Is there a history of foreign alliances or dependency?
c. General Culture(s).	What are the significant religions and philosophies? What social classes exist...what is their significance? What are the social, political, religious, economic values of each class? Is upward mobility possible? If the country is a former colony, what cultural aspects are

	vestiges of the colonial power? What varying attitudes exist towards the USA?
d. Economy.	What is the economy based on? What are the effects of international trade? What is the distribution of land ownership? What is the distribution of wealth? Are there modernized production facilities? Economic ties to the USA? Is there a dependency on foreign aid? Is there a significant national debt?
e. Politics.	What is the general nature of the Govt.? How effective are the formal structures and institutions? How legitimate is the Govt. in the opinion of various classes of society and areas of the country? How do changes in Govt. occur (elections, coups, revolts)?
f. Infrastructure.	What is the general nature of the infrastructure? What is the nature of the following systems: communiccations, roads, railroads, airfields, seaports, public health, schools, cities, water supply, food storage & distribution, etc.?
g. Military and Security Forces.	MILITARY: What are the significant aspects of the organizational structure (C^4I, locations, tasks)? What is are the levels of professionalism and morale? What is the adequacy of equipment? What is the role of the military in this society? What are the loyalties of the military to elected leaders, unelected elites, and the general population? POLICE: Apply the same questions to police forces.
h. Potential Destabilizing Factors.	
1. Government legitimacy and effectiveness.	What is the attitude of the people towards the government? Does National Will support the government and its policies? Are laws and policies implemented in an effective manner? Is corruption at a level that is acceptable to most groups of citizens?
2. Interest Groups and Organizations.	What interest groups have a significant effect on life in the region? Which groups are in conflict with the government and each other? Why? Which significant groups have no representation in the government? How are the groups organized? Consider trade unions, religious organizations, business interests, and the like.
3. Diverging Cultures.	What diverging cultures exist? Why are these groups pulling apart? Is there any effective mechanism to resolve conflict?
4. Perceived Relative Deprivation.	Do any segments of society perceive that they are not getting their fair share of resources? Why? Is modernization adding to or relieving this problem?
i. Insurgency(ies).	
1. Nature of Insurgency(ies).	What insurgent groups exist within the region? Are these groups significant to the situation that is being analyzed?
(a) Leadership.	Who are the leaders? How did they come to power?
(b) Ideology.	What is the ideology of the insurgent group? Is ideology significant to the group and its appeal in the region? Are there competing ideologies within the society?
(c) Organization.	What is significant about the insurgent organization? Who are its political, economic, military, and intelligence segments? Is the insurgency urban or rural? What is its command and control structure? Does the insurgency have a significant overt, public segment?
(d) External Support.	Is external support significant to the insurgent group? Who, how, what, and why? How might external support be halted? Is there a significant criminal connection?
(e) Strategy and Tactics.	What are the key elements of insurgent strategy? Evaluate effectiveness. Do tactics vary? How and why?
2. Nature of Government Response (Counter-	How generally is the government responding to the insurgency(ies). Bottom line: Is the Govt. response effective?

Insurgency).	
(a) National Strategy.	Is there an identifiable National Strategy? Does it pass the Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable (FAS) test? Would U.S. advisors be effective and welcome?
(b) Development.	Is the government effectively addressing causes of discontent? Are there negative effects of implementation?
(c) Social Mobilization.	Is the national information/PSYOP program supporting the National Strategy? Are people physically and emotionally involved in the nation-building process? Is the government effectively in contact with its people? Is there a significant feedback system?
(d) Intelligence.	Are the intelligence systems effective? Do they cooperate? What is the intelligence strategy? Who and what are the main sources of info? Are these sources adequate? Is the analytical and distribution system honest and effective? Can U.S. personnel and systems be of significant assistance?
(e) Effectiveness of Civil-Military Structure.	Does a framework exist for effective civil-military cooperation? Where is decisionmaking done and is it done effectively?
(f) Use of force.	How frequent and how effective is the use of force? Does rule of law and civil authority prevail or does the military control all local operations? Is reduction of civil liberties taken seriously? Is force used discriminately? What is the level of noncombatant casualties? Is there an effective counterterrorist program?
DEDUCTIONS:	What actions might the U.S. take to resolve the problems of this society? What U.S. military forces might be effective? How? Will advisors be effective? Will indirect assistance suffice or will direct U.S. involvement be required and suitable? How much force structure and other resources might be required?
V. NATURE OF EXTERNAL FORCES.	Are external forces significant to this situation? Check for both positive and negative influences.
a. Other Nations.	Is the relationship with neighbors and other countries significant? Is there significant trade, economic influence, or long-term hostility? Is another nation a sanctuary or sponsor for a hostile insurgent group? Are there remnants of Cold War polarity?
b. International and Transnational Forces.	Are there significant international and transnational forces or influences? Is the UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent taking any role in the region? Are there significant regional influences from religious, ideological, or cultural groups?
DEDUCTIONS:	How can the U.S. effectively influence external forces to help resolve the situation? Does the military have a role? What tasks and resources are required?
VI. NATURE OF CRISIS.	What is the direct cause of the current problem?
a. Critical Event(s).	What event triggered the problem? What is its scale? What are the potential long-term and short-term effects?
b. Accelerators.	What events or situations contributed to the instability of the region?
1. Economic Problems.	Were there any significant economic events or conditions?
2. Natural Disaster.	Did an event of nature help or directly cause the problem? How?
3. Government Reaction.	Did government actions (overreaction, underreaction, brutality, discrimination) add to the destabilization of the situation?
4. Recent Military Defeat.	Did a recent military defeat lower government legitimacy and effectiveness?
5. Religious Influences.	Does religion contribute to the instability of the region? How?
6. Ethnic Conflict.	Did previous ethnic conflict significantly effect the situation?
DEDUCTIONS:	Do we really understand the crisis? Can the U.S. have a direct influence on the cause/effects of the crisis? Can we best address the cause or the effects?

VII. TIME.	What is the impact of time as it affects the environment and key players?
DEDUCTIONS:	Is time on the side of U.S. interests? Are there any critical upcoming events that we can influence? Can we begin to conceptually phase our possible actions and commitment of resources?
VIII. LOGISTICS ESTIMATE	What are the significant logistics support considerations for the operation? Does the operation involve other than U.S. forces? Is the theater of operation mature or immature?
a. Geography.	What information is available from terrain and weather analysis? What national/international assets can provide this information? (see Part III a 7 b for other details).
b. Supply.	What supply commodities are required for the operation, i.e. subsistence items, bulk petroleum, barrier materials, major end items, repair parts? What is available in the AO for procurement?
c. Facilities.	Has a Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP) been developed for this operation, i.e. what facilities are available in the AO?, what do we need to take with us and/or build once in the AO? (see Part IV for other details).
d. Transportation	What transportation networks are available to support the operation? What transportation assets (buses, trucks, trains and railcars, etc.) are available in the AO to support the operation? (see Part IV f for other details).
e. Maintenance	What facilities are available in the AO to support projected maintenance requirements, i.e. repairs, recovery and evacuation efforts, vehicle collection points, etc? Are the facilities and equipment adequate (i.e., metric vs standard, safety requirements, etc,) to support the operation?
f. Labor Resources	What general and skilled labor forces are available in the AO to support the operation? Can the U.S. LOGCAP program provide the skills needed? What labor requirements do we want to fulfill with other than military forces? What additional requirements does this place on the supported forces, i.e. security, etc?
g. Health Service Support	What medical facilities are available in the AO to supplement organic military capabilities? What civilian professional personnel are available to augment military capabilities? Are these foreign medical assets compatible with military and national health requirements?
h. Personnel Service Support	What administrative facilities are available in the AO to support the operation? Can the PSS requirements be supported by other than military resources, i.e. religious support, public affairs, postal operations, MWR support facilities, etc?
i. Field Services and Field Sanitation	What facilities are available in the AO to support operational requirements, i.e., shower/bath/laundry, clothing and textile repair, bakery and mess augmentation, etc? Are assets available in the AO to support additional field sanitation requirements, i.e., refuse disposal, liquid and solid waste disposal, etc.?
j. SOF Support	What additional and/or peculiar requirements will support of SOF forces place on topics a-i above? What non-standard equipment will generate new support requirements?
k-l. Joint, Combined & Multinational Operations	What is the Joint or Combined force organization? What are the U.S. force service support responsibilities for this operation? What interservice or national support agreements have been made for this operation? How much logistics interoperability (i.e., doctrine, equipment, etc.) exists with forces operating in the AO? What are the LNO requirements to support this operation?
m. Command, Control, and Communications	What equipment and facilities are available in the AO to support the operation? What are the command and support relationships for the operation? What C^3 interoperability exists within the forces

	(U.S./Multinational) assigned to the operation?
n. Political	What is the governments response to our mission? (see Part IV e for other details).
o. Legal (External)	What Host Nation Support agreements exist that can support this operation? How will local, regional, national, or international laws affect the support planning (and operations) in the AO? What Laws of War apply to this operation and what is the impact on support in the AO?
p. Other	What other logistics planning considerations need to be applied to this operation, i.e. use of POMCUS or Force Provider sets, forward deployed LSE, type of support operations (split-based, intermediate staging bases or LOTS requirements), force-protection requirements, contingency contracting, support of other than military forces, postconflict requirements, etc?
DEDUCTIONS:	What general types of U.S. support actions should be contemplated? What resources will they require? How should the actions of other than U.S. forces and their support resources be coordinated for the operation?
IX. When directed by Deliberate or Crisis Action Planning process... develop, evaluate, and recommend Courses of Action.	**Diplomatic** **Informational** **Military** **Economic**
a. Diplomatic.	Is the State Department in a position to take positive action? How can we use diplomacy to directly address the problem and to support/explain our actions with the world community.
b. Informational.	Can we effectively influence the situation by active or passive use of information? Will U.S. and world media support the U.S. Government Course of Action? Can we effectively use PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels?
c. Military.	What military capabilities can be applied to the situation?
1. Army	Can land-oriented forces be effective? How? Is there a risk factor to committing ground troops? Can Army units be deployed in time to be effective?
2. Navy	Can the Navy effectively project power from the sea in this situation? Is the operation worth the cost of diverting/committing Navy task forces? Does a shortage of land bases support a Naval commitment?
3. Air Force	Can air power be used effectively and is it available? Are there bases within flying range of the Area of Operations?
4. USMC	Is the potential Area of Operations near the sea? Are Marines located in or near the region?
5. SOF	Can a rapid response by a small group of regionally-oriented personnel help resolve the situation? Do we need to further assess the situation by putting small numbers of Americans on the ground or near the region? Are the violent and non-violent SOF capabilities significant in this situation?
6. Space	Should we move or augment any Space assets to assess or respond to the situation?
7. Transport	What TRANSCOM assets can be significant? Is there a potential for a significant deployment or movement of materiel?
8. Joint C^4I	What type of C^4I might be required for the U.S. response? How can we provide it?

d. Economic	Can U.S. economic efforts have a significant impact on the situation? How?
DEDUCTIONS:	What general types of U.S. action should be contemplated? What resources will they require? How should the actions and resources be coordinated?

CONTINUE TO FORMULATE. ASK THESE SORTS OF QUESTIONS, DEVELOP SOURCES, COLLECT INFORMATION, AND DETERMINE POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE. THIS PROCESS MUST BE CONTINUALLY UPDATED. IN TIME, HOWEVER, MOST INFORMATION IS REFINED AND CLARIFIED. YOUR ANALYSIS AND DEDUCTIONS WILL BECOME MORE ACCURATE AND FOCUSED TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS.

TAB 2 TO APPENDIX D

ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Assessment of HA/DR requirements for a particular area must address a myriad of questions and problem areas. Some of these include:

- What caused the disaster or relief effort?
- What basic needs are not being met?
- What other agencies (if any) are already on the scene attempting to mitigate the needs of the people? Has liaison been made with the other agency(ies)?
- Where are the displaced persons or refugees originally from?
- What is the size of the original population of their village or town, including the surrounding countryside?
- What is the size of the refugee population?
- Why did they come here?
- What is the relationship between surrounding villages or towns? Are they related? Do they support each other? Are they hostile toward one another? Is any portion of a population discriminated against?
- What is the food and water status? Where do they get their food? What other means of subsistence are available? What is the quality of the water source? How is water distributed?
- What is the health status of the population? What medical services are available? What is the location of the nearest medical facility? Is there evidence of illness and/or starvation? What portion of the population is affected? What is the death rate? What diseases are reported before and after your arrival?
- What clans or political parties exist? Who are their leaders?
- What civil/military organizations exist? Who are their leaders?
- What organization/leadership element does the general population seem to support or trust the most? Which organization seems to have the most control?
- What NGOs and PVOs operate in the area? Who are their representatives? What services do they provide? What portion of the population do they service? Do they have an outreach program for the surrounding countryside? Are they coordinating with USG agencies? If so, with whom?
- What is the security situation in the area? What elements are the source of the problems? Who are the bandit leaders and where are they located? What is being done to curb these activities? What types and quantities of weapons are in the area? Are there minefields? If yes, where are they located?
- What commercial or business activities are present? What services or products do they provide?
- Determine the groups in the area that are in the most need. What are their numbers? Where did they come from? How long have they been there? What are their specific needs?
- What civic employment projects would the leaders like to see started?

- What food items are available in the local market? What is the cost of these items? Are relief supplies being sold in the market? If so, what items are available, what is their source, and what is the price?
- What indigenous labor or services are available?

What is the size of any transient populations? Where did they come from and how long have they been there?

TAB 3 TO APPENDIX D

COMMON MILITARY ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Common Military Assistance Situations. From the perspective of providing aid, it is important to understand how humanitarian needs (and therefore potential military roles) are likely to differ in three of the most common types of situations in which the military is asked to assist—migrant camp operations, emergencies resulting in displaced persons, and foreign natural disasters.

(Displaced Civilian, Refugee and) Migrant Camp Operations.

Migrant Camp operations occur when non-U.S. citizens arrive at (or are brought to) U.S. territories for processing as potential refugees. They usually remain in U.S. facilities until the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) decides their status—and admits them to the U.S. if they are classified as refugees. In both Guam and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the military provided aid for those arriving to the area. From the perspective of deciding on potential military roles, these situations are often straight-forward. Migrants are to be given full support— food, water, housing, etc.—and the military is often responsible for all aspects of it. How to provide such support is outlined in the U.S. Atlantic Command publication, *Tactics, Techniques, and procedures for Migrant Camp Operations.*

Displaced Persons. In some situations—usually as a result of conflict, though sometimes because of a natural disaster—persons may leave their home, thus becoming "displaced." There are commonly agreed-upon minimum standards for displaced persons in the areas of sanitation, water, etc. Below are key minimum standards for aid agreed upon as part of the most recent, authoritative multi-agency effort.

• Water – at least 15 liters of water per person per day; at least one water point per 250 people; a water point is located within 500 meters of shelters; no more than 10 fecal coliforms per 100 ml.

• Sanitation – 20 people per toilet; toilets arranged by household and/or segregated by sex; toilets are not located more than 50 meters from dwellings.

• Food – levels of malnutrition are stable at, or declining to, acceptable levels; daily requirement of 2,100 Kcal per person per day.

• Shelter
– minimum covered area of 3.5 to 4.5 m 2 per person;
– minimum temperature is 15 degrees Celsius;
– material is sufficiently strong to withstand wind and rain, and
– discourage theft of household property.

• Health
– all children are provided measles vaccinations;
– diseases of epidemic potential (measles, acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases including dysentery and cholera, malaria, and others) are investigated and controlled.
When conducting assessments, if these standards are not being met, assessments should focus on why, and use that information to identify potential military roles. See Sphere

Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for more information on the standards, their importance, other standards (e.g., clothing), key indicators of whether or not standards are being met, and an exhaustive checklist of assessment questions (www.sphereproject.org).

Foreign Natural Disasters. From the perspective of assessing potential military roles, foreign natural disasters that do not result in many displaced persons is one of the most difficult situations. The use of minimum standards in such situations may not be very helpful because the usual objective of disaster response operations is to help restore people to self-sufficiency and facilitate their moving back to their previous standard of living—which may in fact be below the minimum standards.

Inaccurate Preconceived Notions. Past experiences suggest that too often inaccurate preconceived notions about natural disasters abroad have lead to inappropriate responses. Typically these include:

• *Victims are helpless*. This is simply not true.
– Most respond very well, working with neighbors to rescue those trapped in earthquakes or marooned in floods and perform First Aid.
– They then find food and repair their own homes. All usually with little assistance.
– If victims cannot help themselves, they turn to family, neighbors, and formal and informal community groups, such as schools and churches.
– They *rarely* turn to the government or outsiders.

• *International assistance plays a vital role in a relief effort*. The relief phase of a disaster response operation is usually quite short—often lasting only a few days.
– Although there are sometimes unusual circumstances that prolong the phase, most international assistance will not arrive in time to have an impact on the most immediate needs; i.e., search and rescue, emergency medical care, and temporary shelter.
– Most of those responding from abroad only arrive in time to help with rehabilitation and reconstruction—which may or may not be appropriate depending on guidance from higher headquarters.

Recurring Patterns. Although every disaster is different, there appear to be some recurring patterns that can be used as a starting point for assessments.

• *Evacuation, SAR, and Medical Care*.
– The military usually arrives too late to assist with evacuation and search and rescue (SAR), the latter usually required only for 72 hours following a disaster.
– The need for emergency medical care varies with the scale and type of disaster: Severe injuries may be overwhelming after an earthquake, more moderate after a hurricane, and few after a flood. But like SAR, the military usually arrives too late to provide life-saving care.

• *Water*.
– In cities, natural disasters can badly damage all parts of the water system, including the water source, mains, pump stations, and distribution networks.
– In the countryside, wells can be flooded and piping systems damaged. In either case, the water supply may be contaminated.

– The military can play a vital role in assisting with both the rehabilitation effort (through making temporary repairs to wells and water systems) and the relief effort (by setting up water purification units, transporting water, and supplying water storage assets). It can also transport OFDA water storage containers to the area.
– In most cases, water purification units and transporting water are both costly and cannot provide a significant amount of water, relative to traditional water sources.

• *Food*. Outside food aid is rarely required in natural disasters because the damaged area usually does not encompass all the food-producing and storage areas of the country.
– Food can usually be brought in from surrounding areas and quickly becomes available in local markets.
– Also, most people are not severely malnourished before a disaster, and a few days with less-than-normal quantities of food are not going to push them into a downward spiral of malnutrition and death.
– The exception may be floods, which can cause wide areas of damage and are more likely to result in more food stocks being lost and a larger displaced persons population.

• *Shelter*. The need for mass shelter after natural disasters is usually exaggerated—especially in poorer countries—because few homeless seek government-supplied shelter and those who require shelter usually obtain it quickly.
– Moving people away from homes into tent cities is usually inadvisable because setting up such areas also requires providing food, water, sanitation, and (if the occupants don't leave) social services, education, etc.
– Such close living conditions increase the risk of spreading communicable diseases, as well as, social problems.

• *Facilities and Infrastructure*. The facilities and infrastructure that support and make up the relief distribution system are often damaged by many types of natural disasters.
– Electrical and communications systems—both very vulnerable to natural disasters—support other facilities that save lives directly (hospitals) or indirectly (airfields).
– The transportation system (ports, airfields, roads, bridges) that would be used to distribute relief is often affected by all types of natural disasters.
– Although governments and relief organizations often have the capability to procure relief items, they sometimes lack the ability to distribute it.

TAB 4 TO APPENDIX D

Assessment Reporting .

Assessment Report. Once critical factors have been assessed, a matrix of needs can be created that generates an assessment of the proposed military contribution in each area. This assessment can be expressed in the format shown below. This format is compatible with the *OFDA Disaster Assessment Handbook* in order to make it compatible with the interagency relief community.

Notional Reporting Format (Compatible with OFDA format)

From:
To:
Info:
Subj:_____Unit Assessment Report#_____
References: If applicable

1. Summary: Summarize the findings of the initial disaster. Update with further reports.
2. Description of Disaster: What, when, where, and how? An estimate of the scope of the disaster in the area you are investigating.
3. General Situation:
    a. Describe the Assessment Effort (military).
    b. Identify any other agencies, private or governmental, involved in the assessment with you.
4. Health/Nutrition Situation:
    a. How many were killed, where, how many human remains need to be disposed of?
    b. What is being done in the health area, by what agencies, how many people are untreated?
    c. What are the immediate health risks?
    d. If there is a food shortage, describe what it is and where and in what volume.
    e. Is there any assistance only the U.S. military can provide? If so, for how long required?
5. Shelter:
    a. Describe the damage to buildings.
    b. Describe estimated number of people and estimated family units needing shelter.
    c. What is being done to provide shelter?
    d. Is there any assistance that only the military can provide?
    e. If so, for how long required?
6. Water/Sanitation:
    a. Describe water problems. Note the color and smell of the water.
    b. What is being done and who is doing it?
    c. Describe sanitation problems.
    i. How is sanitation being handled?
    ii. Who is doing it?
    d. Is there anything that only the U.S. military can do? If so, for how long required?
7. Infrastructure/Logistics:
    a. Are there things only the U.S. military can restore (especially transportation). If so, in what volume and for how long?
8. Coordination:

a. How is the relief effort being coordinated?

b. Is the host nation government (or local U.S. government in domestic disasters) in charge?

c. What private and/or non-governmental agencies are involved?

d. Is the assessment team attending meetings?

e. Do you need augmentation to get the assessment completed?

9. Capability:

a. Recap those things that only the U.S. military—noting those things that the Marine Corps can bring.

b. Estimate how long it will be provided, and who will replace the military capability (if applicable). Consider using a method like the table provided below to organize efforts and prioritize them.

10. Recommendations: List the recommended priority of U.S. relief asset arrival in your area according to the immediacy of need. (what do you need most, the fastest)

Assessment Matrix

Problem Area	Problem Description	Agency providing Relief	Estimated Duration of Relief	Agency to Replace Military	Date of turnover/ Replacement
Food	Need 300 tons per day (4lbs) per person	Care	30 days	N/A	N/A
Food transport	60 miles from airport to distribution site	USMC Helo	30 days	None. Until roads dry out.	Est 14 days
Measles Vaccine	Require 10,000 doses	Doctors w/o Borders	5 days	N/A	N/A
Vaccine transport	45 miles from port to med site	USMC (trucks)	5 days	None identified	N/A
Medical	Need 2000 bed hospital	USAF	60 days	Doctors w/o Borders can erect hospital in 20 days	NA
Water production	Need 75 tube wells dug	USMC Engineers	10 days	CARE	Less than 30 days
Human remains disposal	20,000 bodies to be burned	CARE (through local contractor)	10 days	NA	
Shelter	10,000 shelter kits required	OFDA	15 days	NA	NA
Shelter transport	Move 10,000 shelter kits from port to housing sites	USMC Helo and trucks	14 days	HN to augment transportation efforts	NA

APPENDIX E

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) CONSIDERATIONS IN FHA/CM

E1. Information operations. IO include a range of U.S. military capabilities. IO is employed across the spectrum of military operations from peace through major theater war. The elements of IO include Operations Security (OPSEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), Electronic Warfare (EW), Physical Destruction of adversary command and control systems, as well as Public Affairs (PA), Civil Affairs (CA) and Computer Network Attack/Protect (CNA/CNP), all supported by Intelligence. The elements of IO required to be conducted during FHA/CM operations will be determined by several factors, including the threat level. In a permissive environment, OPSEC, PSYOP, PA an CA will likely all be required. As threat levels increase, additional elements may need to be employed.

E2. OPSEC. OPSEC is a consideration whenever forces are deployed. OPSEC during FHA/CM operations will support Force Protection requirements. OPSEC requirements will increase as threat levels increase.

E3. PSYOP. Use of PSYOP in a friendly country requires that country's permission. Due to diplomatic or political considerations, PSYOP activities may be identified by a different name. In FHA/CM operations, PSYOP assets may provide the mechanical means to deliver information to a population that lacks a communications infrastructure or when the existing communications infrastructure is ineffective or destroyed. PSYOP capabilities include man-packed, vehicle- and aircraft-mounted loudspeakers, mobile broadcast systems and air-dropped leaflets. When available, *Commando Solo*, a specially equipped C-130, can broadcast on AM, FM and television frequencies. PSYOP assets are resident in the U.S. Army. Marine Corps CA assets include the 3d and 4th Civil Affairs Groups, both resident in the Marine Corps Reserve. PSYOP supports Civil Affairs (CA) activities.

E4. Public Affairs. An effective PA campaign may be essential to the success of an FHA/CM operation. There will likely be media in the disaster area. U.S. journalists will want to talk to task force leaders, and troops, even if they are supporting forces and not the biggest part of the effort. PA must be prepared to tell the story of the good work of U.S forces to numerous audiences. These include the local government and populace, the American public and international audiences. The Joint Force Commander may establish a Joint Information Bureau (JIB). Marine component forces to the JTF must be prepared to support the JIB and media escort requirements. The importance of coordinating JTF press releases and other information cannot be overemphasized. U.S. forces should "speak with one voice." While they are different functions, PSYOP and PA messages should be complementary. The JTF should coordinate release of information with the American Embassy, U.S. Information Service, allied/coalition partners and the Host Nation.

E5. Civil Affairs (CA). The activities of a command that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or

hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. CA may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government (JCS Pub 1-02). CA and PSYOP are mutually supportive within civil-military operations. CA can assist to support friendly or host-nation (HN) civilian welfare, security, and developmental programs, while PSYOP can publicize the existence or success of these activities to generate target population confidence in and positive perception of U.S. and HN actions. An important part of CA is the establishment of a CMOC. The CMOC is a forum for developing negotiated relationships with the HN, NGOs and PVOs.

References:

CJCSI 3214.01
JP 3-13 Information Operations
CJCSI 3210.01A
MSTP Handbook (DRAFT)

APPENDIX F

DOMESTIC EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Resources provided by the federal government are grouped into 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). With the exception to ESF 3 where DoD is the Lead Agency, DoD is a support agency to each ESF.

- ESF 1: Transportation. Providing civilian and military transportation.
  Lead agency: Department of Transportation

- ESF 2: Communications. Providing telecommunications support.
  Lead agency: National Communications System

- ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering. Restoring essential public services and facilities.
  Lead agency: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense

- ESF 4: Fire Fighting. Detecting and suppressing wildland, rural and urban fires.
  Lead agency: U.S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

- ESF 5: Information and Planning. Collecting, analyzing and disseminating critical information to facilitate the overall federal response and recovery operations.
  Lead agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency

- ESF 6: Mass Care. Managing and coordinating food, shelter and first aid for victims; providing bulk distribution of relief supplies; operating a system to assist family reunification.
  Lead agency: American Red Cross

- ESF 7: Resource Support. Providing equipment, materials, supplies and personnel to federal entities during response operations.
  Lead agency: General Services Administration

- ESF 8: Health and Medical Services. Providing assistance for public health and medical care needs.
  Lead agency: U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services

- ESF 9: Urban Search and Rescue. Locating, extricating and providing initial medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures.
  Lead agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency

- ESF 10: Hazardous Materials. Supporting federal response to actual or potential releases of oil and hazardous materials.
  Lead agency: Environmental Protection Agency

- ESF 11: Food. Identifying food needs; ensuring that food gets to areas affected by disaster.
  Lead agency: Food and Nutrition Service, Department of Agriculture

- ESF 12: Energy. Restoring power systems and fuel supplies.
  Lead agency: Department of Energy

DOMS or on Domestic HA Tradition

A. DR FUNDAMENTALS (PRE-CM)
-first responders are local
-Mutual Support Agreements
-STATE ASSISTANCE WHEN LOCAL RESOURCES OVERWHELMED (MISSION NUMBER USED TO ACQUIRE REIMBURSEMENT)
- FEMA when State overwhelmed
- FRP/12ESF's

A. FBI-DOMESTIC CRISIS RESPONSE (CM-SPECIFIC)
- Focus on capture of perpetrators & preservation of evidence

B. DOE – DOMESTIC (RAD/NUC - CM)
-Determines nature & extent of radiological contamination

C. FEMA – DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPS (ANALOGUS TO HA/DR)

D. DOD
-Upon Request From FEMA
-Army is Lead Agency

E. NGO/PVO'S

.

Federal Response Plan (FRP)

•Purpose: "provide policy and procedures for the mobilization of federal resources and conduct of activities to augment state and local response efforts to a significant disaster that overwhelms state and local responder's resources and capabilities."

•Presidential disaster declaration authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to activate all or part of the FRP.

•Emergency Support Functions

1. Transportation (DoT Lead Agency)
2. Communications (National Communications System Lead Agency)
3. **Public Works & Engineering (DOD Lead Agency)**
4. Firefighting (Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service Lead Agency)
5. Information & Planning (FEMA Lead Agency)
6. Mass Care (American Red Cross)
7. Resource Support (General Services Administration Lead Agency)
8. Health & Medical Services (Dept of Health and Human Services Lead Agency)
9. Urban Search & Rescue (FEMA Lead Agency)
10. Hazardous Materials (EPA Lead Agency)
11. Food (Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service Lead Agency)
12. Energy (DoE Lead Agency)

*** DOD is Support Agency to all ESF's except #3**

The Federal Response Plan





COVERT BIOLOGICAL RELEASE

HOURS TO WEEKS

VICTIMS

PHYSICIAN OFFICES

HOSPITALS

CLINICS

REPORTS OF RARE DISEASE OR UNUSUAL SYMPTOMS

STATE HEALTH DEPARTMENT

INSTRUCTIONS ON DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT TO PHYSICIANS, HOSPITALS, AND CLINICS

MANAGEMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ILL AND DYING

PUBLIC EDUCATION

ACADEMIC, MILITARY, GOVERNMENT EXPERTICE AND ASSISTANCE

CHEMICAL AGENT RELEASE

MINUTES TO HOURS

CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE

VICTIMS

BROUGHT TO HOSPITALS BY NON-INJURED

EARLY DEATHS

POLICE, FIRE DEPARTMENT, EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES RESPOND

HOSPITAL TREATMENT

REPORTS SUGGEST CHEMICAL EVENT

MEDIA ADVISED AND EMPLOYED

COMMAND AUTHORITYADVISED

ON SCENE COMMANDER IDENTIFIED

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS

COMMAND OPERATIONS CENTER ESTABLISHED

RESPONSE FORCES ACTIVATED AND DEPLOYED

EVACUATION

MEDICAL

COMMUNICATIONS

RECONNAISSANCE & MITIGATION

SEARCH AND RESCUE

DECONTAMINATION

APPENDIX G

FHA/CM CAPABILITIES

CSSE (FSSG CAPABILITIES)

1. LANDING SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

a. Air Delivery: Free drops, containerized drops (CDS), and heavy drops – 30 tons per day

b. Beach Support/Helicopter Support: Maximum of 2 colored beaches or 2 LZSA's or combination of the two.

c. Beach and Terminal Operations: Area port, and one railhead

2. DELIBERATE ENGINEERING CAPABILITIES

a. Water production:

	FSSG T/E Qty	Total gal/day
B1140, Fresh wtr purif unit (3k gph)	3	108,000
B2604, ROWPU (600 gph)	70	504,000

b. Water Storage:

	FSSG T/E Qty	Total gal
Grand total:		1,352,000
B2086, SIXCON 900gal	210	189,000
B2130, 3K tanks	281	843,000
B2631, 50K tanks	4	200,000
B2632, 20K tanks	6	20,000
B0571, 500 gal tanks	66	33,000

c. Hygiene:

	FSSG T/E Qty	Total Capability
B0055, Shower unit	6	2,232 pers/hr (10min/pers)
B1226, Laundry	24	69,120 lbs/day

d. Fuel:

	FSSG T/E Qty	Total gal
Grand total Bulk Fuel (storage):		5,030,200
B0585, AAFS (600k gal)	8	4,800,000
B2085, SIXCON (900 gal)	188	169,200
B0570, 500 gal pods	66	28,000

e. Bridging:

	FSSG T/E Qty	Assembly time
B0152, dry gap MGB = 9X150'	6	(2.3 platoon hours)
B0130, Bridge wet/dry gap = 3X240"	1	(6 company hours)
B0155, 70 ton Ribbon Bridge = 3X300"	3	(6 company hours)
B0150, wet gap/foot = 6X315'	6	(.6 platoon hours)

f. Construction:

		FSSG T/E Qty
(horizontal) = extensive expedient	50%	
(vertical) = extensive	50%	
B2462, D7G bulldozer		29
B2464, MC 1150, bulldozer		12
B0443, 25ton Crane		4
B0446, 7.5ton Air mobile Crane		4
B1326, Concrete Mixer		3
B1082, Grader		11
B1785, Compactor (roller)		4
B1922, Scraper		3
B0589, Excavator, ACE		5

g. Mobile Electric Power:

	FSSG T/E Qty	Total KW Capability
B0730, 3KW, 60 Hz Generator	35	105
B0891, 10 KW, 60 Hz Generator	70	700
B0953, 30 KW, 60 Hz Generator	55	165
B1021, 60 KW, 60 Hz Generator	35	2100
B1045, 100 KW, 60 Hz Generator	4	400

3. TRANSPORTATION:

a. Material Handling Equipment

	FSSG T/E Qty	Capability/Unit
B0391 Container Handler, RT	11	50k lbs
B2561 Tractor, Forklift, Extend Boom	47	10k lbs
B2566 Tractor, forklift, RT	30	4k lbs
B2567 Tractor, RT, Articulated Steer	30	10k lbs

b. Motor Transport:

	FSSG T/E Qty	Total Capability (on road)
B2085, Fuel SIXCON (900 gal)	106	(95,400 gal)
B2086, Wtr SIXCON (800 gal)	117	(93,600 gal)
D0209, Mk 48, LVS pwr unit	188	
D0271, M970 refuelers 5k gal	20	(100,000 gal)
D0235, M870A2 Semi-trlr, lowbed, 40 ton	13	(520 tons)
D0860, M105 trailers 2 ¼ tons	72	(162 tons)
D0876, MK 14 trailers 22.5 tons	171	(3847.5 tons)
D0877, MK 15 LVS wreckers	3	
D0878, MK 16 5th wheel limited by trailer type	16	
D0879, MK 17 Cargo w/ crane (17 ton/28 pax)	41	(697 ton/1148 pax)
D0880, M149 water trailers 400 gal	45	(18000 gal)
D0881, MK18 ribbon bridge trailers(20 tons)	65	(1300 tons)
D1059, M923 truck (5 ton)/20 pax	163	(1630tons/3260pax)
D1134, M931 tractors (prime mover for D0271)	20	
D1212, M936 wreckers (15 ton)	12	
FY-01 Planned replacement for D1059		
D0198, MK23 (MTVR) 7 ton truck	250	(3750 tons)
D0195, M1077 load system, palletized Flatrack	130	

4. HEALTH SERVICES:

-3 surgical companies (60 holding beds/3 operating rooms ea)
-8 Shock Trauma Platoons (10 holding beds ea)
-Total: 260 holding beds/9 operating rooms

5. MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

- 5 off, 140 enlisted
- 3 platoons

APPENDIX H

CIVIL/MILITARY ORGANIZATION/AGENCIES.

Department, Command, Agency, Organization Home Pages

Army:
http://www.army.mil

Army Forces Command (FORSCOM):
http://www.forscom.army.mil

Army Materiel Command (AMC):
http://www.amc.army.mil

Army Medical Department (AMEDD):
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/armymed/default2.htm

Army National Guard (ARNG):
http://www-ngb5.ngb.army.mil

Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM):
http://www.army.mil/usar/ar-perscom/arpercom.htm

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Indianapolis:
http://www.asafm.army.mil/DFAS

Department of the Army (DA):
http://www.hqda.army.mil

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA):
http://www.disa.mil/disahomejs.html

Department of Defense (DOD):
http://www.defenselink.mil

General Services Administration (GSA):
http://www.gsa.gov

Director of Military Support (DOMS)
http://www.hqda-aoc.army.pentagon.mil/Doms/Doms.html

Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) Redstone Arsenal, AL:
http://www.logsa.army.mil/intro.htm

National Guard:
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA):
http://www.osha.gov

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR):
http://www.army.mil/usar/ocar.htm

Office of Personnel Management (OPM):
http://www.opm.gov

Reserve Affairs (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense):
http://raweb.osd.mil

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC):
http://www-tradoc.monroe.army.mil

U.S. Army Publications Agency (USAPA):
http://www.usapa.army.mil

U.S. Army Reserve (USAR):
http://www.army.mil/usar

U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC)* INTERNET *web site:
http://www.usarc.army.mil

U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC)* INTRANET *web site:
http://usarcintra
(For authorized USAR users; no general public access.)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
http://www.fema.gov/

Medical (training, benefits, etc.)

Army Medical Department (AMEDD):
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/armymed/default2.htm
(Surgeon General, MEDCOM, TRICARE, other medical information.)

AMEDD Center and School:
http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil

AMEDD&S Circular 350-3:
http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/schedule

AMEDD Department of Training Support (DTS):
http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/DTS

Medical courses (online courses for continuing education):
http://www.medcen.com

Points of contacts for AMEDD DTS:
http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/DTS/pocs.htm

U.S. Army Nurse Corps:
http://140.139.13.36/otsg/nurse
(Army Nurse Corps information and links.)

USAR Nursing Web:
http://140.139.90.71
(Site for communication between USAR nurses, information on projects.)

Other Helpful Web Sites

RCAS Project Manager's Web Site:
http://www.rcas.com

USAR Public Affairs:
http://www.army.mil/usar/usarlink.htm

United Parcel Service:
http://www.ups.com
(Home page; track packages and more.)

U.S. Postal Service:
http://www.usps.gov
(Home page; mail manuals, rate calculations, zip codes, and more.)

Veterans Affairs (VA):
http://www.va.gov
(Information on VA benefits, programs, facilities, and more.)

APPENDIX I

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE FORCE (CBIRF) ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, EMPLOYMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

I1. Introduction. The Chemical Biological Incident Response Force was established by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a result of Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), which states, "The United States shall give the highest priority to developing the capability to manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical materials or weapons use by terrorists."

I2. Mission. "When directed, forward deploy domestically or overseas in order to provide force protection and/or mitigation in the event of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. Be prepared to respond to no-notice WMD incidents with a rapidly deployable Initial Response Force (IRF). Continue to be innovative in the development of Consequence Management (CM) concepts, doctrine, organization, tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment. Conduct force protection training for fleet units and federal, state, and local response forces in developing training programs to manage the consequences of a WMD incident." The CBIRF focus of effort during CM operations is to turn contaminated casualties into decontaminated patients.

I3. Organizational Structure. CBIRF is composed of 350-375 Marines and Sailors and consists of six elements depicted in Figure I-1-1 below:



Figure I-1-1
CBIRF Organizational Structure

Organizational Structure CONUS/OCONUS. In garrison, CBIRF is under the Operational Control (OPCON) and Administrative Control (ADCON) of II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) and Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic (MARFORLANT). In a no-notice or pre-staged response within the United States, CBIRF is OPCON to Response Task Force (RTF) East or West, out of Forces Command (FORSCOM, First or Fifth Army), which is OPCON to U. S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The RTF commands all Department of Defense assets in support of the response. During domestic ground operations, CBIRF works for the U. S. Public Health Service in direct support of first responders, such as the local fire department. Overseas, CBIRF is OPCON to the Joint Task Force (JTF) or the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) established by the theater Commander in Chief (CINC) for CM operations.

Misconceptions. CBIRF is sometimes perceived as an enhanced Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defense (NBCD)unit. In reality, CM operations are generally more complex than tactical NBCD and CBIRF was organized specifically to respond to and mitigate the effects of a WMD event by providing its unique capabilities in the areas of command and control, force protection, enhanced NBC reconnaissance, ambulatory and non-ambulatory personnel decontamination, security, search, and rescue, medical triage and stabilization and service support to the RTF (CONUS) or JTF (OCONUS) commander. Before describing CBIRF capabilities in detail, it is important to clarify some common misconceptions.

A.. CBIRF has limited organic equipment decontamination capability, but does NOT conduct Detailed Equipment Decontamination (DED) or area decontamination operations.

B. In addition to standard Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) equipment used byU. S. military forces, CBIRF employs enhanced Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to conduct operations in Toxic Industrial Chemical/Material (TIC/TIM) environments. The MOPP ensemble and M40 series Field Protective Mask (FPM) can be circumvented by certain toxic industrials, requiring enhanced PPE such as fully encapsulating Level A and B suits designed to provide maximum protection against vapor and liquid skin hazards and Self-Contained Breathing Apparatuses (SCBA), used to protect the respiratory tract against TICs and TIMs such as ammonia and chlorine based compounds and solvents which can rapidly overwhelm the C2 canister filter used on the M40 series FPM. The majority of CBIRF personnel are trained in Level A and B operations. TICs and TIMs are potential threats to U. S. forces, even OCONUS, since littoral areas include port and industrial complexes where storage and manufacture of these materials are common. This makes TICs and TIMs readily accessible to terrorists and

may even pose a potential threat in permissive environments, such as during Humanitarian Assistance (HA) or Disaster Relief (DR) operations where the potential for industrial accidents exists.

C. CBIRF also has state of the art monitoring and detection equipment used to identify, sample and analyze Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBR-N) hazards, including TICs and TIMs as well as Oxygen (O2) and Lower Explosive Levels (LEL). Instruments include handheld devices such as the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), Personal Photo-ionization Detector (PPID), Multirae, Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA), Drager Multipac Monitor, the VDR-2 radiacmeter, Portal Shield biological detector, Biological Assay tickets and highly sophisticated portable and vehicle mounted Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS) capable of analyzing up to 75,000 chemical compounds. Note: CBIRF no longer employs the M93 Fox NBC Reconnaissance vehicle.

(D. The Security, Search and Rescue Element (SSRE) is composed primarily of Marine infantrymen, however, security operations are not the focus of effort. SSRE personnel are highly trained in casualty search and extraction procedures, including confined and vertical space extraction, and are also qualified for Level A, SCBA operations. Due to federal restrictions on the use of military personnel in domestic security roles, CBIRF relies on civilian law enforcement agencies to provide site security during CONUS CM operations. For CONUS missions, SSRE may provide limited security, however, circumstances, such as a Mass Casualty incident may require SSRE to place its primary effort on casualty search and extraction. CINCs and JTF commanders should understand that CBIRF may require augmentation to ensure local area and site security.

I4. Capabilities. CBIRF capabilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

A. Command and Control Element:

(1) Provides liaison teams to other agencies or commands.

(2) Interfaces with local and military commanders.

(3) Employs forces to mitigate effects of WMD incident.

(4) Coordinates all on site CBIRF operations.

(5) Establishes data/voice reachback to scientific and medical advisors.

(6) Prepares chemical, biological, or radiological plume models.

B. Force Protection Element (Reconnaissance,Decontamination, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal):

(1) Reconnaissance

(a) Provides 26 person Reconnaissance team.

(b) Conducts Level A, B, SCBA operations.

(c) Identifies all known military agents.

(d) Detects TIC/TIM compounds.

(e) Detects five most probable biological agents.

(f) Monitors for military chemical agents and compounds.

(g) Detects and monitors beta and gamma radiation.

(2) Decontamination

(a) Provides 32 person Decontamination team.

(b) Conducts Level B, SCBA and Level C (MOPP4) operations.

(c) Conducts detailed personnel decon for 150 ambulatory casualties per hour.

(d) Conducts detailed personnel decon for 50 non-ambulatory casualties per hour.

(e) Conducts hospital patient support decontamination.

(f) Conducts force protection decontamination.

(3) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

(a) Provides four person EOD team.

(b) Conducts Level A, SCBA operations.

(c) Identifies devices/threats.

(d) X-rays devices.

(e) Renders safe.

(f) Conducts mitigation.

C. Security, Search and Rescue Element

(1) Employs two, two person interdiction teams.

(a) Conducts Level A, SCBA operations.

(b) Conducts immediate casualty management.

(c) Conducts force protection extraction.

(2) Employs nine, four person search teams.

(3) Employs 20, four person extraction teams.

(a) Conducts confined space extraction.

(b) Conducts vertical extraction.

(4) Conducts limited site/force security.

D. Medical Element

(1) Employs two, two person decontamination triage teams.

(2) Employs two, eight person medical assist teams.

(3) Employ one, eight person medical stabilization team.

(4) Conducts initial epidemiological investigations.

(5) Provides force medical care.

E. Service Support Element

(1) Conducts sustainment operations.

(2) Provides power generation.

(3) Provides water purification.

(4) Provides organic transport of CBIRF personnel and mission essential equipment.

I5. **<u>CBIRF Personnel and Casualty Flow.</u>** During the conduct of CM operations, CBIRF personnel and casualties will generally flow into and/or out of the incident site as depicted in Figure I-1-2.



Figure I-1-2
CBIRF Personnel and Casualty Flow

I6. Initial Response Force (IRF). CBIRF will deploy a highly trained and equipped IRF (approximately 81 Marine and Sailors) capable of providing force protection and mitigation of CBR-N incidents within 6 hours of notification. The IRF provides initial CM response capability and possesses limited sustainment capacity (approximately 24 hours).

A. Pre-deployment guidelines

(1) When possible, CBIRF forward deploys as a total force in order to respond to a WMD credible threat, for events of national importance, or as a force protector.

(2) In no-notice CBR-N incidents, CBIRF will deploy a task organized Advance Team to provide initial critical CM support to the incident commander and to facilitate arrival of the IRF and the Follow On Force (FOF).

(3) The IRF, with limited sustainment, will deploy within 6 hours of notification from the designated Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) in response to a no-notice CBR-N incident. The IRF is capable of responding to CONUS and OCONUS events via strategic military, or civilian aircraft, or organic ground transportation.

(4) The IRF is CBIRF's initial and most expeditious response to a CBR-N contingency. The IRF initially provides limited detection, monitoring, identification, search and extraction, and medical support. Initial CM support by the IRF will be self-sustaining until the FOF arrives (approximately 24 hours).

(5) The IRF is a standing rapid response force prepared to quickly deploy to a CBR-N incident. Marines and Sailors assigned to the IRF are trained to high levels of technical and tactical proficiency and are rotated on a 30 day basis to ensure readiness. Mission essential equipment is embarked to facilitate timely and flexible response.

(6) The task organized FOF will deploy within 24 hours of notification in response to a no-notice CBR-N incident. The FOF is capable of responding to OCONUS and CONUS events.

(7) The CBIRF rear detachment will be prepared to provide required and administrative and logistic support to forward deployed CBIRF operating forces.

B. Tasks – IRF. Taskings include, but are not limited to the following (additional specified and implied tasks will be provided in the warning order

issued by higher headquarters):

(1) Specified Tasks

(a) Chemical, Biological, Radiological identification, sampling, monitoring, survey, and casualty management (search, extract, and medical assistance).

(b) Ambulatory/Non-ambulatory casualty decontamination.

(c) Render safe Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

(d) Security operations.

(e) Technical assistance.

(2) Implied Tasks

(a) Coordinate with CONUS/OCONUS agencies.

(b) Force protection decontamination of CBIRF personnel.

(c) Communication plan/frequencies.

(d) Coordinate airlift.

(e) Plan air/ground movement.

(f) Deploy advance team.

(g) Gather information requirements.

(h) Identify chain of custody requirements.

(I) Coordinate with reachback/technical advisors.

(j) Prepare media plan.

(k) Identify personnel/equipment shortfalls.

(l) Coordinate logistics, supply, and resupply.

(m) Identify and prioritize lift requirements (air/ground).

(n) Plume modeling.

C. Tasks – FOF. Taskings include, but are not limited to the following:

(1) Specified Tasks

(a) Prepare to deploy FOF.

(b) Be prepared to reinforce IRF.

(c) Coordinate airlift.

(d) Plan air/ground movement.

(e) Identify personnel and equipment shortfalls.

(2) Implied Tasks

(a) Maintain connectivity with IRF during air/ground movement.

(b) Continue coordination of logistics, supply, and resupply.

(c) Identify and prioritize lift requirements.

Appendix J
MEF JTF-CM Planning and Operations Checklist

1. **Purpose.** Provide a planning tool for use by MEF planners when the CG, MEF is designated by a regional CINC as the COM JTF-CM.

2. **Assumptions**. The following assumptions generally apply when planning CM operations for a nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical incident:
   a. A nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical incident may cause numerous fatalities and injuries, property loss and the disruption of normal life-support systems.
   b. A major incident will significantly impact economic, physical and social infrastructures.
   c. The extent of casualties and damage will be influenced by the size and nature of the release, time of the occurrence, prevailing weather conditions, population density and building construction. CM planners should consider the possibility of subsequent releases. .
   d. A major CM event in a populated area may result in a large number of casualties, significant contamination and/or damage to buildings and basic infrastructure and disruption of essential public services.
   e. Host nation (HN) government organizations will respond on short notice to provide timely and effective assistance, but the HN may lack some capabilities required to effectively respond the event..
   f. The degree of HN governmental involvement will be related to the severity and magnitude of the event.
   g. U.S. assistance will be provided in response to a HN request.
   h. DOS Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) will be deployed to the Am Embassy.
   i. Required lift assets are available.
   j. DOS will secure necessary basing, overflight, access agreements, facility and equipment usage authorizations in support of JTF-CM operations .
   k. HN airfields and ports will be available.
   l. Specialized DOD and USG agencies will be available.
   m. National reconnaissance assets will be available.
   n. Some level of HN support will be available, including POL, transportation, security, firefighting, medical, construction material, common labor.

3. **Characteristics of a CM Operation**
   a. Crisis Action Planning will be conducted in a compressed timeframe and there will be heavy reliance on SOPs during initial stages of planning and deployment.
   b. The incident area may initially have many dead, injured and displaced citizens, as well as all the inherent problems that follow these conditions.
   c. HN assets have become overwhelmed.
   d. Fear is rampant in the local populous.

e. Except in the I&W scenario, video of the incident may be available prior to deploying because the world press will be quickly on the scene.
f. There will be forces placed on alert by the JCS to be used by the JTF-CM.
g. In-theater assets will be placed at the JTF-CM commander's disposal.

4. **Emergency Support Functions.** The functions described below are contained in the Federal Response Plan, which addresses U.S. government response to a domestic incident. They are provided here because they are applicable to OCONUS CM as well. Although most nations have the capability to provide some or all of these capabilities to their citizens, the effects of a significant CM event would likely overwhelm a HN's ability to provide all the required capabilities at the levels required.

Emergency Support Function	**INCONUS Primary Agency**	**Notional JTF-CM Counterpart**
Transportation	Dept of Transportation	TF Transportation
Communications	National Communications Sys.	J-6 (Comm O)/JCSE
Public Works & Engineering	DoD (COE Civil Works)	TF Engineering
Firefighting	Department of Agriculture (Forest Service)	TF Clean Up, TF Engineering
Information & Planning	FEMA	J-3
Mass Care (berthing/messing)	American Red Cross	J-4, TF Logistics
Resource Support	General Services Admin.	J-4
Health & Medical Services	Department of Health & Human Services	JTF Surgeon, TF Medical
Urban Search & Rescue	FEMA	TF Clean Up
Hazardous Material	U.S. EPA	TF Clean Up
Food	Department of Agriculture	J-4, TF Logistics
Energy	Department of Energy	TF Engineering
Supplemental Support Functions		
Recovery	FEMA	
Public Affairs	Public Information Officer (PIO)	JIB (PAO)
Security & Safety	Safety Officer	Safety Officer, NBC Officer, TF Security
Community Relations	PIO, Liaison Officers	Civil Affairs Officer, PAO
Donations Management	Red Cross or other PVO/NGO	Civil Affairs Officer

5. **Key Functional Areas of JTF-CM Operations**

a. Logistics (subsistence, clothing, blankets, construction material, personal demand items, medical materiel, Class X civic action materiel)
b. Medical (surgical teams, Collecting & Clearing Companies, hospitals, Preventive Medicine, disease vector control)
c. Transportation (air, land, waterborne transportation)
d. Force Protection (general security, Exclusion (Hot) Zone, Personal Protective Equipment)

e. Engineer Operations (potable water, sanitation, debris removal, temporary shelter/displaced person camp, expedient repair of physical infrastructure)

6. Phases of CM Operations

a. Phase I (Assessment). Phase I begins with the incident or indications and warnings (I&W) of suspected terrorist activity. The MEF, if designated by a CINC in its CM CONPLAN as the JTF-CM, has three initial deployment options. They are: to send a JTF-CM Assist Team – If an incident happens in a country that has a standing US Military Headquarters, the CINC, in most cases, will designate that HQ as the JTF-CM. A MEF may deploy a CM Assist team of approximately 8-10 personnel to this standing headquarters to provide additional CM expertise. in the AO; to deploy an advanced element to an initial support base (ISB) in support of a counter-terrorist mission; to send out the JTF-CM ADVON to the incident site.

1) CM Command Element and its normal JTF-CM will send a staff assist package to help in the planning and execution of the CM mission.
2) In a situation in which I&W tells the NCA that a situation may arise in which CM initial response forces (CBRN reconnaissance and limited decontamination, emergency medical and triage and a command and control structure). If I&W were received, the MEF would send its JTF-CM ADVON, along with a tailored initial response force, to an ISB located within 4-8 hours travel time from the possible incident site. This will significantly reduce the time required to provide immediate response if a CM event actually occurs. The third, and probably most common, is deploying the JTF-CM after an incident has occurred. In this case, the JTF-CM ADVON will go directly to the incident site to begin operations and prepare for the arrival of JTF-CM forces.

CM Concept – Augmenting In-Place Headquarters



CM Concept – No Notice Incident



CM CONCEPT – INDICATIONS & WARNING



b Phase II (Immediate Assistance). This phase consists of providing U.S. military and civilian capabilities in support of the HN's initial responders to the incident. These would include units to help in search and rescue of casualties, triage, initial decontamination and limited engineer support. During this phase of the operation, the JTF-CM FWD would deploy and take control of the operation. A Civil Military Affairs Operations Center (CMOC) and Joint Information Bureau (JIB) will be established, if needed, as personnel arrive to augment early efforts in these functional areas.

c. Phase III (Extended CM Operations). These efforts are designed to mitigate the effects of the incident. This could include helping to restore essential government services, decontamination operations, heavy engineering operations and coordination of all responders in the mitigation effort. Units used in this phase could include: Maritime Preposition Shipping, military medical units (starting with surgical teams to augment overtaxed HN staff) Air Force fly-in hospitals, hospital ships, MEU-SOC units, strategic lift assets, heavy engineer units, mobile labs, SOF and ground troops for force protection and counterintelligence assets.

d. Phase IV (Transition to Host Nation/Others). Before U.S. military assets are
redeployed, operations must be transitioned to responsible authority. These can include the HN; international, non-governmental or private voluntary organizations, civilian contractors or a combination of these organizations.

e. Phase V (Redeployment). Once transition is complete, the JTF-CM and U.S. military
forces re-deploy to their home stations. Some military units may stay behind to continue operating under a CINCs Host Nation engagement plan.

8. Integrating JTF-CM Augments. An effective augment reception plan will allow the gaining command to provide the administrative, logistical and information support required to enable augments to become effective staff members in the minimum possible time. A generic Augment Reception Plan is provided below in checklist format (see Tab A)

.

9. Staff Section Responsibilities

G-1 Admin: Normal with extra emphasis on joint personnel issues

G-2 Intel: Normal with extra emphasis on items in Intel Support below

G-3 Operations: Normal with extra emphasis on Civil Affairs

G-4 Logistics: Normal with extra emphasis on Medical/Engineer support and reduced
emphasis on ammunition handling

G-5 Plans: Normal with emphasis in looking at Phases 4 and 5 of the operation

G-6 Comm: Integration with other forces on the ground, C2 for ADVON and Staff

Assist Team, plans for supporting full JTF-CM headquarters

10. JTF-CM Crisis Action Planning

a. Organization of OPT/MPG
   (1) G-3 Lead
   (2) G-1/PMO rep
   (3) G-2 rep
   (4) NBC rep
   (5) G-4 logistics rep
   (6) G-4 med rep
   (7) G-4 engineer rep
   (8) Tactical Science rep/JTAC
   (9) PAO rep
   (10) G-6 rep

b. Recommended working groups (Log, Admin, MOEs, Force Protection, Tactical Science, Information Operations)

c. Force capabilities, packages – (a range of pre-identified capabilities of various sizes that can be called forward to meet actual HN needs while effectively utilizing scarce lift/APOD/SPOD space)

11. **CINC Response**
a. Assign mission
b. Allocate/acquire appropriate forces
c. Assure sufficient appropriate funding/Executive Agent has been identified
d. Coordinate with NCA

12. **Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).** MOEs are quantitative or qualitative measures that compare current conditions to desired endstate. They provide an underlying basis for measuring progress, and ultimately, mission success or failure.

a. Used as an interagency tool, MOEs can help to achieve a common understanding among organizations supporting the CM effort.
b. MOEs can help the JTF-CM commander to decide when and where to shift assets and when to shift to the next phase.
c. MOEs should be based on task-related criteria that permit objective measurement.
d. They should not be averaged, since progress toward endstate may vary from region to region or locality to locality.
e. MOEs are also used to focus the U.S military force on its role of supporting the HN

f. Examples:

1) Phase II MOEs could be: "Response forces in place."
2) Phase III MOEs might include: "Decontamination of personnel ongoing (count or percent), percent decontamination of key facilities and essential equipment."
3) Phase IV MOEs are: "List of major items to transition (yes/no or percent handed off), transition to JTF-CM complete (yes/no), and the percent follow-on response forces in place.".

13. **Intelligence Support** (see Tab B)

a. What are the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)?

- What is the (predicted) nature and extent of the contamination?
- Are there likely to be more releases from accidents/incidents? Where?
- What relief assistance does the host nation (HN) want/need?
- Has the Country Team identified local political realities or long term USG goals that affect the Commander's options? How is Embassy set up for CM – RSO? Attache?)
- What Critical Infrastructure must be protected/restored in order to return the HN to normalcy?
- What can the Commander use as the first indicators of adverse impact by his/her forces on the HN?

b. What organizations are providing relief?

e. Who currently provides security to the relief area of operations?

f. What is the medical situation in the area where the relief effort is to take place?

g. What is the sociological and cultural makeup?

h. What type of equipment is in the country?

i. Where are the logistics and food distribution points?

j. What is the geography in the operations area?

k. What are the lines of communication and transportation?

l. What types of agriculture and livestock are in the country?

m. What is the availability of water?

n. What are potential manmade facilities to aid relief operation (specify location(s) by best available method: geo/UTM/grid coordinates/reference points/etc)?

o. What is the present state of the economy where relief efforts are to be performed?

p. What constitutes appropriate displaced person facilities?

14. **Communications Support**.

a. ADVON

(1) Computers-NIPR/SIPR with PROCOM
(2) Pladium Modems
(3) European Cell phones-2
(4) Sabers-R with base station

(5) Stu III

b. LNO teams
   (1) Computer with classified and unclassified drives
   (2) Stu III

c. JTF Headquarters
   (1) DSN access
   (2) SIPR/NIPR access
   (3) Sabers R
   (4) GCCS
   (5) Intel Systems access

15. Information Operations (IO) in Consequence Management

. Information Operations consist of the five elements of C2W plus the supporting elements of Public Affairs, Civil Affairs and computer network attack/protect. C2W includes the use of OPSEC, PSYOP, Deception, EW and Physical Destruction of an adversary's C2, all mutually supported by intelligence to deny information, degrade or destroy an adversary's command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control systems. By definition, CM is conducted in a "permissive environment." (1) OPSEC. In CM (less robust than combat) need at least basic OPSEC as part of Force Protection. .

(2) PSYOP.

(a) Use of PSYOP in friendly countries requires that country's permission.

(b) PSYOP units deployed to friendly countries may be called Military Information Support Teams.

(c) PSYOP assets:
   (1)loudspeaker teams,
   (2)airborne loudspeakers,
   (3)air-dropped leaflets,
   (4)Special Operations Mobile System-Broadcast (SOMS-B) and even (5)Command Solo (C-130) .

(d) Are products translated accurately into the language of the HN?

(3) Public Affairs (PA) will be an extremely important function during a CM mission. Information releases must be coordinated with AMEMB- Joint Information Center , Allied partners and possibly HN. Remember the USAMB - Joint Information Center is in overall charge of the U.S. PA effort.

(4) Civil Affairs (CA).

(a) CM may be a CA heavy mission.

(b) CMOC is a function not necessarily a place

(c) Has the HN established a HOC?

(d) How is CMOC function fulfilled? (In HOC? In HACC? In formal CMOC? Elsewhere?)

(e) JTF-CM staff members should be prepared to develop "negotiated relationships" with representatives of . NGOs and PVOs because they are not in the military chain of command and are not obliged to follow our "commands." .

16. Supporting DOD and USG Agencies

a. CBIRF (Chemical Biological Incident Response Force) (910) 451-9092
b. CDC (Center for Disease Control (Atlanta) 24 hr number (707) 488-7100)
c. Contracting Resources (Large relevant existing contracts)
AFCAP (AF Contract Augmentation Program DSN 523-6147)
CONCAP (Construction Capabilities Program (Navy) (757) 322-8255)
LOGCAP (Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program DSN 767-0428)
Rapid Response (Army Environmental clean up (402) 221-7714)
d. DOE (Emergency Operations Center Las Vegas NV (702) 295-1382
e. DOS/FEST (Foreign Emergency Support Team)*(202) 955-3637
f. DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency) (703) 325-7146
g. JTAC (Joint Technical Augmentation Cell)*(757) 835-7854
h. Joint Forces Command (757) 835-7854
i. Joint Info Ops Center (210) 977-2191
j. Joint Staff, J-3 SOD DSN 225-8103
k. OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID) 24 hr (202) 712-4845)*
l. SBCCOM (Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command) (DSN 584-3391)
m. Army FORSCOM (Lists CM relevant DOD agencies DSN 367-7427)
* Key player in any CM scenario

17. Liaison Teams.

a. JTF-CM to Embassy - 2 person team with SCI clearance. Must have knowledge of CINC's CM plan and MEF's capability. Will be conduit for information flow from FEST to JTF-CM Staff and Operational Planning Team.
b. JTF-CM to CINC – 2 person team with SCI clearance. Must have knowledge of CINC's CM plan and MEF's capability. Will be conduit for information flow from CINC Crisis Action Team to JTF-CM Staff and Operational Planning Team.
c. JTF-CM to JSOTF-CM (if present)-2 person team with SCI clearance. Will begin turnover procedures between JSOTF and JTF. They will also be JTF commander's eyes on the ground. If JSOTF is not present will deploy to CINC's assessment team.

TAB 1 to Appendix J Intergration of Augments to MEF JTF-CM Checklist

a. TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

_____ Coordinate transportation of augments and their gear from Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) to Joint Reception Center (JRC)/billeting.

_____ Be prepared to coordinate with HN Military for clearance of augments and gear (particularly comm gear) through HN customs.

_____ Identify local transportation requirements for augments.

b. JOINT RECEPTION CENTER (JRC) / OR EQUIVALENT

_____ Ensure adequate head facilities at JRC
_____ Adjust messing facility hours as required
_____ Receive/endorse TAD/PCS orders
_____ Provide Force Protection (FP) brief to augments
_____ Obtain POCs for augments' commands
_____ Provide quarters and messing non-availability stamp, if appropriate
_____ Prepare tax-free status letters, if appropriate
_____ Reconcile augment roster as personnel arrive
_____ Verify clearances on file
_____ Issue Badges/stickers required for access to controlled spaces
_____ Collect/verify augment home station contact information
_____ Verify clearances on file
_____ Provide a "Welcome Aboard" packet to augments to include:

(1) Command organization
(2) Information Systems Directory (ISD) to include emergency phone numbers
(3) Handout on preventive health measures
(4) Dining Facilities/Options
(5) Medical services
(6) Dental services
(7) MWR facilities
(8) Liberty policy
(9) Local customs and sensitivities
(10) Off-limits locations (may be included in FP brief)
(11) Pay/financial services, ATM locations, exchange rate for local currency
(12) Postal services
(13) Transportation/bus schedules

_____ Assign augments to billeting and provide transportation as required

c. WELCOME ABOARD / ORIENTATION

_____ Welcome Aboard Brief
_____ Command Brief
_____ Planning, Decision, Execution Cycle/Battle Rhythm Brief
_____ Force Protection (FP) Brief
_____ Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Brief
_____ J-section/working group assignments
_____ Information Management
a. Security procedures
b. Homepage
c. RFI process
d. Assignment of SIPR/NIPRNET accounts
_____ Communications procedures
a. DSN access
b. STU IIIs

d. STAFF INTEGRATION

_____ Identify pre-assigned augments
_____ Assign remaining augments to appropriate J-sections
_____ Arrange for link-up with respective staff sections
_____ Schedule meetings with respective J-section principals
_____ J-section principals communicate what is expected
_____ J-section deputies provide specific duties and tasks

TAB 2 to Appendix J Intelligence Support for MEF JTF-CM Checklist

a. What are the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)?
- What is the (predicted) nature and extent of the contamination?
- Are there likely to be more releases from accidents/incidents? Where?
- What relief assistance does the host nation (HN) want/need?
- Has the Country Team identified local political realities or long term USG goals that affect the Commander's options? How is Embassy set up for CM – RSO? Attache?)
- What Critical Infrastructure must be protected/restored in order to return the HN to normalcy?
- What can the Commander use as the first indicators of adverse impact by his/her forces on the HN?

b. What organizations are providing relief?
- What type of service are they providing?
- What is the home base of unit/organization(s) involved?
- What are the intended results of their efforts?
- What were the date(s)/location(s) of unit/organization arrived in the operation area?
- What is the HN government structure for CM? (led by Civil Defense? Military? National Police Force? Ministerial Level?)

c. What is the nature and extent of contamination?
- What are its characteristics (acute/latent/cumulative) on people/agriculture/environment/equipment?
- How is it recognized/measured for practical management/formal confirmation?
- Who is (can) actually monitoring the contamination?
- Is it mobile/immobile? (evaporate/adhere/dissolve in water)
- Does it react to make something worse? (what/how?)
- What personal protection is appropriate/expedient/dangerous?
- What infrared photography is available to assist in determining the extent of distressed vegetation (just prior to the release or repeated multi-season, multi-year photos to allow separation of normal seasonal distress from chemical distress)?
- Was there a preexisting contingency plan for the site (or a nearby facility) the predicted nature & extent of a release?

d. What are other possible sources of additional accidents/incidents?
- Location of HAZMAT(CBRN) stockpiles?
- Quantities at each location?
- HAZWASTE locations?
- Municipal waste sites?
- Location of chemical plants (both industrial and military)?
- Types of chemicals at each plant?
- Quantities of each type of chemical at each site?
- Location(s) of nuclear reactor(s)

- Location(s) of prepared decontamination site(s) (both industrial and military)?
- Location(s) of CBRN transportation systems?
- Type(s) of CBRN transportation system(s)?
- Quantity of CBRN transportation system(s)?
- HAZWASTE transportation systems?
- Location(s) of decontamination equipment?
- Type(s) of decontamination equipment?
- Quantity of decontamination equipment?
- Level of CBRN training received?
- Type(s) of CBRN detection equipment?
- Type(s) of nuclear detection equipment?
- Quantity of nuclear detection equipment?
- Type(s) of chemical detection equipment?
- Quantity of chemical detection equipment?
- Type(s) biological detection equipment?
- Quantity of biological detection equipment?
- At what level is the releasing authority for NBC weapons?
- Has individual CBRN equipment been issued?
- If so, to what unit(s) and location(s)?

e. Who currently provides security to the relief area of operations?

- Who
- Military Forces
- Paramilitary Forces
- Irregular Forces
- Others
- Weapons/Equipment Used
- Leadership
- Location(s) (Grid)/Area(s) of Operation
- Method of Operations
- Mobility
- Method of Supply
- Last Known Incidence Involving Violence

f. What is the medical situation in the area where the relief effort is to take place?

- Prevalent Diseases/Injuries
- Source of Infection/Injuries
- Percentage of Population Infected/Injures within the Operational Area
- Treatment Methods, Quarantine and Other Controls
- Hospitals/Clinics (Military and Civilian)
- Location(s)
- Host Nation or Sponsored by Outside Agencies (i.e. Red Cross, World Health Organization, U.N., etc.)
- Capabilities/Level of Care
- Number of Beds

- Burn Units
- Types of Equipment
- Medical Personnel
- Type of Personnel (Doctors, Nurses, Medics, etc.)
- Level of Training
- Number of Personnel
- Emergency Medical Services
- Air/Ground Medical Evacuation Capabilities
- Medical Supplies
- Type of Supplies/Medications on hand
- Availability of Medications
- Availability of CBRN treatment materiel
- Blood Availability
- Logistics/Control Procedures
- Shortages/Problems
- Immunization Program/Type
- Significant Local Occupational Health Issues in AOR?
- Disabilities /Chemical Sensitivities/Exposures that create vulnerable populations

g. What is the sociological and cultural makeup?
   - Average Age
   - Average Educational Level
   - Literacy Rate
   - Type of Family System
   - Language Spoken (Both Primary/Secondary)
   - Typical Diet
   - Average Caloric Intake (Men, Woman and Children)
   - Customs
   - Basic Physical Condition
   - Morale and Discipline
   - Special Historic Information about the People
   - Race and Religion
   - Racial, Tribal and Ethnic Group(s)
   - Social Mores of Note
   - Taboos of the Population (Concerning Sex, Religion, Politics, Medicine, Alcohol and Hospitality)
   - Differences, Tensions and Disputes
   - Roles/Duties of Woman
   - Typical Daily Routine
   - Political Affiliation
   - Common Expressions/Gestures
h. What type of equipment is in the country?
   - Telecommunication/Information Systems
   - Equipment Nomenclature/Systems

- Quality and Procedures
- Level of Maintenance
- Problems with the Systems
- Information Systems
- Civilian & Government Radio/Television Facilities
- Newspaper/Magazines, Posters, Billboards/Graffiti and Handouts/Leaflets
- Vehicles
- Nomenclature/Type
- Inventory and Allocation Plan
- Level of Maintenance/Operability
- Maintenance Facilities
- Frequency of Use
- Engineering and Demolitions Equipment
- Nomenclature/Type
- Inventory and Allocation Plan
- Level of Maintenance/Operability
- Frequency Use
- Aircraft/Airports
- Nomenclature/Type
- Inventory and Allocation Plan
- Level of Maintenance/Operability
- Maintenance Facilities
- Frequency of Use (Take Off/Landings Per Day)

i. Where are the logistics and food distribution points?

- Type of Supply (Food)
- Adequacy
- Method(s) of Distribution
- Storage Site(s)
- Means of Transportation

j. What is the geography in the operations area?

- Standard basic geographic information (see MCIA GIR Part A):
- Surface Configuration;
- Topography;
- Meteorology;
- Hydrology;
- Vegetation;
- Points of Entry.
- Pipelines as critical infrastructure or obstacle (see Chapter 18)
- Man made obstacles/features that impede/channel the flow of displaced persons
- Man made obstacles/features that impede the flow of relief
- Items of critical infrastructure that could be damaged by the flow of displaced persons

k. What are the lines of communication and transportation?

- Describe the Communications and Transportation Networks
- Condition and Use of Highways/Roads (See Chapter 12)
- Conditions and Use of Railways (See Chapter 11)
- Condition and Use of Civil Aviation Facilities (See Chapter 6)
- Condition and Use of Inland Waterways/Ports (See Chapter 2&8)
- Areas Controlled by Government Forces
- Area(s) Controlled or Influenced by Other Forces

l. What types of agriculture and livestock are in the country?

- Main Crops Produced
- Farm Production Distribution Method(s)
- Plants and Wildlife
- Edible
- Poisonous
- Medical Value

m. Where is availability the of water?

- Location
- Potability
- Transportability
- Sanitation

n. What are potential manmade facilities to aid relief operation (specify location(s) by best available method: geo/UTM/grid coordinates/reference points/etc)?

- Bridges
- Airfields
- Dams
- Power Plant(s) Substation(s)
- POL Facilities
- Communication Facilities
- Others

o. What is the present state of the economy where relief efforts are to be performed?

- Cost of Living
- Employment
- Governmental Subsidies
- Percentage of Unemployment
- Price Control
- Availability of Goods and Services
- Existence of Black Markets
- Manifestation of Poverty
- Welfare Projects/Social Services
- Host Government/Local Charities
- Foreign Governments and/or Agencies
- Manifestation of Social Discontent

p. What constitutes appropriate displaced person facilities?

- What is the accepted standard for turnover of an existing camp to NGO/PVO?
- Where should Displaced Civilian Centers (DCCs) be placed?

APPENDIX K

GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

AE	Aeromedical Evacuation
AEC	Agency Emergency Coordinator
AECC	Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center
AECE	Aeromedical Evacuation Control Element
AECM	Aeromedical Evacuation Crew Member
AELT	Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team
AID	Agency for International Development
ALC	Agency Logistics Center
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMTA	Agricultural Marketing Transition Act
AOC	Army Operations Center
ARAC	Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
ARC	American Red Cross
ASH	Assistant Secretary for Health
AWD	Available Without Declaration
B&I	Business and Industrial Loan Program
C/B	Chemical/Biological
CAP	Civil Air Patrol
CAR	Congressional Affairs Representative
CC	Coordination Center
CCP	Casualty Collection Point
CCP	Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program
CDBG	Community Development Block Grant
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDRG	Catastrophic Disaster Response Group
CEPPO	Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief Pacific
CLO	Congressional Liaison Officer
CMC	Crisis Management Center
CNS	Corporation for National Service
CONUS	Continental United States
CPD	Community Planning and Development
CR	Community Relations
CRO	Congressional Relations Officer CRP Conservation Reserve Program
CWA	Clean Water Act
DAE	Disaster Assistance Employee
DALO	Disaster Area Liaison Officer
DASHO	Designated Agency Safety and Health Official
DCE	Defense Coordinating Element
DCLO	Deputy Congressional Liaison Officer

DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DEST	Domestic Emergency Support Team
DFC	Disaster Finance Center
DFCO-M	Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Mitigation
DFO	Disaster Field Office
DISC	Disaster Information Systems Clearinghouse
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DMORT	Disaster Mortuary Team DOC Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOEd	Department of Education
DOI	Department of the Interior
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOL	Department of Labor
DOMS	Director of Military Support
DOS	Department of State
DOS-A/DCP	Department of State, Office of Diplomatic Contingency Programs
DOT	Department of Transportation
DRC	Disaster Recovery Center
DRF	Disaster Relief Fund
DRM	Disaster Recovery Manager
DRSF	Disaster Response Support Facilities
DSO	Disaster Safety Officer
DTMS	Disaster Transportation Management System
DUA	Disaster Unemployment Assistance
DWI	Disaster Welfare Information

EC	Emergency Coordinator
ECS	Emergency Communications Staff
ECWAG	Emergency Community Water Assistance Grants
EDA	Economic Development Administration
EEI	Essential Element of Information
EICC	Emergency Information and Coordination Center
EIDL	Economic Injury Disaster Loans
EM	Emergency Management
EMRT	Emergency Medical Response Team
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
EMT	Emergency Management Team
EMWIN	Emergency Managers' Weather Information Network
E.O.	Executive Order
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ERL	Environmental Research Laboratories
ERT	Emergency Response Team
ERT	Environmental Response Team
ERT-A	Emergency Response Team — Advance Element
ERT-N	National Emergency Response Team
ESF	Emergency Support Function
ESFLG	Emergency Support Function Leaders Group
ESP	Electric Service Priority
EST	Emergency Support Team
EWP	Emergency Watershed Protection

FAO	Federal Approving Official
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FCC	Federal Coordinating Center
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FDIC	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FECC	Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FESC	Federal Emergency Support Coordinator
FHWA	Federal Highway Administration
FNS	Food and Nutrition Service
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FRERP	Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
FRMAC	Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
FRP	Federal Response Plan
FS	Forest Service
FSA	Farm Service Agency
FTS	Federal Telecommunications Service
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GAR	Governor's Authorized Representative
GIS	Geographic Information System
GPMRC	Global Patient Movement Requirements Center
GSA	General Services Administration
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HMGP	Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HQ	Headquarters
HQAMC	Headquarters Air Mobility Command
HQUSACE	Headquarters U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
HQUSAF	Headquarters U.S. Air Force
HSO	Human Services Officer
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
ICS	Incident Command System
ICU	Information Coordination Unit
IFG	Individual and Family Grant
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IRR	Initial Response Resources
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
IRT	Initial Response Team
IST	Incident Support Team
IST-A	Incident Support Team — Advance Element
J-4/JCS	Medical Readiness Division, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Information Center
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JPMT	Joint Patient Movement Team

JRMPO	Joint Regional Medical Planning Office
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTPA	Job Training Partnership Act
JTRB	Joint Telecommunications Resources Board
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LIMS	Logistics Information Management System
MA	Mission Assignment
MAC	Mapping and Analysis Center
MAC	Mission Assignment Coordinator
MASF	Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility
MATTS	Mobile Air Transportable Telecommunications System
MCC	Movement Coordination Center
MERRT	Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team
MERS	Mobile Emergency Response Support
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOC	MERS Operations Center
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MREs	Meals-Ready-to-Eat
MSCA	Military Support to Civil Authority
MSU	Management Support Unit
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCC	National Coordinating Center
NCP	National Contingency Plan
NCS	National Communications System
NCS/DISA -GOSC	NCS/Defense Information Systems Agency-Global Operations Security Center
NCSRM	NCS Regional Manager
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NECC	National Emergency Coordination Center
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NICC	National Interagency Coordination Center
NIFC	National Interagency Fire Center
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOS	National Ocean Service
N/P	Not Provided
NPSC	National Processing Service Center
NRC	National Response Center
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRCS	Natural Resources Conservation Service
NRS	National Oil and Hazardous Substances Response System
NRT	National Response Team
NS/EP	National Security/Emergency Preparedness
NSC	National Security Council
NSF	National Strike Force
NTSP	National Telecommunications Support Plan
NVOAD	National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

NWR	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Weather Radio
NWS	National Weather Service
OC	Operations Center
OCHAMPUS	Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
OET	Office of Emergency Transportation
OFM	Office of Financial Management
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPA	Oil Pollution Act
OPAC	On-Line Payment and Collection System
OPHS	Office of Public Health and Science
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OSC	On-Scene Commander
OSC	On-Scene Coordinator
OSC	Operations Support Center
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSTP	Office of Science and Technology Policy
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PBS	Public Buildings Service
PD	Presidential Declaration
PDA	Preliminary Damage Assessment
PDASH	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PMS	Payments Management System
PNP	Private Nonprofit
POA	Point of Arrival
POC	Point of Contact
POD	Point of Departure
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PRA	Patient Reporting Activity
RAP	Radiological Assistance Program
RC&D	Resource Conservation and Development
RCP	Region Oil and Hazardous Pollution Contingency Plan
RD	Regional Director
REAC/TS	Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
REC	Regional Emergency Coordinator
RECP	Regional Emergency Services Communications Planner
REP	Regional Evacuation Point
REPLO	Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
RERT	Radiological Emergency Response Team
RETCO	Regional Emergency Transportation Coordinator
RFA	Request for Federal Assistance
RHA	Regional Health Administrator
RHS	Rural Housing Service
RIC	Reconstruction Information Center
RISC	Regional Interagency Steering Committee
RMA	Risk Management Agency

ROC	Regional Operations Center
RR	Response and Recovery
RRIS	Rapid Response Information System
RRT	Regional Response Team
RSPA	Research and Special Programs Administration
RTF	Response Task Force
RUS	Rural Utilities Service
SA	Supplemental Appropriation
SARA	Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SBA	Small Business Administration
SCO	State Coordinating Officer
SIOC	Strategic Information and Operations Center
SITREP	Situation Report
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSA	Social Security Administration
SSC	Scientific Support Coordinator
STOLS	System to Locate Survivors
SUPSALV	Supervisor of Salvage and Diving
TAES	Tactical Aeromedical Evacuation System
TIMACS	Telecommunications Information Management and Control System
TLC	Territory Logistics Center
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
TREAS	Department of the Treasury
TSP	Telecommunications Service Priority
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
UC	Unified Command
U.S.	United States
U.S.C.	U.S. Code
US&R	Urban Search and Rescue
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USACOM	U.S. Atlantic Command
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
USPS	U.S. Postal Service
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
VA	Department of Veterans Affairs
VAL	Voluntary Agency Liaison
VIP	Very Important Person
VISTA	Volunteers in Service to America
VOAD	Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
VOLAG	Voluntary Agency
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

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